

Chron Ref: CF/NYH/OSEB/HST/1996-041
File Sub: CF/HST/INT/HEY-001/M

Interview with E.J.R. Heyward

Conducted by
Mrs. Margaret Catley-Carlson
July 14, 1983



UNICEF Alternate Inventory Label



Rcf0006C3F

Item # CF/RAD/USAA/DB01/1996-0091

ExR/Code: CF/HST/INT/HEY-001/M

Interview E. J. R. Heyward by Margaret Catley-Carlson: Cut
Date Label Printed 4/23/2001

Cover + 33 pp + 3b

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* Mr. Heyward came to UNICEF as Deputy Executive Director (Operations) in April 1949 and in 1975 he became Senior, Deputy Executive Director with the rank of Assistant Secretary General a post he held until his retirement in September 1981. From 1947 to 1949 he was a member of the Australian Mission to the UN and the Australian representative on the UNICEF Executive Board. Earlier he worked in the Department of Labour and National Service in Australia. In his graduate education he majored in economics at the London School of Economics. In 1981 Mr. Heyward was awarded the Order of Australia "in recognition of his services with UNICEF."

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Interview with Mr. E.J.R. Heyward
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14 July 1983

Board Delegate

Catley-Carlson: When did you come to UNICEF?

Heyward: I came to New York in March 1947 and was one of those sitting on the UNICEF Executive Board with the Australian delegation from that time on.

Special Mission to Greece

As a Board delegate I was given a special mission for UNICEF to go to Greece, where it was alleged that the UNICEF assistance to children was helping the communist group - that must have been in the winter of 1947.

Catley-Carlson: Were you given the special assignment as a Board delegate?

Heyward: Yes. Not by the Board, but by the Executive Director. The question was raised in the Board by the Greek Delegation, and so the Executive Director decided to send somebody to look into it. And so I did.

Catley-Carlson: This was one of your first problem-solving missions for UNICEF! What was the resolution of that one?

Heyward: The resolution was that really there was no problem. It wasn't materially possible for UNICEF assistance to go into dissident-held areas.

Catley-Carlson: So the problem solved itself?

Heyward: Yes.

Board in early years

Catley-Carlson: And what was the function of the Board at that time compared to now, because that was when UNICEF had not yet switched its mandate towards children in developing countries? Was the function of the Board markedly different than it has become since?

Heyward: The content, of course, had to be different, but the general approach was not so different, I don't think.

Catley-Carlson: There was still a Programme and a Budget and

Heyward: Yes. At that time the Board worked according to a different timetable. As you know, nobody expected UNICEF to last very long, so, when it had received some additional

contributions, there would be another session of the Board to approve what programmes were to be funded by the money. There were four or five sessions of the Board during a year at that time.

UNICEF life expectancy

Catley-Carlson: And people honestly believed they were working towards a four or five-year time frame?

Heyward: I don't know that they thought they were working towards a four or five-year time frame. I don't think they did.

Catley-Carlson: You mean not that long?

Funding

Heyward: I mean not that long. When UNICEF was actually founded, a lot of people thought that the residual assets from UNRRA would be all the money it would get and that after that it would fold up. In fact, the residual assets from UNRRA turned out to be much less than they thought - about \$22 million - and they were a lot longer coming, so meanwhile Maurice Pate scrounged around and got food, money, and special contributions.

Catley-Carlson: Are you saying that UNICEF was not envisaged to be a fund-raising agency?

Heyward: Perhaps not. I don't think that was specified. The original resolution said that it might receive contributions, but a lot of people thought it wouldn't get them anyway.

Catley-Carlson: How soon did Maurice Pate start fundraising?

Heyward: Before he got any money, he hired a basement room in Washington and a secretary at his expense, and started work. Of course at that time people thought about feeding children in Europe and the only people who had any food was the USA, basically, so he got food from US Departments.

Catley-Carlson: And did Canada and Australia and other countries...?

Heyward: They came in shortly after that, also with contributions in kind and money.

Staffing

Catley-Carlson: Why would people work for UNICEF at that time, if it was going to have such a short-term duration? Did this not affect the ability to take on people? Even before we get to the question of how you came to UNICEF - when you were on the Board, it seems logical it would have been difficult to find people to work for an organization whose lifespan appeared to be so limited.

Heyward: Well the general attitude at that time was rather different. Of course there were a lot of people being demobilized from various organizations, including UNRRA, and since nobody thought that the organization was going to be very long-lived, there wasn't the concern about proper geographical distribution, career-building and all that, and people were recruited who could do what they were willing to do in an immediate job. There was a big influx of people from UNRRA, from the International Red Cross, the national Red Crosses, the Friends organization, and so on.

Heyward joins staff, Pate style

Catley-Carlson: Why did Maurice Pate ask you to come into UNICEF?

Heyward: I understand he was told by the Board that he must have somebody, because gradually things got a little more complicated and larger, and it was recognized and urged by the Board that he needed some additional help. I think he felt that I would do the least harm!

Catley-Carlson: I see. A mild-mannered man who wasn't going to interfere in the way Maurice wanted to run things!

Heyward: Maurice was very permissive - he gave a lot of confidence to people and as long as he felt the lines were right, he didn't want to be looking over their shoulders all the time. Not that he wanted to run everything himself, but even so there was too much for him to do, as he spent a lot of time as Executive Director visiting the field.

Catley-Carlson: Why did you agree to join?

Heyward: I liked the work. You said, "what about careers?", so for the first period I could get a period of detachment from my Government service and it was only later that it was necessary to resign.

Catley-Carlson: Now, your own coming in - can you relate that to the transition period? When you came in, was UNICEF still working primarily with the children of Europe and the children who had been very upset by the war, or had the focus already changed? Can you talk a little bit about that?

Heyward: Well I came in on April Fool's Day 1949, and at that time work was starting in the developing countries. I think the Asian office had started in Manila in 1948, and in 1949 also things were starting in Latin America, but UNICEF didn't receive its actual mandate to continue in those countries until General Assembly decisions taken between 1950 and 1953.

Catley-Carlson: How many people, roughly, were there when you came to UNICEF? What was the structure like?

Heyward: Quite a lot of people, several hundred I would say. Because there were quite a lot of people in the European countries. Each European country that was being served

had a mission in it, probably with between five and ten people. The big organization was the Paris Office, which was bigger than Headquarters.

Catley-Carlson: How many people would have been at Headquarters?

Heyward: Maybe in the seventies.

Catley-Carlson: About seventy to a hundred, at that time. And what was the structure at Headquarters?

Heyward: There was a Director of Operations, Mr. Karl Borders and there was a Programme Division, Procurement, Finance, and Personnel obviously.

Catley-Carlson: All put into one, or separate Divisions?

Heyward: All separate Divisions, I believe.

Money problems

Catley-Carlson: And what were the main organizational problems at that time? Money, communications? Was money a problem?

Heyward: Yes, money was a problem all the time. The basic activity during that period was child feeding, therefore the great question was 'how to get the food'. Food was not a surplus commodity at that time so that had to be begged from the producing countries, mainly USA, Canada, Australia. Some money to move it and administer it also had to be begged, so money was a continuous problem. I would say a great deal of activity centred around money, and the use of money.

