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UNICEF IN CHINA

1947 - 1951

A paper prepared for the UNICEF History Project
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On the programming side, the initiation and development of the the short and simple health workers training courses emphasizing midwifery, village sanitation and preventive health care for children was significant and enduring; and less well known, the organization of functional neighbourhood support for child care centres in urban settings proved to be effective under conditions of minimal government support and much instability.

And finally, the China experience was one of the first occasions when UNICEF had to try from the very beginning to uphold its principle of non-discrimination and work for the children on both sides of a revolution at the same time.

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Notes on Spelling of Chinese Names

Most people writing about China nowadays use the Pinyin system of romanization; most people also have their favorite exceptions. One author will refuse to change "Canton" into Guangzhou but has no difficulty with Beijing for "Peking"; another finds it reasonable to turn Mao Tse-tung into Mao Zedong and Chou En-lai into Zhou Enlai but unacceptable to alter Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen.

In writing about UNICEF in China during the late 1940s and early 1950s, using Pinyin can be troublesome. All the letters, documents, and books of the period accepted the familiar Wade-Giles system of romanization. This practice was made more interesting by the many exceptions to allow for historical spellings and variations in dialect. Examples were found chiefly in place names such as Peking, Canton, Swatow, Amoy and Kowloon which were in general use and accepted by the post office. Sometimes the change from the old Wade-Giles or traditional to the new Pinyin does not make much difference. Sometimes the new romanization makes the word almost unrecognizable. For example, the traditional "Hongkong" becomes Xianggang in Pinyin, and "China" becomes Zhonghua.

In spite of these difficulties for some Westerners, however, it seems to me that Pinyin should be generally used. It has been officially adopted (by the 5th session of the first National People's Congress in 1958) and generally represents a closer approximation to the words as spoken. Certainly, for most UNICEF staff members today in the Asia Section and others dealing with supplies, shipping, public information and other matters connected with the large China programme, the UNICEF office and capital of China are located in the city of Beijing, and "Peking" is for

INTRODUCTION

This paper is written to set down the story of UNICEF in China during its first years there. It begins early in 1947, almost as soon as UNICEF itself was created, and ends less than five years later in May of 1951 after all the UNICEF offices in China had been closed and the international staff withdrawn.

It is important to remember that the situation of China was unique among the countries emerging from the Second World War. Other participants were entering a period of relative stability and reconstruction. Relief and rehabilitation efforts, both national and international, could go forward effectively.

China, however, was still engaged in a devastating civil war. This was a conflict that preceded by far the Second World War, finding its roots in the 1920s. And earlier still, ever since the overthrow of the Qing dynasty and continuing for two decades, were the unsettling battles for domination among war-lords in many regions. The nation's sufferings were compounded in the early 1930s with the progressively serious Sino-Japanese conflict. For the West, "the war" was over in August of 1945. But in China, wartime conditions persisted as the struggle between Nationalist and Communist forces intensified. As UNICEF began its work, the contest was nearing its climax.

These troubled conditions were not so much a background for the work of UNICEF - rather, UNICEF was necessarily caught up in and conditioned by them. The two summary chronologies in this paper are intended both to point up critical events in China

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during the first half of the century and to place UNICEF's brief years there in context.

The mood of the times is reflected in a letter from Dr Marcel Junod, UNICEF's first Chief of Mission for China, to the Executive Director, Maurice Pate in the summer of 1948:

This mission is the hardest one I ever had to lead because the success of it does not depend on you or yourself or even on the Government and voluntary agencies, but on the unbelievable circumstances in which this country happens to be today.

This came from a man of many and wide experiences in difficult circumstances. He had served as a delegate of the International Red Cross in the Far East during the war in both Korea and Japan.

Experienced UNRRA workers had interspersed their programming advice to UNICEF during 1947 with words of warning. If it had been difficult for them, it became even more so for UNICEF. After reviewing the work and plans of the UNICEF Mission in July 1948, Newton Bowles wrote to Mr Pate, "This is a most inopportune time to undertake health and welfare work in China. The civil war dominates everything." Later on in early 1949, Norman Horn, UNICEF Textile Consultant, wrote from Shanghai, "We can accomplish nothing of value under the present chaotic conditions. . . I might as well return to New York."

In juxtaposition to all of this was UNICEF, a very young organization just beginning to work out its own policies and principles of operation under the terms of reference of the United Nations General Assembly. It could hardly have found itself starting to work in a less favourable place and time than China in 1948 and 1949. But it did start then and, looking back, it is surprising to discover that many of the problems and issues dealt with became very familiar to UNICEF field staff in other places and later times.

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Marco Polo. For those who attended the first UNICEF staff seminar in China, Qingdao was a beautiful seaside city in Shandong province not to be confused with the port of Tsingtao through which bolts of raw Shantung silk were exported, and where, indeed, one of the first groups of UNICEF-aided child-care centres was established.

The spelling in English of some Chinese personal names presents a different kind of problem. When the Chinese characters for the name are given, the Pinyin romanization can be accurate; this is true, of course, for all well-known people such as Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong. But when a letter or document refers to someone only by Wade-Giles spelling, the Chinese characters can only be guessed at and transposing into Pinyin could be wide of the mark.

To sum up, in this paper, Pinyin romanization will be used generally throughout (except for inevitable lapses). In some cases, for clarity, the other form may be added in parentheses. Personal names will remain as they appear in the documents. Passages quoted will follow the original, but passages paraphrased will use Pinyin.

Chapter 1 - Not Yet Ready for China

In December of 1946, the General Assembly created the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. Two months later, with help from personnel from the China Office of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the Republic of China prepared a request to UNICEF for \$150,000,000 "in cash and supplies" for a three-year programme of child welfare.¹ The amount asked for was far in excess of UNICEF's resources. For example, although UNICEF was to receive UNRRA's residual assets, these totalled only some \$33 million altogether.²

The newly-appointed first Executive Director, Maurice Pate, writing from UNICEF's Headquarters at Lake Success had to point out that UNICEF was in its nascent stage and had no funds of importance. Furthermore, UNRRA supplies were still flowing into China and "therefore it would be some later date before we start in China."³

Although UNICEF was indeed at a very early stage, and pre-occupied with the European programmes just getting under way, it

1 The drafts of the projects making up this total were forwarded by courier with a letter from the UNRRA Director of the China Office in Shanghai, Major General Glen Edgerton to Alex McIver, Acting Chief, UNRRA Office of Far Eastern Affairs in Washington, dated 3 March 1947.

2 John Charnow, History of UNICEF, draft, 1965, page 1.

3 Pate, UNICEF Lake Success to McIver, UNRRA Washington 21 March 1947.

began to plan for its work in China during these first months of 1947. Much of this early planning was developed through correspondence with UNRRA personnel in Washington who in turn referred to their China Mission headquarters in Shanghai.

It was natural that the new staff of UNICEF at Lake Success should look to UNRRA's experience in China as a guide to its own planning. After all, UNICEF's creation was largely the result of UNRRA's initiative; and UNRRA in China was then well into the largest international programme of assistance ever attempted for one nation.⁴ The problems confronting its execution were never fully overcome and the successes often overshadowed by failures. But a stockpile of practical experience was accumulated by those who stayed on through 1947. Although their conclusions varied, these UNRRA staff members offered a remarkably helpful package of observations and advice to UNICEF.

UNRRA operations in China were to close officially at the end of December 1947, although a closure staff stayed on until the early spring of 1948. UNRRA's close relationship with UNICEF continued during this period. Indeed, an UNRRA staff member, Mary Palevsky, Chief of UNRRA's Regional Administration Division in China was named by Mr Pate in December of 1947 to serve as UNICEF's Interim Representative until the arrival of the Director of the UNICEF China Mission.⁵

A drawback to speedy communications with the Government before the appointment of a UNICEF Director stationed in China was the curiously roundabout routing of correspondence. Let us take an example to represent the way information was exchanged between China and UNICEF Headquarters throughout most of 1947. During February, UNRRA's Welfare Division was working with the

⁴ Frank Price, UNRRA in China 1945-1947, UNRRA Washington, April 1948

⁵ Cable from Harlan Cleveland, UNRRA Director China Office to Frank Harris, UNRRA Chief, Far Eastern Affairs, Washington 19 December 1947

Ministry of Social Affairs in Nanjing to draw up plans for the best use of funds and supplies expected to be received from UNICEF. Since no one then in China had a clear idea of how the new United Nations "Children's Welfare Fund" was to work, a plea went out to UNICEF for clarification.

First the request was transmitted from Nanjing to UNRRA, Shanghai. The UNRRA Executive Officer there, writing for the Director, China Office, sent a letter to the Deputy Director General and Chief Executive Officer at UNRRA Headquarters in Washington to advise Mr Pate that UNRRA personnel were helping formulate the Ministry's plans and that

It would be very helpful if your office [UNRRA] would arrange to forward details regarding the assistance to be provided to members in the United Nations through the Children's Welfare Fund, particularly the exact nature of the services to be made available as well as the conditions and methods of administration applicable.

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By the time this request had been further channeled to UNICEF at Lake Success through the UNICEF Liaison Office in Washington and the reply to China back-tracked along the same route, it was too late to counsel caution at the field level and head off the exuberant but unrealistic \$150 million request.

It is not entirely clear now whether this curious method of correspondence was the result of an effort to follow the niceties of inter-agency protocol or because of the lack of a UNICEF Representative in China all during 1947. (By contrast, UNRRA had set up an office in Chongqing in 1944 well before World War II was

6 Letter, Franc Shor, UNRRA China Office, Shanghai to A G Katzin, Chief Executive officer, UNRRA HQ. 15 Febr 1947

over and had begun recruitment of field staff in China before the move of its headquarters to Shanghai in late 1945.⁷)

In any event, lacking its own representative in China for this first year, UNICEF followed (rather than led) the development of a programme for children in China through correspondence addressed, in the first instance, to UNRRA Headquarters in Washington. When Glen Edgerton ("Major General USA", as he signed himself) wrote as Director of the UNRRA China Office to his Washington headquarters about "the development of program plans in connection with the ICEF", he made it clear that "The plans enclosed were evolved by the Ministry with the cooperation of representatives of the National Health Administration and Ministry of Education as well as representatives from various voluntary or philanthropic organizations."⁸ But UNICEF did not take part in the planning.