Rajchman

Dr. Rajchman, who was a remarkable man, a remarkable Chairman (he was a full-time Chairman, really, though unpaid) also gave a lot of time and had many ideas, and he was always looking for something more permanent.

Milk conservation

Therefore we came, under his pushing, into the new types of support in the European countries, so they could carry on giving milk to children when the external supplies dried up.

Penicillin production

He was also very much concerned with certain medical supplies, particularly penicillin. At that time the source of supplies of penicillin were international, and he had the fear that they might be dried up by war or other disturbance; he felt that there should be a source of penicillin production in different parts of the world. With technical help from Connaught Laboratories in Canada production was started in Chile and India and maybe in France.

Yearly contribution pattern

Catley-Carlson: But from what you are saying, the early years were very much focussed on the acquisition of goods and the money to move them around. How long was it before countries began to accept the notion that, on a yearly basis, they should be making contributions to what we now call 'general resources'?

Heyward: I guess that happened only in the 1950's. When the function of the Fund was changed - late in 1950, the contributions to UNICEF fell precipitously, in a rather sad way. It seemed to reflect that while people were willing to contribute to children in Europe, the willingness to contribute to children in the developing countries was vastly less. So contributions fell and had to be built up again from an extremely low point, in 1951.

Catley-Carlson: That must have been a terribly difficult time?

Heyward: Yes it was.

Catley-Carlson: What happened? Did people just cut down on their operations?

Cutback in European operations

Heyward: The European operations were cut back, obviously, because it was agreed that the need was over and so a lot of staff left at that time, and gradually the long-term work in the developing countries grew.

Catley-Carlson: Tell me, just as a parenthesis - one of the continuing questions in UNICEF has always been whether UNICEF should have activities which are related to the European child, and the recent debate with the Geneva office, as we talk in 1983, is still centred on this question. Part of this, I'm sure, has historical roots - the familiarity of Geneva with the genesis of the organization in Europe.

Was there suggestion at this time that those offices should stay open under some capacity, and was there a great debate about this or was it pretty well accepted, when the focus changed, that the European offices should close down, with the exception of Paris, obviously?

Heyward: I think it was pretty well accepted that the various country missions should close down. Paris continued to follow certain things, namely the milk conservation work which continued for some time after that, but the main function changed to a "regional office" for the Eastern Mediterranean and Africa. Perhaps one of the reasons why that could have been accepted was agreement that the activities they were doing need not be continued.

Current concern with European child

The case that has been made for concern for children in Europe concerns problems that were not at the forefront of people's minds then and in which UNICEF offices were active.

Catley-Carlson: No, the problems for the child in the post-industrial society were not exactly the crux of difficulty in the 1950's, in Europe.

Heyward: No, nor the children of immigrants.

Shift to developing countries

Fund-raising problem

Catley-Carlson: Why do you think it was difficult to get money after the change in focus? You have said this obviously related to less willingness to come up with money for children in the developing world. Presumably at this time that also reflected the fact that donor countries didn't have development aid programmes? Governments didn't have pockets labelled 'development' and so therefore there was no convenient pocket to reach into to help UNICEF.

Heyward: Right. And the concept maybe was rather weak also.

Catley-Carlson: I want to ask you about that next. You have noted that there were some real problems in getting money in the early years, after the mandate shifted.

Mandate

Were there similar problems in working out a mandate for UNICEF in these countries? Let's divide the response into several areas: first of all, a mandate in terms of the Board: was there a unified view in the Board of what UNICEF ought to be doing once its focus shifted to developing countries? How did the mandate evolve in the early years?

Heyward: It evolved in an extremely pragmatic way, which has advantages and disadvantages. Certainly if an agency were being started up now, I could imagine several years of consultation and planning. When UNICEF was started, the concept was a continuation on a reduced scale, for children only, of what had been going on before.

Rajchman influence

While Rajchman was an intellectual person, his experience also was related to Europe and to China because the League of Nations, where he had been head of the health section, didn't deal with anything outside Europe except China. Rajchman was squeezed out by the McCarthy business, so his guidance was gone after 1950.

Pate influence

Maurice Pate was extremely pragmatic and not very interested in intellectual questions, so the basic assumption was that what had been done in Europe was a good thing to do in the developing countries. So, there were child feeding programmes, school feeding programmes, there was even some distribution of clothes. Then it was thought that a long-term investment such as milk conservation would be a good thing, and I mentioned the penicillin. At a rather early stage there was a relation with WHO.

WHO

When UNICEF first started, WHO didn't exist but there was an Interim Commission for WHO.

Catley-Carlson: So UNICEF preceded WHO?

Heyward: Oh yes.

Catley-Carlson: I hadn't realized that. So the continuing concern over the years as to whether UNICEF was duplicating the work of other organizations, were not a concern in the early years?

Heyward: No. But the Interim Commission of WHO started to be concerned about that and I suppose people thought that Dr. Rajchman would have liked to have been the Director-General of WHO, and therefore some people viewed him as a sort of rival.

Catley-Carlson: Were there some that suggested that there were enough missionaries and church groups doing this sort of work and, therefore, there wasn't the need for international organizations?

Heyward: I don't remember that. Dr. Martha Eliot was concerned with the founding of WHO as well as being one of the Board delegates of UNICEF. In those days, the Children's Bureau was very living and active in the United States. The first two representatives from the United States were Katherine Lenroot, who was the head of the Children's Bureau and Dr. Martha Eliot who was her deputy and later on Dr. Martha Eliot succeeded her. She also made an important intellectual input. She was also a delegate to WHO Interim Commission, and later the WHO Assembly.

JCHP: BCG, Yaws, Malaria

She brought about the first agreement setting up the Joint Health Policy Committee. They descended on UNICEF and said we must agree to this.

Catley-Carlson: Really the Joint Health Committee goes right back to the very beginning of WHO?

Heyward: It represented this Interim Commission before the WHO agreement and charter had been signed.

Catley-Carlson: What things did the JCHP look at in its early years?

Heyward: In Europe there had been a very important programme of BCG vaccination because tuberculosis was a big aftermath of the war privations. The Scandinavian Red Cross Societies had been running that, but they began to run out of money and so a Joint Enterprise was formed between UNICEF and the Scandinavian Red Cross Societies under the direction of Dr. Johannes Holm. The BCG campaign was continued in Europe, and later on it was thought that it would also be good for the developing countries. So the Joint Health Policy

Committee oversaw that, and also other support activities that UNICEF might undertake in the health field.

Communicable disease control

At that time there were rather strong communicable disease programmes in WHO. (They still continue to be strong even though the WHO official objective has changed. That great group of professional people stayed in WHO and you could say now distorts the approach to primary health care). There was a group of people on tuberculosis with whom Dr. Mahler was associated - he was the project leader in India; there was a group of people on yaws and UNICEF was very strongly involved in that in several countries - Haiti, and Indonesia, for example and yaws was effectively eliminated as a public health problem and the related disease of Kala-azar in Iraq. Later on came the malaria eradication campaign. In all those fields, the WHO leaders were very strong, and they brought UNICEF along in their wake.