Although UNRRA was at this time acting as a sort of go-between, it had much more knowledge of the Chinese Government's proposals than it did of the nature of UNICEF. The UNRRA Office in Shanghai had, of course, seen the UNRRA Council Resolution but had little further information which might have been useful to UNRRA staff working with the Government. On the other hand, the Chinese delegation to the United Nations seemed to be under the impression that some \$450,000,000 would soon be made available to UNICEF and that one-third of it would go to China upon the drawing up of a plan.⁹

In his letter of 3 March 1947, General Edgerton summarizes observations from his staff which, he suggests, Mr McIver "may wish to pass on to Mr. Maurice Pate". And, as early as this, an ominous chord begins to reverberate. On the one hand, "The

⁷ Price, Harry B. UNRRA in CHINA 1945 - 1947. Operational Analysis Papers, No. 53, UNRRA, Washington, D. C. April 1948

⁸ Edgerton to McIver, Acting Chief, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, UNRRA, Washington D. C., 3 March 1947

⁹ Edgerton in Shanghai to McIver in Washington 3 March 1947

Ministry of Social Affairs is the logical permanent Government agency in which the administration of such a [UNICEF] program should be lodged." But, sad to say, the Ministry has weak relationships with the provinces, its budget is inadequate and its personnel underpaid and untrained. Government officials are concerned chiefly with party and military affairs. Are they really sufficiently interested "to back and put into effect a serious plan of improvement of the social welfare structure which the country so badly needs?"¹⁰ Perhaps the Ministry hopes to improve its own structure with funds from the Fund?

The advice goes on pessimistically: the UNRRA programme has already shown that no new agency should even try to distribute supplies "until the economy is devoted to peaceful measures".¹¹ When would that be? A related but even more serious and persistent question comes up: "We do not feel that the Government can actually implement or make such a guarantee [i.e. distribution without discrimination] in the present state of unrest."

So - how to sum up? Do not go into China now.

But - if UNICEF were to go ahead anyway and attempt to begin operations in China during 1947, at least it would be possible to retain some of the experienced UNRRA staff then in China, and to set up a training programme for Chinese staff to carry out the future work.

This early programming effort on the part of UNRRA and Government staff and the initial flurry of exchanges following the first awareness of UNICEF's creation came to an end with Mr Pate's sobering letter of 21 March 1947 stressing UNICEF's infancy

¹⁰ Edgerton to McIver 3 March 1947
Edgerton-McIver letter p.2

and poverty at that time and determining that UNICEF would not start in China until "some later date".¹²

In accordance with the multiple carom system of correspondence of this period, Mr Pate's letter was bounced first to UNRRA Washington, then to UNRRA Shanghai and then, one supposes, to the Government. There is no mention in any of these letters as to how the information actually reached the Ministry of Social Affairs in Nanjing.¹³

Before moving on to the second half of the year when the story picks up again, we should raise the question of why no UNICEF representative was appointed for China during all of the turbulent and crucial year of 1947? It is true that UNRRA was still in operation there and that some of its staff were both knowledgeable and cooperative, working with the Government to draft a programme for the benefit of children. But the cumbersome method of communication made the relationship awkward. It is also true that there were at first "no funds of importance" for helping to start significant programmes, but projects were getting under way in Europe and UNICEF staff were being appointed for service there. Yet not one UNICEF staff member was in place in China for over a year. Indeed, even at the end of UNICEF's 4th year of existence (1950) when some \$114 million had been spent, only ten percent of it had been made use of in all of Asia.¹⁴ Paul Cohen believes that the supreme problem for American students of Chinese history is "ethnocentric distortion".¹⁵ It would appear that in these early years of UNICEF a related kind of distortion existed.

12 Pate, UNICEF Lake Success to McIver, UNRRA Washington D C 21 March 1947

13 McIver in Washington to Gaumnitz in Shanghai, 25 March 1947 This letter transmitting Mr Pate's letter of 21 March was also "carried by Mr Cox". It was not uncommon then for travellers to "safe-hand" certain messages as well as mailing them until it was discovered to be the least speedy method of delivery.

14 Charnow, History of UNICEF, draft, p 3

15 Cohen, Paul A - Discovering History in China, Columbia 1984

A second matter that excites curiosity is how the amount of \$450,000,000 could have been seriously considered as representing UNICEF's likely resources in 1947? One can only speculate: perhaps a transposition of US dollars into Chinese National Currency (CNC) at the prevailing inflationary rates of exchange with a failure to change the currency sign for the transpacific journey? An inadvertant substitution of the more commonly used wan (10,000), for the Western unit multiple, "one thousand" (qian)? Wishful thinking nurtured by substantial sums from UNRRA and the United States? Or simply prophetic? After all, while \$150 million is still large, it is not unrealistically so; indeed, it is only three times UNICEF's 1984 commitment to China.¹⁶

In any event, one cannot help but feel that this entire awkward episode might easily have been avoided had a UNICEF Representative been stationed in Nanjing during 1947 having direct communications with the Government and with UNICEF Headquarters.

¹⁶ UN Economic and Social Council, E/ICEF/1984/P/L.22
15 February 1984

Chapter 2 - Getting Ready for China

By the middle of the year (1947) when it had become known that UNRRA would be closing down its operations in China, people became concerned about what would happen to the projects under way for children and for the many not yet helped at all. The New York Times correspondent writing from Nanjing on 30 June expressed dismay that although some 2 million children had been kept alive by receiving food, clothing and medicine through UNRRA during the previous year, continued help on a similar scale did not seem at all likely. Yet the absolute need in China was far greater than even UNRRA had been able to reach. ¹⁷

In notes prepared at the request of the United Nations Appeal for Children, L. King Quan, Chief of the Analysis Branch in UNRRA's Office for Far Eastern Affairs, the desperate situation of children in China is again pointed up. "Some of these children, who were born during the war,¹⁸ have never seen a day of peace and comfort. Some of them are orphans; most of them are undernourished. Some have to sleep in doorways in zero weather, others hide in the daytime and come out at night in search of food and shelter. The stronger ones resort to petty thievery to keep themselves alive, while the weaker and sick just die off in the city streets to be picked up and buried . . . it is not unusual to see 40 or 50 of these little corpses if one makes the round of the city streets in the early morning hours." Quan estimated that some 29 million children in China under the age of 14 were desperately in need of emergency help. ¹⁹

¹⁷ Durdin, Tillman - "China to Suffer Hard Blow", The New York Times, 30 June 1947

¹⁸ This refers to the Sino-Japanese war which had started ten years earlier, merging into World War II and the civil war

¹⁹ Quan, L. King - Chief, Analysis Branch, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, UNRRA - "Notes on the Needs of Chinese Children"

Because evidence of overwhelming calamities visited upon children during the long war years seemed clear, the gathering of detailed data through special field studies was considered both superfluous and, at the time, impractical. Rather, UNICEF needed to deal with the more immediate matter of how its limited resources could best be used under the precarious conditions then prevailing; dependence on UNRRA advice necessarily continued.

The "Cotton Project" is another example of the extent to which UNRRA's experience - which included having to use commodities which were available apart from their relative appropriateness - affected UNICEF's early planning stages. There is no question but that cotton was of extreme importance to the people of China, both for cloth and for "wadding" against the unrelenting chill of northern winters. But would a cotton project be the best start for UNICEF in China?

For one thing, UNRRA had already shipped vastly more quantities of cotton than UNICEF could begin to equal. In a handwritten memorandum to the Australian legation in Shanghai, Mr Donald estimated that over US\$62,000,000 worth of cotton had already been shipped to China with an additional \$19 million added through a special programme. And as late as October 1947, some \$50 million worth of cotton still remained unsold under the terms of the UNRRA Commodity Account with the Central Bank.²⁰

But in September, "the Chinese Delegate had advised ICEF that the most suitable form of relief would be cotton clothing and had recommended that this be supplied as raw cotton. . ."²¹ UNRRA's Chief of Far Eastern Affairs, went on to say that "I had to tell ICEF that I shared their scepticism on raw cotton particularly in the light of recent experiences."²² In spite of these

²⁰ "Donald Memo Australian Legation" - Background data on cotton prepared for "Aust Legation and ICEF Thu 3 Jan" (1948)

²¹ Letter from F. D. Harris, Chief, Far Eastern Affairs, UNRRA to Miss Eleanor Hinder, British Consulate, Shanghai, 26 Sept 1947

²² Harris to Hinder, 26 September 1947

reservations, however, the "cotton project" was taken up again a year later, as we shall see.