Concern with types of supplies

You were saying 'how did the Board look at its mandate?'.

Catley-Carlson: Yes - what sorts of things did the Board talk about during those years?

Heyward: They used have agonizing discussions about, 'Is it right for UNICEF to be doing this?', which I could understand, what I couldn't understand were discussion on 'Is it right for UNICEF to be supplying a particular form of supply?', which to me was the wrong question. The only way to answer that was, 'Should UNICEF be supporting this activity and is the supply necessary for this activity?'

Catley-Carlson: What do you mean? Can you give an example? Should UNICEF be supporting this kind of supply? What sort of precise questions?

Heyward: That could come up about anything. Is it alright for UNICEF to supply filing cabinets and typewriters to the offices that were administering these programmes? Is such and such a piece of machinery too complicated and sophisticated, not for the country to handle, but for UNICEF as a "children's fund" to supply.

There was also a doctrine that nothing should be supplied if it could be made locally -- a carryover from the European post-war situation, where the problem was always foreign exchange.

Catley-Carlson: And the Board would debate these questions.

Heyward: Yes, the Board, and also that was a matter for Adelaide Sinclair. It was a matter of conscience for her, which I could never understand. But she used to really worry about

such questions, and blithely turn down supply things that she thought were inappropriate.

Catley-Carlson: You mean the Board used to approve supply lists?

Heyward: Probably they saw them but rather than approving whole supply lists, maybe what were regarded as controversial questions would be brought up. The Board, these dear people, would sit around in New York, and say, not 'Is it right for UNICEF to be supporting yaws?', but 'Is it right for UNICEF to be supporting this type of supply?' e.g. vehicles for a yaws campaign.

Catley-Carlson: What about the choice of countries? How did the Board make decisions there and how did the expansion - the choice of countries basically, that UNICEF would move into - how was this made? This must have become a very acute question as time moved on and more and more countries became independent.

Heyward: Yes, it was, but that wasn't really so acute to people as this question of the type of activity.

Catley-Carlson: Filing cabinets were more important than whether you moved into Thailand or not?

Concern with main problems of childhood: Secault

Heyward: Right. It was only in the years 1960 to 1963 that the Board made a very fundamental decision to try to help countries with what were agreed to be the main problems of children in those countries about which action was feasible. That was done under the impulse of Dr. Sicault, who came in as Deputy Director of Planning. He had come from Morocco where he had general responsibility as Director General of Health, but he had been particularly interested in children (which is a large part of health in developing countries) and he had a more general view.

Catley-Carlson: So that was the origin of the idea that you start from something that we now call strategic analysis of the problem of children, and that the type of assistance would then vary from country to country according to what this analysis would yield?

Heyward: Right.

Catley-Carlson: That was a big step.

Heyward: Yes.

Catley-Carlson: Was it a difficult step?

Heyward: It was. It was difficult to persuade the Board that it was worth looking into that question, because they thought if you get any money it should be going to feed little children. I'm exaggerating, but...

Catley-Carlson: This debate still goes on and always will.

Heyward: The Swedes, for example, were also inclined to be opposed to that enquiry. They at that time, in my view, thought that you should be doing in developing countries exactly what you did in Sweden, and their question to UNICEF was 'Why are you not supporting day-care centers and pediatric services? These absolutely couldn't have been supported in developing countries, but as you mentioned before, since there were no development assistance programmes people didn't know that.'

Catley-Carlson: And very little international travel.

Heyward: Yes. I remember successfully persuading the Swedish Delegation that, since they had these questions, the way to resolve them was to support an enquiry into what actually was needed in developing countries. I think they accepted that argument, so there was a certain amount of enquiry then in developing countries the results of which were included in a book edited by Dr. Sicault for co-publication by UNICEF. It now looks to be very primitive, but it was the first attempt to begin to assess the situation and to get the Board off these agonizing decisions of 'should we be supporting this or that'.

Because of the strength of these communicable disease sections from WHO, vis-à-vis the MCH section, which was and remains very weak compared to them, UNICEF got led into all those basic public health programmes which had a bearing on children but were not specifically focussed on children in a way that maternal and child health and training of village midwives, setting up health centers and so, on would have been.

Education

Catley-Carlson: In that period, when those initial analyses came back with the idea that education was also an important part of a child's development, what was the Board's reaction at that point?

Heyward: There had been great controversy and that was one of the agonizing decisions, 'Should we go into education?'.

Catley-Carlson: Had we been doing some education before that time?

Heyward: Health education, but not education as such, and that was never decided positively, but what the decisions of 1960 brought was that if it was agreed to be a main factor affecting children in a country, then UNICEF could cooperate in it.

Catley-Carlson: And the Board went along with that - and has been debating it ever since in terms of what this actually means in terms of educational content?

Heyward: Yes.

Catley-Carlson: That transition was probably the most profound, or the second most profound, after deciding that UNICEF had a mandate outside of the children principally affected by war and into developing countries. That would presumably have been the second most profound change within UNICEF - the decision to base the programme on the needs identified in the country.

Staff implications

It must have had tremendous implications for UNICEF staff, because somebody who is awfully good at ordering penicillin, offloading it off the truck and helping with an immunization campaign is not necessarily the same kind of person who can analyse the needs of a country. Now, how did the Organization start to shift itself?

Heyward: Yes, it was an extremely difficult thing to do, largely because of what I mentioned earlier, that people had been recruited under other perspectives. Of course, at that time, the theory was that the leadership would come from specialized agencies and UNICEF was supposed to be a supply agency, therefore UNICEF probably was not supposed to make this analysis.

Catley-Carlson: But what specialized agency existed in 1960 that could have done this analysis?

Heyward: None.

Catley-Carlson: I see - that was a just a practical deterrent to the theory?

Heyward: Well the thought was that you should set up an international mission in which many agencies would be represented. And if you did that, of course, then all these aspects would be looked after, but that never worked in practice.

Catley-Carlson: And 20 people sitting around a table would agree instantly on what the needs of children were in one country. I sometimes think we have moved on. So then UNICEF started these analyses of the problems of children. Who did them? Did the same people who did logistics management try to turn their hands to these?

Heyward: I don't remember the answer to that question very clearly. I would guess that the situation differed very much from country to country. In some countries, there were good people, resident in the country from WHO, who could give a great deal in that. In others there were not. Certain consultant visits were arranged. I can't tell you what was the volume of that. The countries' own strength in analysing also differed very much from place to place.

Geographic expansion

Africa

You were asking earlier how was it that the Board decided so easily to help all these countries. That was partly due to the transformation of the colonial system. When the countries of Africa, for example, were colonies, then the U.K. and France sitting on the Board asked for help for their colonies and some work started. When they became independent obviously it wasn't a question of cutting it off because they had become independent.

Catley-Carlson: So UNICEF went in before independence in a number of these countries?

Latin America

Heyward:

Now Latin America was independent but had always had some people on the Board and they rather rapidly raised the question that we must develop co-operation in Latin American countries. There was a Representative of Brazil who made a very strong point of the infant mortality rate in Latin American countries compared with others.

Catley-Carlson: So the rough pattern of establishment was what? I have always had the impression that we started most heavily in Asia in the beginning and moved out from there.

Asia

Heyward:

That is true that we started in Asia. We started in China as a war-devastated country and moved into other Asian countries. Of course, Asia will remain large because the child population is so large.

Middle East

We moved into the Middle East where there was a United Nations involvement already with the Palestinian refugees. We moved out from that and moved into Latin America, and Africa came a little bit later, but within these first years around '49-'50-'55, UNICEF spread its assistance into those continents.

European office role in Africa

Catley-Carlson: A lot of the African programmes, though, were run from the European office for a long time.

Heyward: The European office was responsible both for Africa and the Middle East.

Catley-Carlson: How did we do that? Tell me about it - what would people do? It seems inconceivable now, when we have offices throughout Africa and the Middle East, that this was done actually from Europe.

Heyward: Yes. The Director in Europe, particularly when it was Charles Egger, spent most of his time outside Europe travelling to Africa and the Middle East. Gradually various offices were set up.

Catley-Carlson: But during the period of direct administration from Europe, what this would mean in effect is that UNICEF was ordering supplies and shipping them to a receiving agency in the country. But then having very little really to do with what happened to them after that point. Or am I wrong?

Heyward: Yes and no. There was always a system of visiting a country to see what was going on. For example, in West Africa, there was Dr. Roland Marti (deceased) who was the representative for a considerable group of West African countries. He worked out of Dakar if I remember correctly. He had a regular schedule for visiting these countries; he discussed needs with the government people with whom he had established relations of confidence. In the early stages there was also a colonial backup for those administrations, and he agreed with them rather rapidly as to what they needed and what he would do, and they thought he was practically a saint. But he visited them regularly several times a year to see what was going on, what was being done.

I guess the colonial backup was quite important. France had a medical service which was part of military service. They had a lot of excellent young men in the field promoting programmes, implementing, and standards of implementation were really quite good.

UNIPAC

Catley-Carlson: When was the decision taken to establish UNIPAC as a centre to store goods in warehouses so that they would be available for shipment to these countries? How did this start?

Heyward: I don't remember the date.

Catley-Carlson: 1960s?

Heyward: Perhaps. It wasn't too early. It started in a basement room in the U.N. building, and after they kicked us out, two or three people working there were moved, I believe directly to Copenhagen.

Catley-Carlson: Was this seen by the Board as a major step or was it simply an administrative measure that grew after a time?

Heyward: Rather the latter. It turned out to have a lot of advantages of bulk purchasing, more rapid delivery, ability to use currencies that were limited to expenditure in certain countries. Particularly the Eastern European countries had such terribly long delivery periods - you place the order and they deliver two years later. You didn't have a programme waiting for two years to receive supplies, but they could feed the stock in UNIPAC.

Catley-Carlson: Why was it put in Copenhagen when we had an office in Paris?

Heyward: Because it was regarded as a warehouse and an operation rather than a center of administration. I don't remember why Copenhagen. It had to be in a free port it was thought, not in a city like Paris. It was much smaller when it started, so it wasn't a matter of great interest to the countries which country it would be placed in.

Greeting Cards: National Committees

Catley-Carlson: Another thing that was starting at about that time was the Greeting Card Operation and I think the story is well known of the little girl who had the first greeting card, and these were produced. Was this again something that started so small that the Board really didn't take notice or was the question discussed with the Board? How did that get started - in terms of an organization in another business entirely - the production of as fanciful an item as greeting cards?

Heyward: It started on quite a small scale. I don't suppose that anybody foresaw that it would be a...

Catley-Carlson: ...multimillion dollar business.

Heyward: No. The growth was gradual.

Catley-Carlson: It was never a policy issue that was debated?

Heyward: The Board never had a great agony about that. As the national committees came along, they really needed that operation as a means of giving them a 25% handling charge, on which they could make, say, a 5% profit to use in other activities. The growth of national committees was a more important policy question than the greeting cards.

Catley-Carlson: There are two things that have struck me the most in UNICEF. Somebody asked me what are the two most important innovations in UNICEF. I say national committees and national officers. So let us talk about both of these. I am sure I can find others but those have struck me as being not unique because UNESCO also has its national committees, but having such a unique importance to UNICEF. Whose ideas were these? How did they get started? Where did they get started first? What was the original concept of these groups?

Heyward: I'm sorry I can't answer all those questions. Originally they were thought of by the Executive of UNICEF as being very much local fundraising bodies. Maurice Pate was a great 'voluntary' man. He believed much more in a voluntary effort than in a government effort.

Catley-Carlson: Did he invent the idea?

Heyward: You know that there had been a campaign in 1948 starting outside UNICEF but giving a little support to UNICEF -- 'one day's pay' -- and that was organized by a Norwegian, Ahke Ording. That had brought together some national groups with the idea of fundraising for children.

Catley-Carlson: When did national committees start getting together? Do you remember that?

Heyward: No. But reasonably early they started getting together in Europe.

Catley-Carlson: European committees came before the North American committees?

Heyward: Well they started getting together before. Somewhat later they started admitting the North America committees.

Catley-Carlson: Still haven't. But maybe soon they will. They get carbon copies of the invitations to other people and are not allowed to speak, but we are hoping that that will end.

Heyward: The last reunion I went to, the U.S. Committee was present and allowed to speak.

Catley-Carlson: It has been an unnecessarily difficult issue, I think.

Heyward: The national committees each in a sense wanted to become a separate UNICEF and to decide policies and how money should be used. There was a continuous tension in fundraising, whether they control UNICEF information in the country, whether they control contact of UNICEF with the government.

Catley-Carlson: The same things we are still debating today and will be for a long time?

Heyward: For a long time in the beginning they didn't want to be interested in development problems that UNICEF was really facing.

Catley-Carlson: What do you mean?

Heyward: When they had their reunion they didn't think it was natural to ask someone to come and talk to them about the problems UNICEF was facing in the developing countries. I remember going to a reunion representing UNICEF and having the greatest difficulty in getting time to speak.

Catley-Carlson: They want to talk about fundraising and ...

Heyward: ...and their own problems. That was the charitable approach rather than a development approach, which tended to linger on longer there than in UNICEF itself.

Catley-Carlson: The national committee growth and the greeting card growth took off simultaneously.

Heyward: Yes.

Catley-Carlson: Do you want to talk about the greeting card growth? It has really evolved into an extraordinary operation. You had a lot to do with the establishment of the selection committee, for example.

Heyward: That was another conflict and tension with the national committees because they started saying they wanted to use cards selected and printed for their country. A set of cards for each country wouldn't have raised any money. So we set up this other system consisting of three steps: collection of designs; approval of designs by a group which was 50/50 representing national committees and resources people; and allowing each national committee to make a selection of approved designs that they thought would fit their country.

Catley-Carlson: You then brought in art authorities and art historians and experts. When was that done?

Heyward: It was as part of this procedure.

Catley-Carlson: That must have been somewhat resisted.