As an aside, but a pertinent one, this letter illustrates the continuing once-removed nature of the UNICEF-China correspondence. Mr Harris of UNRRA Headquarters in Washington "was called in yesterday by the International Children's Emergency Fund to advise on how best the ICEF could devise their proposed programme of \$2 million dollars for China." He in turn, turns to the British Consulate in Shanghai for advice. And, with characteristic reluctance at the time to trust the mails, "I am sending this letter with Mr Atkinson who leaves this morning for Shanghai and it is being written in some haste."²³ This could almost have been a direct quote from the letters of Sir Robert Hart writing from Peking a century earlier.²⁴

In November of 1947, Mr Pate decided to ask Harry Price who had been Assistant Director of the UNRRA China Mission since its inception in Chongqing during the war and was an "old China Hand" to serve as UNICEF consultant in China. Unfortunately, this invitation came too late for consideration since UNRRA had already arranged for his continued services. Mr Price did, however, write Mr Pate a "minority report" outlining his own views on the path he felt UNICEF should take through the uncertain circumstances that lay ahead. His first recommendation - to jump ahead a few days - was that "it would be well to appoint as soon as possible a competent full-time ICEF representative in China".²⁵

Toward the end of November when the UNRRA programme was winding down in the midst of the increasingly sharp civil war conflicts in China, UNICEF continued its dogged search for help

²³ Harris to Hinder letter of 26 September 1947

²⁴ Sir Robert Hart, The I.G. in Peking. Letters of Robert Hart, Chinese Maritime Customs 1868-1907. "P.S. The Tientsin courier is just in with a letter from Lang." 7 April 1884 (Vol I, p. 537)

²⁵ Letter from Harry Price in Shanghai to Maurice Pate, 1344 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington 5 D.C. [sic]

from personnel who had worked through the UNRRA years. Harlan Cleveland, the promising young administrator who had taken over the unenviable task of seeing UNRRA through its last several months, convened a meeting of his senior staff to take up the question of what best advice should be offered to the not yet year-old Children's Fund, the beneficiary of UNRRA's "residual assets". In addition to Cleveland himself, those taking part included Dr B Borcic, a continuing friend of UNICEF; Mr H Lund who wrote the majority report of UNRRA advice to UNICEF; Miss Mary Palevsky, who was later to become the first (interim) UNICEF Representative in China; Dr J Petersen, medical adviser; and Harry Price who wrote the separate "dissenting" letter of advice to Maurice Pate.²⁶

It was at this time that there came a partial breakthrough in the ponderous system of correspondence between UNRRA and UNICEF. Harlan Cleveland - instead of replying to UNICEF's request through his own Headquarters in Washington, writes directly to UNICEF's Director, Mr Pate! Could this be because he was only 29 years old at the time? (Of course, he sent a copy to Colonel Harris in Washington, and with the contemporary lack of faith in mails, notes that "Dr Borcic, WHO, who is leaving on tomorrow's plane has kindly agreed to deliver this letter to you by hand.")²⁷

In addition to the notes on the meeting itself, Cleveland attached a paper written by Lund which presented the near consensus of advice for UNICEF reached at the meeting.²⁸ The paper first reviews the very great limitations of the national ministries through which UNICEF would be expected to work: Health, Education, and Social Affairs. There was an especially strong cautionary appeal for UNICEF not to try to work through the

²⁶ UNRRA, China Office - "Notes on Meeting re International Children's Emergency Fund - 24 November [1947]"

²⁷ Cleveland, Shanghai to Pate, Dupont Circle Building, Washington, 25, D.C. 6 December 1947

²⁸ "Suggestions for the Utilization of an ICEF Grant for China" written by Dr Harold H Lund. UNRRA, Shanghai, 6 December 1947

Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) - "historically an organ of the Kuomintang Party".

Furthermore, at the lower levels of government, provincial and municipal, participation of welfare bureaus in the UNRRA programme had generally been of a low order. There were many political appointees and the local cooperating agencies were lacking in funds for effective operation, yet jealous of their prerogatives.

The political, military and economic situation accentuated these limitations. "With 80% of the national budget (and many times the national government revenue in taxes and bonds) devoted to war, it would not be reasonable to expect a constructive development of health and welfare services. Governmental agencies, national and local, are inevitably geared to the military effort, and are subservient to political pressure." ²⁹

There follows a discussion of the severe handicaps under which CNRRA (The Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) had to work, particularly the extreme pressure to devote resources directly or indirectly to meet military objectives. To try to off-set this pressure, UNRRA was given an equal voice with CNRRA in making allocations which resulted in marked improvement in working relations between UNRRA and CNRRA because UNRRA as an international agency was prepared to accept responsibilities for decisions which CNRRA could not afford to take. The lesson that UNICEF should take from this experience was that: control of resources must rest with UNICEF down to the point of end distribution. (This issue was to be heatedly debated later on.)

The paper continues along these generally dismal lines noting also the weaknesses of voluntary agencies in China at the local

²⁹ "Suggestions for the Utilization of an IOCEP Grant for China" - H. Lund, Shanghai 6 Dec 1947

levels, and the high degree of unreality in National Planning. In summary, UNRRA had the following to say to UNICEF:

The fund of \$3.5 million is small in relation to needs;
It should not be turned over to public or private agencies;
Commitments should be made on a project basis with
supervision and control exercised by UNICEF;
Large-scale, nationwide schemes are not possible;
Avoid dissipation of benefits by thinly spread distribution
of supplies.

As for positive suggestions:

- 1) Projects should be associated with teaching institutions, using local resources and training personnel for continuance of services. Examples of specific projects -

Child welfare centre in rural areas including clinics for children, well babies, pregnant and nursing mothers; home visits to obtain data on pregnancy, births, infant deaths, morbidity, housing, sanitation and family income; mass education through public meetings, entertainment, posters, literacy instruction and educational motion pictures; stress community support; successful projects along these lines had been organized in a group of villages outside "Peiping"

Child welfare centres in urban districts, as above

School extension services. Since only "A small percentage of school age children go to school in China" important to provide teaching personnel, meals, clinics, supervised play to out of school children. Successfully tried in Tientsin under CNRRA auspices

Mobile service units for provision of medical treatment, public health education etc. for rural areas

Vocational workshops for adolescents particularly where there are large groups of refugees

2. Finance and management UNICEF funds could properly be used for payment of some local workers, especially professionals in teaching organizations; equipment and expendables to be imported as well as food and textiles for direct distribution to children in need
3. The Secretariat A secretariat in China should be set up by UNICEF for the management of the grant; composed of Director, Executive Officer, public health physician, public health nurse, child welfare worker, expert in public health education, two field organisers, reports officer and statistician; allow about 3% of grant for expenses of secretariat
4. Relations with the Government Suggest creation of a Board of Trustees which would control the UNICEF grant made up of three members appointed by Government, three by UNICEF and three more appointed jointly by these six. Allocations would be on a project by project basis

The paper concludes with an acknowledgement that the overreaching concern of that time had not even been mentioned: "Nothing has been said. . . on projects in Communist-controlled areas. UNRRA's experience. . . is illuminating and should be carefully studied before the ICEF makes a final commitment. . . An international fund should be utilized without discrimination on political grounds." 30

Although the 24 November meeting in Shanghai reviewed the Government request for cotton and UNICEF's interest in a grant to a Children's Institute, the discussion on these two matters was not reflected in Lund's paper. H C Chang, the Director of the

30 H. Lund, "Suggestions for the utilization of an ICEF grant for China, UNRRA, Shanghai 6 Dec 1947

Bureau of Social Affairs, had written to Dr Borcic proposing that two-thirds of the then anticipated commitment from UNICEF of \$3.5 million be used to buy cotton from the United States. Borcic had discussed this proposal in Washington with UNICEF representatives and with P C Chang, China's member on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

But Pate had already written to Borcic advising him that UNICEF favored using two-thirds of the commitment as a grant in aid to a Children's Institute to be set up in one of the Chinese leading cities. The Children's Institute Board would be composed of representatives from the Executive Yuan, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Health, leading voluntary agencies and perhaps UNICEF.³¹ This interest in a Children's Institute seems to parallel UNICEF's early, favorable experience with short-term group refresher and training courses for health personnel in Europe and the movement toward helping to establish an International Children's Centre in Paris.³²

During the UNRRA discussions in Shanghai, the proposal for a Children's Institute was warmly supported by Dr Borcic who concluded that "putting up such an institute, the money would be well utilized -- almost any other expenditure of it would be wasted." Mary Palevsky, on the other hand, did not favor a single large institution, but felt that many small training centres in rural areas which are most in need would be better.

There was no disagreement about cotton. The UNRRA advisers continued to look askance at the proposal. Borcic: UNRRA's experience should serve to prove the impracticability of this step.³³

³¹ Letter from Maurice Pate, UNICEF Executive Director to Dr B Borcic, Chief, Health Division, UNRRA China Office and UNICEF's unofficial "Correspondent" in China in the later part of 1947 and early 1948

³² John Charnow, History of UNICEF, NYHQ, 1965, p.41

³³ Notes of Meeting re ICEF, UNRRA Shanghai, 24 November 1947

When Harry Price looked over the paper prepared by Harold Lund, he decided that he would have to send Mr Pate a letter "written from a different standpoint", although he believed that "the memorandum which he [Lund] and Miss Palevsky prepared merits the closest study." And Price's letter to Pate is couched in such gentle terms, it reads more like a supplement than a dissenting view. He makes seven recommendations: ³⁴

- 1) appoint as soon as possible a competent full-time representative in China. . . a person with a background of China experience
- 2) develop immediately a basic statement on objectives and standards for use of UNICEF supplies or funds applicable to situation in China
- 3) after agreement with Government, the UNICEF Representative would approach a selected list of Government and voluntary agencies to prepare applications for UNICEF assistance, not exceeding about \$200,000 to any one project. This approach is needed "because no single agency at the present time has the organization, personnel or demonstrated competence to handle or supervise the handling of the entire fund."
- 4) a UNICEF "secretariat" should be built up as rapidly as possible; a responsibility would be to observe agency performance in developing supported projects, basing any further allocations on such performance. An important standard of evaluation would be "the extent to which they succeed in mobilizing indigenous resources for use

³⁴ H. B. Price, Assistant Director, UNRRA China Office to M. Pate, Executive Director, UNICEF NY. 6 December 1947

in conjunction with the ICEF contribution."

5) the development of a "Board of Trustees" at the Prime Minister level with majority Chinese membership to receive recommendations from the UNICEF Representative and secretariat and to make allocations on this basis to the several participating agencies. The Board must have a status "free from political domination"

6) because of inflation, UNICEF allocations should be made in the form of supplies rather than money. (But not cotton! "I definitely do not favor the idea of a large cotton program along the lines previously discussed.") Sending of goods to China for sale, proceeds to be used for internal financing, is a good method of funding in a non-inflationary way. But this should be subject to the most careful planning and the closest observation to ensure against diversion of proceeds.

7) emphasis on development of healthy indigenous effort in child welfare field; relationship to teaching agencies is essential (here agreeing with Palevsky and Lund). Child welfare problem in China colossal; UNICEF should contribute toward handling of such problems through existing agencies and by methods capable of being reproduced without external support.

Three days after this letter was written but before it reached New York, Mr Cleveland received the news in Shanghai that a UNICEF China Mission was "contemplated". This is a curious word to use as late as December 1947.³⁵ The appointment of the UNICEF head of mission, was "still under consideration"; meanwhile UNICEF asked UNRRA to recommend a staff member who could act in an interim capacity for UNICEF; recommend a top level secretary from

³⁵ Cable 8307 Harris UNRRA-Washington to Cleveland UNRRA Shanghai 9 December 1947

"British Dominion (repeat Dominion)"; and assign office space, equipment and vehicles. UNICEF was unlikely to be in the field before the end of the year.

On the 11th of December, the package of advice from Shanghai had reached Washington, and UNRRA hastened to send it over to the UNICEF Liaison Office there.³⁶

On the 12th, Cleveland recommended Mary Palevsky to serve as UNICEF interim representative; and from the dominions of Canada and Australia, Dorothy Geraghty and Kathleen Robinson as excellently qualified secretaries. Cleveland's cable was duly passed on by UNRRA in Washington to UNICEF's liaison office and then to New York.³⁷

On the 19th of December, UNICEF drafted a cable asking Palevsky to serve as interim UNICEF Representative, to employ a secretary and set up a UNICEF office in Shanghai. UNICEF expressed great appreciation for UNRRA's recent helpful analyses of problems and its recommendations to UNICEF for meeting them.³⁸

In the same draft, shortened and cabled to Shanghai by UNRRA on Christmas eve, UNICEF announced the long-awaited appointment of the UNICEF Chief of Mission for China:

Marcel Junod, Swiss Surgeon with wide experience and formerly in highest positions with International Red Cross ending as their chief delegate in Far East and presently with ICEF, has been selected after consultation with Borcic to be head of ICEF Mission.

³⁶ Memorandum from F D Harris, UNRRA to John Nason, UNICEF
11 December 1947

³⁷ Cable from Cleveland UNRRA Shanghai to Harris UNRRA Washington
12 December 1947 and Harris letter to Nason, UNICEF Washington
15 December 1947

³⁸ Cable From Harris, UNRRA Washington to Cleveland, UNRRA
Shanghai, 19 December 1947 (drafted by UNICEF but cabled in
revised form on 24 December)

Will arrive Shanghai early January. Borcic feels Miss Palevsky is equally essential to success ICEF in China and ICEF therefore hopes she and Junod can work out arrangements for her continued collaboration.³⁹

The Chief of UNRRA's Office of Far Eastern Affairs explains the delay in transmitting the UNICEF message. He writes to Karl Borders, then at the UNICEF Liaison Office in Washington, ". . . I enclose a copy of the cable (now cleared by all) which we are today dispatching to Shanghai. The cable has been pruned a little bit in view of a new economy campaign started by the Director General (in the interest of conserving UNRRA's residual resources for the benefit of the Children's Fund) so I am sure you will be in complete agreement with the exclusions we have made."⁴⁰

Alas, the "pruning" did not really "conserve UNRRA residual resources" for UNICEF, because UNRRA Shanghai immediately asked for fuller information about Marcel Junod which was then cabled to him in its original, UNICEF-drafted form!

And so, at year's end, Mary Palevsky had accepted the appointment as "Interim Representative ICEF" and Marcel Junod was making preparations to leave for China as the permanent Chief of the UNICEF Mission there. A preliminary UNICEF commitment of \$3.5 million had been made for programmes in China.

³⁹ Harris to Cleveland, 19 December 1947 para 2 (draft)

⁴⁰ Letter F D Harris to Karl Borders, 24 December 1947

Chapter 3 - UNICEF Starts Work in China

When Marcel Junod arrived in Shanghai on 5 February 1948, he needed to take up right away three matters. The first was to negotiate and sign an agreement with the Government in Nanking for the establishment and operations of the UNICEF Office. Mary Palevsky had recommended to Headquarters in January that this matter should be handled after Junod's arrival rather than by herself.¹

A second matter was the building up of a UNICEF staff for China. Although a large number of UNRRA (and CNRRA) staff members were being terminated at this time as the UNRRA operations were winding down, many of them were not especially eager to continue working in China under the highly volatile political and military circumstances. Dr Junod was not too well during these early days, and it was necessary for him to carry out some of the personnel interviews from his bed.

The third assignment of these first months was to arrange through CLARA contacts in Hongkong a plan for UNICEF-aided projects to be carried out in the "Liberated Areas" of North China. CLARA had maintained a liaison group in Shanghai during much of the period of UNRRA operations, but as the various truce efforts failed and UNRRA itself started closing down, CNRRA and UNRRA personnel in Communist-controlled areas and CLARA personnel in Nationalist areas were withdrawn. CLARA, however continued to maintain a small liaison group in Hongkong. So it was necessary for Dr Junod to travel down to Hongkong to set up the first

¹ Cable Cleveland, UNRRA Shanghai to Harris, UNRRA Washington, 9 January 1948 (#8378)

arrangements for the entry of a UNICEF team into the Communist controlled areas of North China.

Although the first UNICEF offices were set up in Shanghai for easier contact with UNRRA and because of the shipping facilities, UNICEF decided to establish its China Mission Headquarters in the capital at Nanking while retaining the Shanghai office for supply operations, finance and administration. By March, Dr Junod had moved to Nanking, and a hostel was opened for the newly arriving staff. Within a month, the first UNICEF-aided child-feeding centres were opened here.

With regard to the setting up of child care centres, the advice of the UNRRA group (Lund, Palevsky and Price) was followed. That is, well-known and respected Chinese were asked to serve on a committee charged with the selection or creation of centres, the allocation of UNICEF supplies and the general supervision and management of the projects. In each of the cities where UNICEF supplies were to be used in this manner, one international staff member was appointed as the UNICEF Field Representative. This UNICEF Representative worked with the local committees to help set up the child care centres, kept a record of the incoming supplies and their distribution to the centres, and reported to the China Mission about the development of the programme as a whole.

On another matter, the UNRRA advice was not followed: Lund and Palevsky had argued against UNICEF's working through the Ministry of Social Affairs, and Price had suggested that if it were necessary to do so, other Ministries also be brought in on the Government side. As it turned out, UNICEF's official contact at the central Government level was indeed the Ministry of Social Affairs; the day-to-day dealings with the Government were carried out through Dr H C Chang, the Director of the Department of Social Affairs in the Ministry of Social Affairs.

As a practical arrangement, this was probably as good a way as any under the circumstances. It gave Dr Junod and his staff a single individual to deal with in the government on most matters. By contrast with UNRRA, UNICEF's resources were so modest that temptations to divert supplies to personal or political purposes were slight. And the local committees showed a real concern for meeting needs of children at the community level and took seriously their responsibilities for oversight of the centres. UNICEF Field Representatives in all of the cities where this pattern of assistance was carried out found no problems of misdirection or mismanagement of UNICEF supplies.

At UNICEF's New York Headquarters in New York during April, the Programme Committee of the Executive Board devoted the major part of its session to a discussion of the programme possibilities in China. It was proposed that an amount of \$500,000 be set aside for establishment of programmes "in areas not under the direct control of the Government". This was the circumlocution used for referring to those parts of China directly under the control of the Communist forces, or "Liberated Areas", as they were referred to in places "not under the direct control of the Government".

There had been much discussion between UNICEF and UNRRA and within UNICEF about this question of helping children in need fairly without regard to whether they lived in areas controlled by the Nationalists or by the Communists. One strong recommendation was for UNICEF to deal with each side independently. Thus, in addition to setting up a mission in Nanking, another separate mission would be established in the "Liberated Areas" with access and supply routes through Manchuria. The other view, which prevailed, held that since Nationalist China was the only government recognized by the United Nations, there should be only one UNICEF mission and that one in Nanking. It had to be hoped that the Nanking government, represented on the UNICEF Executive

Board, would uphold UNICEF's commitment to all children without geographical discrimination.

In practical terms, this meant that Dr Junod had to seek permission through the Ministry of Social Affairs to undertake talks with the CLARA representative in Hongkong about entering into an agreement with the Communist authorities for developing a programme in their areas. Understandably, the Nanking Government (now entering the last year of its existence after some two decades of bitter civil war) was not deeply interested in facilitating any kind of aid and comfort to the other side. Nevertheless, permission for the CLARA discussions was given, and on the first of June Dr Junod began talks in Hongkong with Lin Chung the representative of the Chinese Liberated Areas Relief Association. Agreement was reached for a UNICEF team to go into Communist-controlled areas for discussions on the spot about how UNICEF aid could best be used.

Earlier, Dr Junod had been looking for someone to represent UNICEF in such discussions. With agreement now reached in principle on both sides, he then wrote to Dr Leo Eloesser on June 6th proposing that he transfer from WHO to take up this special assignment for UNICEF.

Dr Eloesser whose whole life had been marked by an eagerness to accept unusual and difficult challenges, characteristically gave up a teaching assignment in Changsha to accept the UNICEF request.² In a letter to Mr Pate written from Nanking, he outlined his views on this new mission.³

- 1) He had just returned from a five-month WHO assignment in communist-controlled regions of North China. As long

2 See Leo Eloesser, M.D., Eulogy for a Free Spirit, a biography by Dr Harris B Shumacker, Jr published in 1982 in New York by The Philosophical Library

3 Eloesser to Maurice Pate, Executive Director, ICEF, Paris (sic) Nanking, June 16th, 1948

as only one party to the civil war was recognized, any relief operations within the country must be conducted with the recognized Government's knowledge and sanction. In this respect, he noted, "Dr Junod has handled the situation with extraordinary deftness and sagacity." Having obtained concessions from the highest Nationalist authorities, Dr Junod had overcome obstacles to the success of the ICEF mission. On the Communist side, Dr Eloesser had been assured of welcome and cooperation. In spite of the recent history of UNRRA difficulties with the Nationalist Government in trying to facilitate programmes for Communist areas, Dr Eloesser remained determinedly optimistic.