Heyward: Yes, people were very suspicious about that but after the first couple of meetings of the joint group at which each side looked askance at the other, they gradually found that they had quite a lot of interesting things to say to each other. It was necessary to bring some professionalism into the choice of design, otherwise the Greeting Card Operation would never have gone on.

Catley-Carlson: Has the Greeting Card Operation ever had its own crisis? It seems to have been a very smooth operation from start to finish.

Heyward: Yes. I think it had crises or at least tensions, concerns, conflicts with committees.

Catley-Carlson: Basically it has been a fairly smooth progression from its inception?

Heyward: Yes.

National officers

Catley-Carlson: It is a remarkable organization. Let's jump and talk about the other national officers. We are moving into the realm of personnel and administration but I must say that travelling around visiting UNICEF field offices I have been so extraordinarily impressed by this device of the national professional. How was this established? I understand you were the origin of the whole concept of the national officer.

Heyward:

I might have been. Anyway it seemed to me profoundly absurd that the professional quality of a person was not recognized in his own country. So in order to become an expert he had to be recruited by WHO or someone else and sent over to a country other than his own. As the quality of personnel in developing countries gradually rose, as a result of training efforts, this situation was more and more resented in the countries. On the other hand we couldn't engage these people at international salaries or they couldn't work any more with their colleagues because there was too great a disparity between national and international salaries. So at that time we could engage general service people at local salary scales. Some organizations used to begin to try to hire people as general service, but that was unacceptable to professional people. So we began this national professional officer system which was criticized but not too much, really.

Catley-Carlson: Did the rest of the UN structure accept this innovation?

Heyward: No, but they didn't worry about it too much.

Catley-Carlson: How can that be? I mean you have UN offices around the world and you have different categories; people take notice of them very quickly. There wasn't really that much of a fuss about it?

Heyward: No, I don't think so. I mean things weren't as uniformly organized in those days. UNICEF was a small organization and a bit crazy.

Catley-Carlson: So we got away with it is what you say?

Heyward: Yes.

Catley-Carlson: When was that started? Do you remember?

Heyward: No.

Catley-Carlson: This was basically, as I understand, the idea that you pushed through. Was it a difficult one to get the Organization to accept?

Heyward: No, the Board was quite keen on it. I remember expounding it in a budgetary session. People asked, 'What is your personnel plan, and how do you propose to deal with constantly expanding work and so on?'. We said we were making more use of local people. It was India who asked the question and they said it was a very good plan and they were very glad of it. Following their lead, the Board always supported that.

Decentralization

Catley-Carlson: Another great source of UNICEF's vitality and effectiveness, I think, has been the decentralization to the field offices of a really remarkable degree of

authority. How did that happen and what was the process that led to decentralization? The external auditors have noted that UNICEF is by far the most decentralized of the international bodies and that the UNICEF representative has more authority and responsibility than the head of any other UN office.

Pate/Rajchman influence

Heyward: I would agree with you. I guess it started from the style of Maurice Pate who expected senior people to exercise a great deal of responsibility. He himself worked in the European countries on American relief in the First World War and the Second World War also under such a system, when responsibility had been given to him. He also, in turn, delegated a lot of responsibility to nationals, so that was a part of his style. It was also part of Dr. Rajchman's style, because he was conscious, in contrast to many other U.N. agencies at that time, of the responsibility of national officials.

I say in contrast to other organizations because in general many organizations thought they were going to lay down the law and that international people would come and say to countries, "This is the way to do it", and that that would be followed. Dr. Rajchman always pointed out that the real responsibility if things went wrong would be that of the national official, who would lose his job or worse. So he laid down as a policy for the Organization: "We must be supportive and try to build up national responsibility". After the Technical Assistance programme got going (that must have been ten years later probably) and began to distribute money to agencies for projects required by countries, everybody was forced to that view.

Catley-Carlson: So you are saying that UNICEF was never centralized - that it wasn't a question of a dramatic decision taken to remove from the centre authority to the field, it was always decentralized?

Heyward influence

Heyward: Yes. The only thing we had to be alert for was to counter the constant tendency to centralize. Because of course the people at the Central Office always think that they know better - they can always tell you about the mistakes that the field has made, and it is never visible to them the mistakes they have made or what has been the effect of delays, waiting for decisions to come through and so on. So I regard my contribution to that as trying to be alert and preventing centralization.

Reporting requirements

Catley-Carlson: One of the problems I'm sure you struggled with and I certainly did during my two years here, is how you reconcile that which we both see as enormously important, with the kind of reporting requirements that are necessary, with being able to assure the Board that if they mandate

programmes in certain areas that these are going on, and in effect to have some look in at what is going on. Do you want to talk about that for a while - there are no magic solutions for that process?

Heyward:

No. I don't think we solved that problem well. There was introduced a system for regular reporting to the Board by type of programme, which was supposed to be done every two years. That would have been done usually by a visitor like an expert consultant or an auditor going around the countries and making that report. And of course there were, and still are, annual reports.

It's very difficult for people really to follow those properly, and I think that you have to make a choice - if you really want to follow all that detail, Headquarters would have to build up a very large headquarters - much larger than they have. So what I advocated was that information should be available in the office in the country, and it was the responsibility of the head of that office to follow programmes and to be aware of what needed attention and what was going wrong. It was his responsibility to take corrective action, because the people here never had the same immediate sense of what was going on. If a Headquarters Programme Officer's attention is drained off to a crisis in one country, in human terms he is not following the other countries at the same time. We put the responsibility on the Representatives backed up by regular visits to them. Regional Directors were the key of that visiting system. One struggle about decentralization was not really from Headquarters, but from the Regional Offices to the Country Offices.

Catley-Carlson: Why is that? Did Regional Offices actually have authority at one time? For example, choices of expenditures?

Regional/country office relationships

Heyward:

The Regional Offices existed before the Country Offices, naturally, therefore, they set up administrative programme services. For example a Regional Office would have a supply section, a programme section; and the Country Offices started by being rather subordinate offices, just as now, for example, the about-to-be upgraded office in Mali which has only been allowed an outposted Programme Officer up to now. Similarly, when I was talking about Dr. Roland Marti travelling out of Dakar, the support services for that were in Paris. It was Paris who would have raised detailed supply lists for the specifications and placed the orders and arranged the shipping and so on. His little office couldn't possibly. The same thing with the Bangkok Office, servicing all the countries around Bangkok.

Catley-Carlson: So really, the first stage at field organization was what became Regional Offices which really had the competence, the authority and the personnel and staff. And they had a pretty tight rein on the smaller entities in the countries?

Heyward: Right. And gradually, as the Country Offices became more competent and more responsible people were put in them, they start to build up tension there. There was a management review - possibly by Mr. Michelmore from the U.N. Management Service, who recommended a change in that system, which many of the Regional Directors felt was traumatic and it took years for that to be digested. It was very hard for them to accept the idea that their function was to work with the Country Representatives, to guide them, to help them, to support them, to discuss policy with them, but that didn't mean that their office had to draw up the supply lists, and so on. All the more strange that the resentment from the Country Offices was not really to the Regional Directors, who were always welcome on their visits. The resentment was to the undergrowth under them

Catley-Carlson: The Advisers and

Heyward: Not Advisers, but the Supply Staff would be writing back and saying, "Why do you want two dynamos - one should be sufficient?".