2) Rapid changes in the military situation were likely; although the "Central Office" should lay down policy, would it not be best to leave local details to the local officer? [This question has reverberated within UNICEF for decades]

3) Although Harbin has been repeatedly mentioned as a port of entry for supplies, should not actual centres and channels of distribution be determined in the area after consultation with authorities there?

4) Food is not scarce in Communist China, therefore feeding programme not a high priority; but need for medical care is; therefore "urge installation of centres for vaccine-production, equipment of maternal, children's and anti-epidemic sanitary centres, which, if installed, will be a permanent monument to the efforts of ICEF."

5) Maintenance of two-way radio liaison highly important. (During the period of UNRRA-CNRRA-CLARA operations of the previous two years, two-way radio

liaison was maintained between Shanghai and several "special offices" in Communist-controlled areas. Because of the breakdown of relationships between CNRRA and CLARA, radio liaison between UNICEF and CLARA would have to be by way of Hongkong.)

Thus by the middle of the year, within four months of his arrival in China, Marcel Junod had established formal and working relationships with the Government, set up a UNICEF office in the capital and field offices in several other cities, with staff in place or under recruitment; and plans were in train for UNICEF work in North China. A picture of UNICEF in China at this time - mid-1948 - is preserved in a report prepared by Newton Bowles for Maurice Pate.⁴

The pattern of visits from headquarters to the field which was to become so characteristic of UNICEF later on was not a UNICEF hallmark in these early days. During the four years, 1947 to 1951, only one visit from UNICEF Headquarters to China was carried out. The one who did it was Newton Bowles, then of the Headquarters Programme "Section" who had served with UNRRA both in Washington and in China through 1947. The visit was warmly welcomed by the newly-appointed UNICEF staff in Shanghai and Nanking. He reported that:

1) Child feeding centres. Nearly 800,000 pounds of whole milk powder had arrived in China; rice was being booked for shipment from "Siam"; and cod liver oil capsules were to be shipped from New Zealand in August. Distribution of these supplies for child feeding centres was to be made to 7 cities - Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow, Tsingtao, Tientsin, Peiping and Canton. Supplies for Kaifeng and Hsuechow could not be shipped "owing to the unsettled military conditions"

⁴ Bowles to Pate, "Progress Report on UNICEF Programme for China", UNICEF, NYHQ, 23 August 1948

2) Channels of distribution. Instead of distributing ICEF food through special feeding centres to be established, first feeding would take place through agencies already operating in the field of child and maternity welfare both Government and private. This would avoid the delay of setting up a new distribution mechanism and help to strengthen existing child welfare agencies.

Planning had been carried out jointly between UNICEF and MOSA; this cooperation would now be extended to the operational phase both at the national and local levels.

Paralleling National UNICEF Advisory Committees, local coordinating committees had been established in the cities where distribution was to be carried out. UNICEF Field Representatives were already working with the local committees in Shanghai, Nanking, Tientsin and Peiping. These committees "seemed seriously concerned about making good use of ICEF supplies." The Ministry of Communications was responsible for handling incoming supplies and had received the first UNICEF shipments reaching Canton, Shanghai and Tientsin in a satisfactory manner.

3) Prospects. "This is a most inopportune time to undertake health and welfare work in China. The civil war dominates everything." Only make-shift arrangements seemed possible. Unrealistic to expect effective direction by MOSA of local agencies. Therefore, the ICEF local committees will provide the mechanism for working with the local child welfare agencies. But financing is a serious problem - without adequate supplies of local currency, the programmes in China cannot succeed. "The strands of administrative

weakness and shortage of money interweave to make a sombre background to our China programme."

As for the immediate future, the UNICEF programme Committee at its session devoted to the China Programme in April 1948 considered an extension of the food programme to a second million dollars, a textile programme of \$850,000, and a medical programme of \$300,000. In Nanking, Sub-committees of the National Advisory Committee to UNICEF were working on plans for these programmes. But a common negative element in China is "the extremely limited channels to reach the great need of China's children."

4) Staff of China Mission -

| | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------|
| Chief of Mission | Marcel Junod | Swiss |
| Deputy, supply operations | Ralph Goodwin | N. Z. |
| Asst Supply Officer | Stuart Youngson | U. K. |
| Finance & Admin | Henri Anette | France |
| Secretaries | Shirley Price | Australia |
| | Naomi Rolbant | USSR |
| Field Representatives | | |
| Shanghai | Wm C Berghes | USA |
| Nanking [Nanjing] | Evelyn Anderson | USA |
| Hankow [Hankou] | D K Faris | Canada |
| | (arriving Sept) | |
| Tsingtao [Qingdao] | Elsie Moyle | N. Z. |
| | (arriving Sept) | |
| Tientsin [Tianjin] | Jean Schilling | France |
| Peiping [Beiping] | Helen Drummond | USA |
| Canton [Guangzhou] | (vacant, later to be filled by | |

Simon Polak Netherlands

Consultant, Textile

Programme

Norman Horn

USA

Mr Bowles concludes his report with a statement about the newly formed "North China Field Team". Although UNICEF had been very careful to deal through the Nanking Government with regard to this programme, it was also necessary to keep it as distinct as possible from the (Nationalist) China Mission to gain acceptance on the other side.

Before moving on to an account of UNICEF's entry into "North China", one other projected programme under the direct supervision of the China Mission should be described. Acting against the advice of the UNRRA staff consulted, and of Borcic's confident prediction that UNRRA's experience would prove to UNICEF the impracticability of such a step, UNICEF nevertheless moved ahead in August to undertake a cotton programme in China.

In a letter drafted for Karl Borders' signature, Newton Bowles presented for Norman Horn, the new consultant to the cotton programme, a "job description" that is a model of clarity.⁵ UNICEF had agreed to procure some \$600,000 worth of raw cotton for China. In exchange for this cotton, UNICEF should receive "a maximum quantity of cloth for the use of the children and expectant or nursing mothers of China, or the institutions caring for them." The cost of processing the raw cotton to finished piece goods including administration, transportation and warehousing would be borne by the Government. But in order to speed up the process so that cloth would be ready for the children before winter, an early direct exchange of UNICEF cotton for finished cloth could be arranged.

⁵ Letter Karl Borders to Norman Hall, "Subject: Assignment of Mr Norman Horn in China", UNICEF, NYHQ, 23 August 1948

One of the specific proposals made by the Textile Advisory Committee meeting in Shanghai was to exchange a third of UNICEF's long staple cotton for locally grown short staple cotton in China. This local cotton would be used for "wadding" of clothing against the winter - a common practice in northern China. But the textile consultant was advised that "UNICEF expects all Governments to make maximum use of indigenous supplies and therefore finds it difficult to reconcile the above proposal with ICEF principles."⁶

Another request not considered appropriate was for \$30,000 worth of dyes to be used during processing. It had already been established that processing costs were to be borne by the Government. A quick and direct exchange of cotton for cloth would by-pass this question.

Mr Horn was also to take up the matter of marking, so that UNICEF cloth could be identified down to the end user.

Finally, no part of the UNICEF cotton would be shipped to China until after the consultant's recommendations had been received, and the future of the programme would depend on how the initial shipments were handled.

Administratively, Norman Horn would "work under the general direction of Dr Junod, with the assistance of the Deputy Chief of the China Mission, Mr Ralph Goodwin, and with the advice of Mr Jerome Jacobson, Legal Counsel to the Fund in China." Three to six months were expected to be sufficient to carry out the assignment and one or more "Textile Supply Officers" and other UNICEF staff would be provided to work with him and to carry on

⁶ Letter Borders to Horn, paragraph 6. This principle became well known through the early years to UNICEF programme staff in the field. The principle eventually became modified almost beyond recognition.

the work after his departure.

Chapter 4 - The North China Field Team

Before following the UNICEF North China Field Team into the Communist-controlled areas of Hebei province for the rendezvous with CLARA officials at Shijiazhuang in July and August of 1948, we should take a look at the turbulent events overtaking the country. These events necessarily impinged on the work of UNICEF and its planning. The generally depressing conditions are expressed in a report entitled "Economic Aid under the China Aid Act of 1948" outlining the problems surrounding the administration of United States assistance during the same year that UNICEF was getting started in China:

During all of 1948, the economy of Nationalist China continued to deteriorate at an accelerating pace. The loss of territory to Communist forces, the further dislocation of transportation and productive facilities and a sharp increase in smuggling combined to reduce receipts from taxes, Government-operated enterprises and customs duties. Increased military expenditures were incurred as the civil war spread and mounted in intensity. Prices in August 1948, . . . were more than 3 million times those of the pre-war half year, January to June 1937. In the first 7 months of 1948 prices increased more than 45 times and the black market rate for the United States dollar increased over 50 times. . . . In the mid-summer of 1948, there was a sharp increase in the velocity of currency circulation which sent prices to astronomical figures. The Chinese Government was unwilling to print new currency notes of sufficiently large denominations to keep pace with the prices, and it had become impossible to print adequate quantities of currency of lower

denominations, which had to be used in such bulk that bushel baskets were required for currency transactions."¹

On the military side, as U. S. Ambassador, J. Leighton Stuart wrote to the Secretary of State on August 10th that the Communists were winning the civil war, retaining the initiative against troops unwilling or unable to fight; the Communists occupied most of north China east of Xian and north of the Yangtze except for a few urban centers such as Beijing and Tianjin and some lines of communications; it appeared that all of Shandong would be taken over soon including the provincial capital Jinan and the chief port Qingdao; then a full scale attack against Nanjing could be mounted or even against the Beijing-Tianjin area.²

It was from this "Beijing-Tianjin area" that the North China Field Team journeyed overland by truck southwestward to Shijiazhuang. In spite of the preoccupation of the national government with economic and military problems, Dr Junod had managed to secure from them agreement to:

- a) the entry of UNICEF personnel into Communist controlled areas (but with the caveat that "in case of war" the permission may be withdrawn)³;
- b) the establishment of a medical programme with UNICEF supplies in these areas; and
- c) the setting up of radio liaison between the UNICEF Team and the China Mission via Hongkong.⁴

The North China Field Team was made up of two people: Dr Leo Eloesser as senior member and Perry Hanson, formerly of UNRRA in Kaifeng, West Shandong and Tianjin. The two had met for the first time during the previous December (1947) in Tianjin and had

1 The China White Paper, page 399

2 The China White Paper, Annex 161, "The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to Secretary Marshall" p.885

3 Ku Cheng-kang, Minister of Social Affairs to Dr Junod, 10 July 1948

4 Memorandum, Hanson to Pate, 10 September 1948

travelled together (on separate assignments) over much the same route they would now be taking again.⁵ This time, after discussions about the mission with Dr Junod in Nanking, the team acquired a Dodge six-by-six "Personnel-carrier" which had started its career with the army, was then passed on to UNRRA and now bequeathed to UNICEF. To emphasize its new identity, the vehicle was painted blue and marked with large Chinese characters and the English initials: UNICEF. The journey northward began by sea on the deck of a Chinese freighter bound for Tianjin's port of Tangku.

The team needed to buy a hundred gallons of gasoline for the overland journey, and Dr Eloesser noted what the fast depreciating Chinese dollar had done to prices. "At the Caltex petrol agency, Perry and I bought two drums of gasoline and ten gallons of kerosene for something over a billion dollars, National currency. By the time we had a cheque cashed at the bank, Caltex had closed. Next morning, the gasoline cost two billion dollars."⁶

On August 14th, the team drove southward from Tianjin along the Grand Canal to the Nationalist-Communist border. [see map] When battles have been recently fought, outpost guards on either side tend to be suspicious of travellers and very nervous. On this occasion, each of the Nationalist officers at three out-posts simply looked at the chop of the Minister of National Defense, General Ho Ying-chin and waved the team on into no-man's land. On the other side, the young Communist sentries were satisfied with a calling card which bore in both Chinese and English the resounding, if redundant: United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund [lian-he-guo guo-ji er-tong jin-ji ji-jin hui]. However, at Qing-xian, the commander of the first Communist garrison asked the team not to go any further until he had received clearance from higher authorities. A day later, this

⁵ Shumacker, Leo Eloesser, M.D., pp 324-326

⁶ Leo Eloesser, Medical Service to the Chinese People, draft, p.28.

came through and the UNICEF team set out again with two Red Army escorts. Heavy rains had flooded out some of the roads but detours were possible and two days further on the team reached its destination, Shijiazhuang, averaging about 50 miles a day, then considered to be quite good time. (However, looking to the futurework of UNICEF in the area, the team recommended that "each member of the North China Team should be provided with a light but sturdy bicycle."⁷ One jeep would also be needed but the personnel-carrier simply consumed too much gasoline - nearly one gallon per mile.

CLARA maintained a hostel on the outskirts of town, a converted Japanese officers club, where UNICEF personnel assigned to the programme in North China would be put up and which would serve as the headquarters of the UNICEF North China group.

Over the next several days, in a series of informal and formal meetings, UNICEF and CLARA reached an understanding about working together for the benefit of children in the area. CLARA accepted wholeheartedly Dr Eloessers proposals for a children's health programme; they were, however, concerned about the supply operation and emphasized that the success or failure of the programme would depend on the success or failure of getting supplies in. This was to remain a significant issue.

As for supply routes, CLARA showed that projects in North China could not be supplied through Manchuria. Two reasons were given: the Nationalists controlled a corridor separating Manchuria from North China; and Manchuria was a virtually autonomous region which should warrant a separate UNICEF office and programme. The route southward from Tianjin and then west which the UNICEF team had recently travelled was not much better. Fresh in memory was the dismal UNRRA experience during 1947 when barges loaded with supplies for the Liberated Areas had not been allowed to move down

⁷ Memorandum, Hanson to Pate, Seijing, 10 September 1948

the Grand Canal from Tianjin. CLARA recommended instead that UNICEF use the two small Shandong ports of Yang-jia-kou and Cheng-zi-kou; CLARA would provide horse-carts for hauling supplies inland. In addition, the Friends Service Unit made an offer to use its nearby fleet of several trucks to transport UNICEF supplies, especially the most valuable or perishable.

While the negotiations were in progress, Nationalist fighter planes attacked the city and also dropped messages warning that bombers would "wipe out the industrial sections" of the city in the afternoon and urging civilians to leave. A single "Liberator" appeared as promised and methodically bombed a section of the city near the railway shops. The plane missed its target but completely demolished a considerable area of homes. In the shambles, families dug frantically to unbury those missing among them. This untoward destruction illustrates a complaint of a military advisor of the time that not only did the Air Force "strafe from ineffective heights, but they also bombed from ridiculous elevations." ⁸

The Friends Service Unit and UNICEF vehicles were used as ambulances to ferry the dying and wounded to the hospital where Dr Eloesser, Dr Ma Hai-teh (George Hatem) and Dr Ho Mou were operating on the most severely injured among those who could be saved - amputations, crushed chests, compound fractures etc. They worked through the rest of the afternoon and most of the night, returning at six in the morning after a two-hour rest. ⁹

Air raids continued but no more serious damage was done at this time. The UNICEF Team continued its meetings with CLARA to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement expressed in a "Letter

⁸ The China White Paper, p 330

⁹ Memorandum, Hanson to Pate, 10 September 1948; and Report #1 of North China Field Team, Shih-chia-chuang, August 26, 1948

of Understanding" and to work out a Plan of Operations.
10

The background statistics for the Plan of Operations, prepared by CLARA, noted that in the relatively stable region of "Hwa Pei", i.e. "North China" where UNICEF aid would be used, there was a population of 82 million or "twice the population of France". The average life span of Chinese was just over 20 years. Counting children under twelve and nursing and pregnant mothers, there were 40 million eligible for UNICEF help. Since UNICEF's \$500,000 was small by comparison to the need, careful attention must be paid to its use.

Administratively, UNICEF and CLARA would establish a "Supply Receiving Centre" at Dezhou on the railroad near the Shandong border to receive UNICEF supplies coming in from the two small ports. Shijiazhuang was recommended for the "North China Regional Office of UNICEF". It lies on the railroad. Medical schools, the Institute for Medical Research and the Vaccine and Serum Production Institute, larger groups of medical personnel and a large hospital all lay within easy reach of the town. It was also the headquarters for the central CLARA authorities.

Referring to Eloesser's proposals for the training of health personnel, the Health Commissioner, Dr Qian, cautioned that it represented a new departure for the North China Region. So great care should be taken in the choosing of the first personnel, the preparation of the first courses and, above all, in emphasizing to each class that maintenance of child and maternal health was paramount, not curative medicine.¹¹

10 Exchange of letters: a) Eloesser and Hanson to Tung Pi-wu, Chairman, CLARA; and b) General Wu Yun-fu for Tung Pi-wu, Chairman, CLARA to UNICEF NYHQ % North China Field Team. Eloesser and Hanson

11 "Plan of Operations for Liberated Areas", Appendix #4, Report #1, North China Field Team, August 28, 1948

There would be 20 trainees, middle school graduates, for the first course lasting about 3 months. Trainees showing teaching ability would be kept on as instructors under the senior faculty for the second series of courses; and the better of these would be sent out to training sub-stations thus accelerating the pace of the training project. The curriculum would include:

- a) sanitation and communicable diseases;
- b) first aid and treatment of injuries; and
- c) midwifery.

At this time, there was no objection to making use of other foreign teaching personnel, even of British or American missionaries. Indeed, UNICEF was asked to hasten recruitment in particular of Edth Galt and Isabel Hemingway, both with the American Board Mission, for the midwifery course.

Field work would begin as soon as the first training course had been completed, and as trained workers increased, teams would be assigned first to the five central regions of the Area and eventually to all 22 districts. These teams would work out of a district centre and would consist of: a chief, one person in charge of preventive medicine, one midwife, one person in charge of health education of the public, and a nurse "in charge of supplies, sterilization and assistance with vaccination." The centre would also have one cook and two or three mule-drivers. One mule cart and four to six pack animals were considered enough for each team.

As for help for the Vaccine and Serum Production Plant, it was understood that the Pasteur Institute had shown a willingness to take part in the programme; if so, UNICEF was asked to urge the Institute to hasten its entry into the Area. If not, then the Rockefeller Foundation should be asked for advice and help. In any event, two Pasteur personnel should be recruited, one production-immunologist and one "preparateur". Dr Li Chih-chung, Chief of the Anti-Epidemic Bureau had already set up a plant for

modest production with trained personnel; Eloesser felt, therefore, that the proposed new plant could be brought speedily into production.

Supply lists were attached to this very informal Plan of Operations.

The Shijiazhuang Agreement was made up of an exchange of letters between UNICEF and CLARA. The UNICEF letter included six points:

- 1) the programme was for children and mothers "without discrimination because of race, creed or political belief", and the supplies would not be used for any other purpose;
- 2) UNICEF supplies would be "matched" by CLARA's providing personnel, warehousing, transportation and services;
- 3) All supplies imported by UNICEF shall remain the property of UNICEF "and shall be utilized under the supervision and control of UNICEF personnel until consumed or received by the end-user"; [this clause later became the most controversial]
- 4) Expenses in local currency to be met by CLARA;
- 5) Radio liaison with Hong Kong to be maintained;
- 6) UNICEF personnel would have freedom to supervise distribution of supplies, and the programme would have "full freedom of publicity".

CLARA's letter repeated verbatim the six points and reaffirmed agreement adding, "We especially approve of the medical program." Four points were added for consideration by UNICEF:

- 1) UNICEF should set up an office "in the China Liberated Areas which will have direct connection with UNICEF Headquarters and its Far Eastern Desk, and that the China Liberated Area will continue to receive a fair and reasonable allocation in conformity with a policy of non-discrimination.

- 2) Project personnel would be mutually acceptable
- 3) UNICEF personnel would abide by the laws of the democratic governments and respect the customs of the local people.
- 4) Difficulties arising because of communications problems or military situations would be solved by mutual consultation.