Catley-Carlson: And we don't like the choice of refrigerator you've made.

Heyward: And of course sometimes the Supply people were right.

Present balance

Catley-Carlson: Yes, exactly. Is UNICEF about the right amount decentralized, too decentralized, not sufficiently decentralized? What would be your judgement now?

Heyward: Well, at the time that Mr. Grant came in, I think the time was ripe to try to bring some greater policy direction to the Country Offices.

Catley-Carlson: Yes, we almost got to the stage that if a Country Office did it, it was right, without really very much questioning or, let's put it this way, there was no particular place in the structure where the recommendations were being questioned.

Heyward: Yes, that is still a problem to do that in an effective way. I think he pushes programme directives sometimes too hard, but that is difficult to judge because I think we ought to make a distinction between promotion and programming - what most people see, what the staff mostly sees as promotion...

Catley-Carlson: Yes that's right and they often take it for programming, but they have to do the programming. Exactly. But do you really think it is necessary for UNICEF to have so much staff in the Country Offices?

Staffing

Heyward:

If you were starting now, when many countries have better quality national staff, I don't think you would need to take on so many staff for routine operations. You could concentrate on a few policy people.

Budgets

Catley-Carlson:

One of the things that you will always be remembered for is budgets, and the extremely complex and very comprehensive programmes that you worked out, at least the procedures that you worked out for the budget. You and Don Hall had, I guess, almost a unique record of working together for a number of years which seemed very rare in terms of two people working together on the same subject. What were the great changes as the budgets evolved over the years? It is certainly one of the things for which you are most remembered?

SIAR, unitary budgets

Heyward:

Well I guess one of the most important changes was recommended by SIAR (The Scandinavian Institutes for Administrative Research). The Board called them in feeling there must be real grounds for economy and so on, would they please tell them what they were. SIAR weren't able to find specific economies that they could recommend but I think one of the very valuable things that they told us was, "If you want economies, economical administration, you have to put the responsibility on the head of each administrative unit, and you must drill into him that it's his responsibility to run his unit efficiently. Therefore you should draw up the budget also in terms of administrative units (Country Offices and Divisions in Headquarters).

Catley-Carlson:

What had happened before that?

Heyward:

They had been lumping things together under categories. So much was going to Programming and so much to Supply, and so on. Bringing it under the country also enabled us to relate the budget much more specifically to the tasks which were to be done in the country.

Bertrand

To some extent, Bertrand wanted to go against that. For purposes of comprehension by the Board he wanted to bring things together again in certain categories, but he did agree that we should keep the unit budgets also, and to me they were the most important.

Catley-Carlson:

Why did the Secretariat agree with Bertrand?

Heyward:

We were under the gun, either to agree with him or to agree with going to the ACABQ. And he had a much more professional interest and was much more interested in the programme objectives than people in the ACABQ who only follow certain rules of budgetary analysis. He thought it

was necessary to have a degree of conformity with the U.N. and I guess we thought it wasn't a good idea to oppose that.

Catley-Carlson: He applied "UN-ology" to the thing. But what did you think of his ideas at the time? Basically he proposed that UNICEF activities be reported as activities so that if you had a Regional Officer performing several different functions those functions would be divided into different slots in the budget for the allocation of resources, and for the reporting of resources. What did you think of that at the time?

Heyward: I always thought that was secondary - that that might be useful to the Board. To me the basic thing was the administrative unit. What was each Office doing? People wanted to break down the work into different activities and found that useful - that was alright, too.

Catley-Carlson: But didn't that quintuple your work?

Heyward: Not really. But it did increase the work. The thing is, if you had the basic units in there, you could divide them up without too much difficulty.

Catley-Carlson: I think we're probably going back to the older system now because the recent experience suggests that you're taking the same figures and manipulating them twice for no particular purpose and creating a big extra workload and without appreciably increasing the Board's knowledge of what UNICEF was actually doing. In fact I think quite the opposite - I think it obfuscated what the real costs of programme delivery are.

Heyward: Computerization allows a budget to be presented in a few ways without too much extra work.

Catley-Carlson: Depends on your coding system.

Heyward: Yes.

Catley-Carlson: Exactly. But the budget preparation was always a very large task for you, was it not?

Heyward: Yes.

Catley-Carlson: And when you had an annual budget? How many months of preparation would it take?

Heyward: Oh, I don't know. It didn't take months of my time. I didn't object to the annual budget because things were always changing so much, that even within a two-year budget you would have to make revisions, so it didn't make all that difference. However not having to go to the Board each year is helpful.

Catley-Carlson: Very much so. And then the budget format changed quite radically - well how did it change?

Heyward: It changed from being based only on office organization to being based on an analysis and categorization of activities which enabled certain types of expenditure to be brought out. But we were able to keep, Inspector Bertrand agreed, the office organization, although he thought that the Board would be most concerned with the breakdown by category of activity.

Catley-Carlson: What was the most important recommendation of Bertrand, in your view?

Staff vs. supplies

Heyward: The most important one was an endeavour, in which he wasn't successful, to explain to the Board that people were not more wicked than supplies. And that for the type of work that UNICEF was to do - which is really based on leverage and getting countries to introduce policies favouring children - people are required, and the Board was really following a false criteria if it was looking mainly at the ratio between expenditure on people and expenditure on things. The Board didn't follow him, because his argument came at a time in U.N. history when it wasn't acceptable.

Catley-Carlson: And the Board accepted his recommendations?

Heyward: They did. With varying degrees of enthusiasm.

Catley-Carlson: Little did I imagine when I sat at the Board and voiced doubts about them that I would live to see those doubts very much sitting on my desk.

Budget development

What were you most pleased about in terms of the budget development over the years?

Heyward: I think the strongest feature of our budget was its relation to support for programme design and implementation, so that there was not a separate spirit or separate criteria in either the Budget section, Personnel section, or the Finance section, and the budget really was a document supporting the service of the Organization to the delivery of programme aid.

Catley-Carlson: This is not the case in other organizations?

Heyward: I believe it is much less the case in other organizations. For example in FAO the budgetary authority is a separate authority, deciding whether or not it will do things agreed by the programme people. While that is not the case in WHO, their budget pushes good budgetary principles to a high degree of inefficiency. First of all, it is planned so long in advance, in order to take advantage o

consideration by regional committees, so that by the time it arrives at the point of execution it's really something else that should be done. Secondly, when you read so much of the budget in terms of 'such-and-such an Adviser has to be provided for this subject, in this country, for so many months' and each country would have a list of such items, that is extremely disconnected and certainly a reader would have no basis of judgement of what were really the priority needs in the country.

So I think that the UNICEF approach of a country programme and a support staff roughly based on the size of that programme and the items in it, without trying to go into details exactly of what people are going to do, is much sounder. It takes less time to prepare and therefore is somewhat more up-to-date. It is also more flexible because staff is provided with only their general field of work being specified, not the precise tasks they are to be engaged on during the budget period.

Catley-Carlson:

It's almost the same problem you spoke of earlier with the Board agonizing over whether a certain number of filing cabinets were necessary to be provided in order to carry out a programme of immunization. You get the Board now agonizing over why it takes three programme officers to deliver four programmes in Sri Lanka whereas it only takes two to deliver them in another area. There's no way you can really explain to them to reflect the difference of the intensity of programming, the different capacities, the different drawdowns on programmes; it's a very difficult process.

Heyward:

Yes. That's why I think SIAR was right in trying to put a lot of responsibility on the office heads.

Nutrition

Catley-Carlson:

Let's switch streams completely and talk about nutrition. This is another one of the major areas that you are very much identified with in UNICEF. I don't think it would be an exaggeration to say that for many years you were Mr. Nutrition and of course now you're the anchor-man of the major WHO/UNICEF nutrition project. When did your interest in nutrition as a discipline or as a field begin, within UNICEF, and how did that develop?

Heyward:

I believe it began in the 1950's and probably developed because there was more inter-agency concern in a field that is multi-disciplinary, than many other programmes. At that time, the nutrition division at FAO had much more strength within FAO than it has now, and therefore that was one of the agencies. Therefore we had to work with both WHO and FAO, which meant that there had to be a more senior and front-office type of concern with that programme than many others which were related technically to one agency or one section of an agency. And there was a great deal of

difficulty in specifying what UNICEF was going to try to do, or should be trying to do, and I remember drafting a paper which went to the Board probably in the mid-1950's, about 1956...

Catley-Carlson: That early?

Heyward: ...An Applied Nutrition programme, which would probably be regarded as very primitive nowadays. It was something that our colleagues in FAO and WHO were willing to go along with as a practical activity by UNICEF. I didn't have any particular professional training in that field, so I think I was drawn into it organizationally.

Catley-Carlson: And what were the first manifestations of this. How did you begin to try and apply the intellectual realization that the simple provision of food is not sufficient and that this needs to be supplemented, complemented, and articulated through something called 'a concerted approach on nutritional deficiencies'? How did you then start to try and programme that?

Heyward: Well, we started to programme it because this early report asked the Board to approve certain lines of activity, about seven I believe. They kindly gave their approval. So that became one of the elements that Country Offices would consider in preparing their programmes. The Board has always said that more should be done in nutrition than was being done. It is a cry that has been repeated frequently.

Catley-Carlson: So what elements, for example, when you first of all wrote the paper, were you singling out as areas where attention had to be paid?

Heyward: I don't remember all of them but there was already an element of family and community organization, family and community production of food in gardens and there were health elements, which have been articulated specifically much more recently.

Catley-Carlson: Which ones?

Relation with agencies

Heyward: As we have now moved to the joint WHO/UNICEF programme, a contribution from Dr. Fazzi was to say that it is not particularly sensible to try to define nutritional activities as a particular group of activities, but we should be looking at various activities which bear on the improvement of nutritional status. That brings in non-dietary factors, mainly health factors, as well as dietary factors. Among those there are a number of health needs that are particularly related to malnutrition - they exacerbate malnutrition and maybe are worse because of malnutrition - measles is one of those, because malnourished children die of measles in developing

countries, and well-nourished children do not. The diarrheal disease control also illustrates a similar interaction. So there was always an inter-agency and inter-disciplinary angle.

There was set up the Protein Advisory Group, which included representatives from both the agricultural production side and the health side. However, it stirred up a lot of opposition from agencies and that also was recast a few years ago in order to make the main body an ACC Sub-Committee on Nutrition, which reversed the emphasis. The ACC Sub-Committee consisted of people responsible for nutrition in the various agencies and government officials, and it had an Advisory Group on Nutrition of resource people replacing the former Protein Advisory Group. The resource people were more directly advisory to the people responsible for nutrition of different agencies. In that way the resentment was overcome and the responsible agency people had a means of dealing with a lot of common concerns.

Catley-Carlson: Was it a difficult concept to sell within UNICEF - the idea of nutrition as opposed to food?

Heyward: I don't remember that there was a lot of difficulty about that.

Catley-Carlson: Do you see some advances that have been made in terms of the way nutritional problems are being attacked?

Heyward: I think that the concept of trying to improve nutritional status through work on non-dietary and dietary factors together, is an advance in concept. To carry that out has not proved easy, nor have we been well organized to do it.

Through the joint programme with WHO, we are getting more recognition for nutrition in the health sector. The ACC Sub-Committee has taken up nutrition in agriculture. UNICEF is trying to bring in the women's organizations. Other aspects are still very weak - education, development programmes. It has now only recently become much clearer that there are obviously production aspects; the income of the family is a very important aspect.

Catley-Carlson: It's so complex - it's really the whole realm of social development. All the elements that affect the family.

Heyward: Yes. With particular emphasis on some of them, so I think that makes clear why you need co-ordinating and promoting attention from outside the various disciplines and therefore why some at the Director level should be concerned.

Catley-Carlson: Why has our co-operation with FAO seemingly diminished in the recent past, when our interest in nutrition has stayed very high?

Heyward: I think because what has happened to nutrition in FAO. They have great difficulty now in filling the post of Director. The last one who was really allowed to be effective was Marcel Autret. Then they appointed as his successor another Frenchman who was rather a disaster. After that there was a new Director-General of FAO who really doesn't believe in nutrition, I don't think, at all.

Catley-Carlson: So we have had less and less to talk about?

Heyward: The most recent Director, Mr. Z. Sabry, has resigned, allegedly because he couldn't get enough done and the post remains vacant. It was vacant for a long time before he took it on and it's vacant now. Many people turned down the job, because other Divisions are not asked to pay any attention to nutrition. So, what can the Nutrition Division do? It is practically a waste of time.

Catley-Carlson: Difficult personnel problems
Let's switch views again and go into some of the experiences you have had in UNICEF. What was the trickiest field mission that you ever had to undertake?

Heyward: I suppose the trickiest was related to a personnel matter in Kabul. I don't know whether the case has come to your notice. There was a Representative there who been promoted above his capacity, a very earnest, conscientious person, who had fallen completely under the thumb of a particular faction of his office, so the office was ridden with friction. He was addressing the world by memos that he thought were well-written and humourous which he was circulating around government and specialized agencies, about opening cans of worms and God knows what else. John Grun and I went together - John Grun at that time was the Director in Delhi - and we had to interview him and other people in the office, and take what for UNICEF was a very serious decision to terminate him and two national officers. He since tried to mobilize his government several times to reverse it. But that was painful because the faction under whose thumb he had fallen was quite powerful in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It was amusing in a way because people concerned had no idea in their own mind about the illegitimate uses of power. For example, a person in headquarters used to go round threatening internationals in the office that if they didn't toe the line their visa would be removed and they would be declared persona non grata.

Catley-Carlson: We still have those occasionally. It's a multi-cultural problem, I think.

Heyward: There were a man and wife in effect running our office and the international agencies section of Foreign Affairs, who thought that power was to be used for their own purposes.