With the talks thus concluded to everyone's satisfaction at the time, Eloesser immediately went to work with health personnel on the details of getting the Training Courses started. Other prospects were also encouraging. In the North China countryside, it was the beginning of harvest and the crops looked very good: millet, sorghum, corn, cotton, soy-beans, peanuts, dates, pears, sesame and sweet potatoes. Hanson returned with the documents to Tianjin (taking six days this time to average 30 miles a day because of flooded roads and a two-day border battle). He then went on to meet with Dr Junod in Beijing at the newly-opened UNICEF Field Office where he reported on the outcome of the trip and forwarded messages to New York Headquarters.

Chapter 5 - The Health Workers Training School

When Dr Junod had asked him to work for UNICEF in North China, Dr Eloesser had made it clear that he "knew little about babies and less about feeding them". Even earlier, he had questioned whether his own speciality was of any great importance in China then. "For it was apparent to me. . . that thoracic surgery had little to do with the welfare of Chinese villagers but that teaching like that I had seen in Yen-an might help them."¹

So at Shijiazhuang, he went ahead with enthusiasm with the planning for the first UNICEF-aided training courses, complaining only that continuing air-raids left wounded whose necessary attention stole time from preparations for the school. At first, he worked chiefly with Dr Li Chih-chung, Head of the Anti-Epidemic Bureau. Together they bicycled to the nearby river where a sandy island had been reclaimed and, years earlier, a Trappist monastery built. An agricultural station occupied about two-thirds of the compound and the Anti-epidemic Bureau the rest. The two agreed that this would be a good site for the training school. The day-to-day problems faced by the 100-member staff of the Anti-epidemic Bureau which Dr Eloesser describes were similar to those which would have to be met by the faculty and students of the Health Workers Training courses:

. . . apprentices in training rotated through different departments, beginning with bottle-washing and tending animals; they got up before dawn and worked until dark: some sat up all night, tending apparatus. Boys and

¹ Leo Eloesser, *Medical Service to the Chinese People*, p 28 and p 6

girls hauled hay and curried horses, shovelled fuel and worked bellows; they came fresh from the plough and ox-goad, but with patience they learned to handle thermometers and test-tubes. Obstacles overcome. . . were from things so elemental that we take their provision for granted. Light, heat, water, fuel and also, equipment that could not be made at home - watches, thermometers, syringes, microscopes, chemicals, stains.

Light came here and there from kerosene lamps, dark-yellow kerosene that encrusted the wick after half an hour and had to be scraped off. The wretched lamp-chimneys cracked; they were scarce, almost irreplaceable. The boys would mend them with paper until finally the lamp burnt smokily without a chimney. . . elsewhere oil-lamps served, like those depicted on Greek vases, with a wick of cotton or pith coming out of a spout on the side of a bowl.

Coal was not too scarce. It came by rail from a mine some 40 miles away and was brought some 5 miles on carts, but it wasn't plentiful enough to heat buildings, laboratories and sleeping quarters. . . Winter was like that of the Dakotas; in spite of cotton-padded clothing, the boys and girls who worked in stone buildings had purple swollen, chilblained hands and frost-bitten feet and ankles. . .

The monastery had a well... In the bottle-washing room and at the still, a cask and a gasoline drum with a hose attached furnished running water. The running was done by the boys who ran to the well with buckets to keep the cask full. Distilled water, pure enough for intravenous injection was keenly needed. In Hsi Ching, I designed a still with baffle-plates that a tin smith made from my

paper and tin-can model. It worked, delivering protein-free water. . .

Young white-coats who may read this, how would it be to work in a laboratory that has no light, no electricity, no gas, no running water; where every empty bottle or tin-can is a treasure; where to break a thermometer or a syringe or a needle or a test-tube is a catastrophe; where paper is so scarce that you keep your notes on brown straw paper such as your grandmother's butcher used to wrap chops in; where everything that man can use of make is to be used thriftily and carefully and not to be discarded as long as any use is left in it?

At a 5:30 bugle call you crawl shivering from under the covers out into the night; you wash your hands and face a little, a very little, in a pan of icy water; you have 20 minutes of setting-up exercises and then go to work until 8:30. At 8:30 you have a bowl of millet gruel and a few shreds of pickled cabbage and turn to and work or hear lectures with one or two ten-minute rest periods until noon. At noon you get an hour off, mend your clothes, sweep out your quarters or do any of the chores that accumulate when you have no one to do them for you. At one o'clock you turn to again until 3:30; then you run off, get your bowl and chopsticks and line up for sorghum or millet porridge and soup or maybe a little vegetable cooked in oil. Squatting on your heels in the courtyard, your bowl in one hand, your chopsticks in the other, you eat in a circle of your buddies. . . At four you meet to discuss the day's work or perhaps finish cleaning up the laboratory or have a study period. At five you hear the newspaper read; from six to seven you have to yourself; from seven to nine you have a quiz or

a solemn, fiery Marxist indoctrination and at 9:30 you turn in.²

The new school building was to be 18 feet wide and 90 feet long, half of which would be used for the production of small-pox vaccine and classes held in the other half. Masons and carpenters went to work. The small faculty drew up study plans and schedules. Students began to arrive - 17 young men and women. Then, suddenly a messenger bicycled in with the news that the Nationalist Commander, Fu Tso-yi was massing troops to the north and was planning to attack and occupy Shijiazhuang! The workmen packed their tools and left. The faculty and students packed all they could and set out for the hills to the west. By foot, in carts and on horseback, women and children, boys and men, cows and calves moved off leaving behind the scaffolding of the half-finished school.

After several days of chilly flight, the group reached the village of Liang He (Cold Creek), which the irrepressible Leo Eloesser decided would be a perfect location for the school. Converted temples at the village entrance would serve well as class-rooms and there would be space also for a laboratory. The next day, on a nearly empty stomach because the provision carts had been delayed fording a swollen stream, Eloesser went about planning for the school at this new site.

But soon another message came: General Fu Tso-yi had been defeated and had pulled out of Shijiazhuang. So the lovely prospect offered by the Cold Creek Temples had to be given up and the party made its way back to the Trappist monastery on the river. November 22nd was now set as the date to open the school. The carpenters and masons returned and worked late each night to finish the building in time. Everyone foraged for teaching supplies and everything was finally ready on time: the school

² Leo Eloesser, Medical Service to the Chinese People. draft pp 31-34

"opened with speeches, presentation of scrolls and banners and a great feast."³ This time there were twenty students.

The class was made up of a strange mixture of young men and women ranging from medical students whose academic courses had been interrupted by the civil war to illiterate farm-wives who never learned to read a blood-pressure dial. In Dr Eloesser's view, it was the disappointed medical students who were the misfits in this new approach to training health workers for the villages.

After only six weeks of preparation, the class took to the field for a fortnight in small groups of two or four so that lessons learned at the village level could be brought back for working into the curriculum. And what could they actually do? - Vaccinate against smallpox and typhoid, help clean villages and construct latrines; take a health survey; assist midwives; and undertake health education of the public. They did it well, and the many problems taught much. As Dr Eloesser said, "When the teams returned to school and presented their reports for discussion, I was astonished to see what the short 6 weeks of training had been able to do for our group of boys and girls; I learnt too, that future preparation should be more explicit, more detailed and better timed."⁴ The students went on to complete this first course by the end of January 1949.

During the period of this course, the problem of communications between Dr Eloesser at the school in the monastery near Shijiazhuang and Dr Junod in Nanking - or with UNICEF's New York Headquarters - was unusual. The initial arrangements for radio liaison by way of Hongkong had to be followed up. After Nationalist approval for receiving and sending messages through Hongkong with the cooperation of the British authorities had been received, Dr Junod flew again to Hongkong on 14 October. He

³ Eloesser, Medical Service to the Chinese People, p 42

⁴ Eloesser, Medical Service to the Chinese People draft, p 50

found that the first three messages sent from Shijiazhuang had already arrived, and he was able to send off the first reply. Although several exchanges of messages were completed over the next three months, the procedure was cumbersome: UNICEF messages from Nanking had first to be submitted to the Ministry of Social Affairs for approval, then mailed to Hongkong to the CLARA liaison officer who radioed it to Shijiazhuang where it was picked up and carried by messenger on bicycle or donkey to Dr Eloesser. In the other direction, messages received from Shijiazhuang in Hongkong were mailed in four copies to the British Embassy in Nanking which retained one and sent the other three to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Social Affairs and to UNICEF.⁵

With events moving so swiftly in China, this was not the most felicitous manner of keeping in touch. As for progress reports about the work of the North China Field "Team", Dr Eloesser had no recourse but to trust them to some traveller. All of his early reports were sent out in this manner usually by Friends Service Unit volunteers travelling across the lines.

If it was difficult to send radio messages and reports in and out of the area, it was virtually impossible to move any substantial amount of supplies across the military lines. But with the possibility that the small Shandong ports might be used, the UNICEF procurement section in New York went ahead with the then relatively new and complicated task of securing a wide variety of drugs and hospital equipment - and this, without the chance to exchange information quickly or raise questions with Shijiazhuang about the many detailed specifications. Nevertheless, by the end of 1948, \$138,000 worth of supplies had been procured and were on their way to China. Then, because of the unavoidable delays, a revision of the first list arrived in

⁵ Hanson, "The UNICEF Program in China", p. 9

New York. There also came a second list valued at \$500,000.

By then, the initial shipment was on its way, and the first UNICEF supplies for "North China" arrived in Tianjin on 29 March 1949. But why had the supplies been shipped to Tianjin? Why not to one of the small Shantung ports as had been proposed six months earlier?

The reason was that the whole course of the civil war had moved dramatically. The rapid advance of the Communist forces and their capture of Jinan, the capital of Shandong, and "Peiping" and "Tientsin", and southward again after the battle for Xuzhou to the banks of the Yangzi caught many on both sides by surprise. Jean Chesneaux refers to it as "A victory that was too sudden."