Dangerous field trips

Catley-Carlson: Were you ever in physical danger in any of your field trips?

Heyward: I doubt it.

Catley-Carlson: You went into Angola fairly soon after the war there. What was the situation like when you went in there?

Heyward: Yes, but there wasn't physical danger for international people in Angola at that time, at least in the capital. There was danger for a remarkable Dutch woman who went out to the field with Social Welfare Department staff to dangerous areas to serve groups of people who had been cut off from food and so on. I don't remember particularly difficult trips. I think that basically...

Headquarters/field relationship

Catley-Carlson: ...the main difficulties are at Headquarters!

Heyward: Well, yes. The field people usually are quite glad to have someone to discuss things with. That was one of the puzzling things I found about the resentment of Regional Directors, at cutting off certain operational functions from their offices, because the field people were really longing to have the Directors or someone else come from outside whom they could discuss their problems with.

Catley-Carlson: I found the degree of animosity between Field and Headquarters to be quite astonishing. It is very different than any other organization I have ever served in. You must have noted this over the years. Does it go in waves?

Heyward: I don't know that it does go in waves - I think it has been stirred up in recent times and by some Regional Directors, perhaps in their budget interests; stirred up because 'we are the champions against Headquarters', perhaps to help solve their own problems with Field Offices. I thought there was always animosity between any organizational unit and the level supervising it - not animosity necessarily, but tension.

Catley-Carlson: Tension - oh, there is. 'Headquarters doesn't understand the Field and the Field doesn't understand Headquarters'! That's a normal part of an international operation. The sharpness of it has surprised me in UNICEF, to a very considerable degree. Was it ever thus?

Heyward: No. I think it has been allowed to get somewhat out of hand.

Political questions in Board

Catley-Carlson: What's the stickiest political problem that we ever faced before the Board?

Heyward: I suppose the efforts of the three Executive Directors to maintain the mandate of UNICEF - not to take account of political discrimination as far as children were concerned. That has given rise to repeated conflicts with a main contributor, conflicts about Cuba, conflicts about Indo-China, and others, too.

Catley-Carlson: These have generally not come to the Board? At least they haven't erupted in the Board, have they?

Heyward: I think that mostly they have, or many of them have. There was a dramatic conflict in the Board about Cuba. Usually they got ventilated in the Board, sometimes not, sometimes only indirectly. Votes have been counted in advance and they have decided that the matter wouldn't be pursued. That didn't mean that there wasn't a good conflict going on in the Board - lobbying, explanations having to be given outside the Board if not inside.

Catley-Carlson: To what do you attribute UNICEF's basically non-political nature?

Heyward: First of all it was set up that way. The Executive Directors believed very firmly in that aspect. The Organization wasn't very large and for a long time wasn't regarded, I think, by governments as of major political interest. The fact that it was concerned with children helped it not to take political stances.

Desirable future trends

Catley-Carlson: As a final question we'll ask you the one which is always impossible: What would you like to see happen in UNICEF within the next ten years?

Decentralization, staff training

Heyward: I would like to see a continuation of the country-level co-operation, that involves the maintenance of decentralization. I think it would also involve a stronger staff-training element, a continuous training element, an upgrading of the capacities of country-level Representatives.

Working with Governments; use of advisers

I think the problem of helping them through discussion of policy of what we should really be promoting, at the country level or in a country framework, is not yet solved. Mr. Grant's endeavour to contribute to that through Advisors is a step, but I don't think that is an effective way of addressing the most difficult problem, namely: how to work with countries on what they should be doing, rather than, once you have decided to do something about say health, then you get a lot of technical advice about how to do it.

Overall programming; planning

The overall programming aspect is not strongly developed. There was an endeavour to do that at one time through what was called 'Planning' but it has faded away, partly under the hostility of the programme people who thought that their turf ought not to be trodden on. I think that it was probably wrong to let it fade away, and it ought to be brought back - what is the general shape of programming in a country, and how can you select and promote the right policies in a way that countries can follow you and replicate programmes within their financial and personnel resources?

Those are matters that are not sufficiently addressed by anybody, I believe, not in other agencies nor in UNICEF. A means to address that would be the main organizational advance that I would hope to see.

Collaboration with other aid sources

I think the collaboration with the other sources of aid - bilateral aid, financial aid agencies - is perhaps another feature in which UNICEF has rather been leading. I think a lot of advances have been made on that and a great deal more could be made if we had more valid concepts in the area of effective policy and programme selection and design. So, that would be one of the ways of bringing to bear more resources to solve its problems.

Going to scale; community responsibility

Nobody has solved the problem of improved services on a large scale, and I believe that will require a lot more community responsibility than has been admitted, or put into practice up to the present time.

Despite the extensive rhetoric, community responsibility is difficult to implement. I think a whole new field of how to sensitize communities, how to help them organize themselves to deal with problems needs to be greatly developed.

NGO's

In some countries some non-governmental organizations have done a lot of work in that field, but it hasn't become part of the operational style of UNICEF or other agencies, or government services. The work that is being done by a number of institutes of public administration in developing countries, where David Korten is associated, is of great interest. I hope we can bring their findings more effectively into our Organization.

Programme procedures

There are a number of UNICEF programming procedures which are definitely dysfunctional in that regard. The general theory we were taught was wrong. The theory, which if I exaggerate, says that if you were going to really have a

good programme you would have a very thorough baseline survey; you would then have a technically sound plan of operations that was going to extend over a number of years - five years because all these problems are long-term problems. I believe that experience doesn't support this theory. There are practical means of approach if you really want to be not technocratic but work in the communities. Because nobody knows how the communities are going to work or what they're going to put their energies into. I was delighted to discover recently that there is a group based in the University of Michigan called, "Community Systems Foundation", which, under contract from AID, is beginning to publish that that is all wrong. It's very interesting to me that their findings converge with the community approach that David Kortem calls "social development administration".

Simple baseline surveys

So, they are saying that you should have a rather simple baseline survey to start, mobilizing existing information; you should put a lot of attention on helping countries to develop rather simple information systems that would help both field people and the Ministries to follow what is going on; you should put a lot of emphasis on training or helping countries to train people in the interpretation of information, which is neglected at present; helping countries, therefore, to develop flexible programming which on the basis of their information system can respond to the community level. So, the programming model which UNICEF tries to instill on people is not really following those lines at the present time. In some cases our action is better than our model.

Recording procedures; audit-financial controls

Catley-Carlson: I think that certainly one of the main challenges is to be able to do that and to be able to sufficiently, flexibly, adapt our recording procedures and the necessities of audit-financial control and all the rest of it and some sort of predictability in planning levels just so you can maintain ceilings but, it has to be done. There's no question about that.

Women's literacy

Heyward: I would also like to see UNICEF give much more attention to women's literacy. I believe that directly and indirectly it has a great bearing on child survival and development. But the international community is not giving it the attention it needs.

Catley-Carlson: Thank you very much. I'm sure once this has been read, different questions will occur that we didn't touch on. You'll probably be the victim again but I've enjoyed doing this.

Heyward: That's very kind of you.