⁶ Certainly, during all of the discussions about establishing the UNICEF office in North China, none of the CLARA officials present seemed to anticipate the geographical extent of the advance as coming so soon, not even after the decisive victories of the Communist forces in Shandong and the capture of the important city of Weixian and of Jinan, the provincial capital. The August and September discussions about making use of the smaller inconvenient Shandong ports for receiving UNICEF supplies and their laborious forwarding inland by cart was now totally irrelevant. And personnel, too, for the North China Field Team no longer presented a problem with regard to the securing of Nationalist permits to enter the area. For example, Edith Galt, the nurse-midwife instructor for the health workers training course had been waiting patiently in Tianjin for the Nationalist travel permit so she could join Dr Eloesser and the school. With Tianjin "liberated" in January, she was automatically within the area, and instead of having to make her way slowly to Shijiazhuang, she was now able to take the train to Beijing and help open the second training course there.

⁶ Chesneaux, *China, The People's Republic*, p. 9

The repercussions of the accelerated movement of the war were felt in Shijiazhuang in early December of 1948. Dr Ssu, the Chief Health Commissioner and Head of the Army Medical Service returned to the Health Workers Training Centre to announce that Beijing would soon be taken and that the new Government would need both Dr Li Chih-chung, Chief of the anti-Epidemic Bureau who taught sanitation at the school and Dr Liu Shih-chieh who taught communicable diseases. The school itself would later be moved to Beijing, but the present course should be completed. Dr Eloesser was left to see it through with the small faculty seriously depleted by the loss of the two "top men".⁷

As the first course was drawing to a close in January 1949, Dr Eloesser was in correspondence with Dr Ssu about health programmes under the new Government and the training of staff for them. Dr Ssu replied that careful planning was needed: "if we think of something quite carefully and thoroughly we can make our work more effectual and the people will get more help from us."⁸ After further emphasizing the difficulties of beginning this new and greatly enlarged undertaking, he went on to outline his proposal.

The training course would be divided into four departments: 1) sanitation; 2) communicable disease control; 3) women and children's health (including midwifery); and 4) first aid and treatment. The course would continue to be short - 3 or 4 months only. The teams would be enlarged to five - one from each of the four departments and one for "administration". Dr Ssu makes the observation that the team's combined training would equal that of one person trained for over a year! After a year or so of work in the field, the workers would have a chance for additional training - in their own department or to learn other fields of

⁷ Eloesser, Medical Service to the Chinese People, draft, p 48

⁸ Letter from Dr Ssu Chin-kwan to Dr Eloesser, 22 January 1949, an English translation of which is reproduced in Dr Eloesser's "Medical Service to the Chinese People", draft, pp 51-54

health care. Thus, there may be "no need to send them to medical college, nursing school or to learn pharmacology later on."

Dr Ssu again stressed the size of the health problem and the need to "train a big number of village health workers within a short period so as to serve the people practically." There are 2,009 xian (counties) in China. Three-fourths of these would be "liberated" during 1950, so the training task ahead was vast and immediate.⁹

In a separate letter to doctors of the Government Health Administration in Shijiazhuang, Dr Ssu gave instructions about the graduates of the first course: what they had learned was suitable for village health work, but the medical need was so great in the villages these workers might be tempted to act as doctors. This must be guarded against. Since the training itself is still in the very beginning, it is important to find out from work in the field what has proven good and what bad in the training so that improvement can be made for the next batch of trainees. It is important therefore to keep up an "intimate connection" between the newly trained field workers and the teachers of the training class. Remember, the main work is prevention. Finally, "It is an important work and we can get our experience from it."¹⁰

Dr Eloesser was always generous in his written praise of the work of his colleagues, and his response to Dr Ssu's letter was characteristic: "What a kind, courteous, unassuming, deliberate, attentive, carefully considered missive. . ." [Over 25 years later, after a return trip to Beijing, he referred to "Dr Ssu Chin-kwan's active support and participation in the early three-month training courses at the Pen Tu monastery and Tungchow" which

⁹ Dr Ssu's letter to Eloesser, noted above

¹⁰ Letter from Dr Ssu Chin-kwan to Drs Ju, Liu and Chu of the Government Health Administration, Shijiazhuang, 22 January 1948. Translation included in Eloesser's "Medical Service to the Chinese People", pp. 55-56

"may have been a first contributory step toward reform of medical education and medical service. ." ¹¹]

It was therefore with high hopes for a warm and fruitful working relationship with the health-field leaders in the new Government that Dr Eloesser pedalled from the monastery in to Shijiazhuang with messages for transmission to UNICEF Headquarters. But the earlier arrangements no longer applied; Beijing would have to be consulted and the matter settled there. Dr Eloesser was perplexed: "This was my first inkling that government relations with UNICEF had changed." ¹²

Early on a cold winter morning, Dr Eloesser boarded a charcoal-burning truck loaded with passengers and luggage for a two-day journey to Beijing and to what had been the "UNICEF Peiping Field Office" housed in a building of the "Peking Union Medical College."

¹¹ Eloesser, Medical Service to the Chinese People, draft, p 57

¹² Eloesser, Medical Service to the Chinese People, draft, p 58

Chapter 6 - Caught in the Middle

Soon after returning to Nanjing from his trips to the UNICEF Field Offices in Beijing and Qingdao and then to Hongkong for further talks with the CLARA Liaison Representative about communications with Shijiazhuang, Dr Junod found that the Nationalist capital was preoccupied with the realization that the momentum of the advancing Communist forces would not be slowed and certainly not halted at the river (Yangzi).

The loss of all of Manchuria had stunned the Government, and the unexpected defeat in the battle for Jinan meant that only the Nationalist armies at Xuzhou could prevent the fall of Nanjing. Foreign nationals began leaving, including the families of most of the diplomatic corps. The United States Military Advisory Group was withdrawn. All of the United Nations personnel in Nanjing (with the exception of UNICEF) also left. It was decided that Don Faris, UNICEF Field Representative in Hankou, and Elsie Moyle, UNICEF Field Representative in Qingdao should leave, but that the child care centres in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Nanjing should carry on as long as possible.

Because of the rapid political and military developments during the last few weeks of 1948, Junod attempted to keep in touch with UNICEF Headquarters in New York by telephone. The connections were never very good, however, and it was agreed that Junod should come to New York for the Executive Board meeting in January where he could present his views in person on the future of UNICEF in China. He left for New York on the 22nd of January 1949, just about one year after his arrival.

Just as Eloesser and Ssu in the North were planning for a new health programme under the changed circumstances there, UNICEF Headquarters was taking another look at UNICEF's future (if any) for China as a whole.¹ The discussion pointed up the difference between the situation in Europe and that in China. Early guiding principles for UNICEF were more often than not based on European conditions. For example, "Emergency measures shall be so developed and administered as to utilize and strengthen the permanent child health and child welfare programmes of the countries receiving assistance. . ."² But in a country such as China where "permanent child health and child welfare programmes" did not exist, such a principle was irrelevant.

Once more, we note the disparity between Europe and Asia. Although about 5% of the 70 million children and expectant mothers might be helped by UNICEF-aided feeding programmes in Europe, "a far smaller percentage" could be reached in China and the Far East.³ "At the peak of UNICEF operations in Europe some six million children received a daily supplemental meal."⁴ Child feeding operations in China were interrupted before even a small fraction of that mount had been reached.

Within China, there was also an imbalance. As late as October 1948, the Nationalist Government was requesting from UNICEF \$6,500,000 worth of aid and only \$500,000 for areas not under their control. The proposed programmes for the two sides differed: the Nanking Government asked for \$4 million in food, \$2 million in cotton, and \$1/2 million for medical supplies. In North China, a programme had been developed for training local personnel in simple health-care skills to be used by teams of

1 Unsigned draft, "Future of UNICEF Programme for China", NYHC, undated, but probably drawn up in December 1948 or January 1949, and probably by Newton Bowles [?]

2 United Nations document E/411, 1 April 1947 (Section B)

3 Document E/590, para 14, United Nations, October 1947

4 Charnow, History of UNICEF, draft, p 2

trainees in the villages with \$500,000 aid from UNICEF.

It is curious now to note the persistence of the assumption that China would continue to be divided on the mainland - at least for the duration of the then temporary "Emergency" Fund. Planning for both sides continued.

In discussing UNICEF's future in China at Headquarters after his return from China, Dr Junod concluded that emergency relief was not the way to go. Rather, two Institutes of Child Health should be established, one in the North and one in the South.

Other proposals included help for an Anti-Kalazar programme which would provide drugs for infected children and an attempt to eradicate the sandfly from infected areas. The Friends Service Unit would provide personnel and UNICEF the supplies. [UNICEF did, in fact, buy stibinol from India through the UNICEF Bangkok Office for the anti-kalazar efforts in North China.]

There were also proposals to aid serum and vaccine production; a mass health education programme; and projects against tuberculosis, venereal disease, malaria and trachoma, jointly with WHO. And FAO in Washington recommended the development of an indigenous supply of milk or milk substitute, from goats and soybeans. This was based on a suggestion by Dr P Z King, then UNICEF Headquarters Medical Advisor.

The discussion about the future of UNICEF in China emphasized that although UNICEF was initially created to deal with problems of children arising from the Second World War, China's children had suffered far more from the protracted and continuing civil war. The needs were so vast that only a China dedicated to meeting those needs - not imported food, clothing or medical supplies as such - could hope to be effective. The discussion recommended planning, not from the top down, but from the bottom

up. "This is not a way to spend a lot of money fast; it is a way to spend a little money well."⁵

One of UNICEF's more endearing characteristics is its willingness, sooner or later, to modify certain "basic principles" if circumstances in the field clearly warrant it. For example, even at this early stage of UNICEF's history, we can find the following statement: "Unquestionably, therefore, UNICEF assistance in China under present conditions can be really effective only if UNICEF is prepared to devote part of its resources to internal financing of child health and welfare. . ."⁶

But even while these discussions were going on in New York, events continued to move rapidly in China. The Nationalist defenders at Xuzhou were demolished by the end of December, and the exodus from Nanjing accelerated. On Christmas eve when the UNICEF office in Nanjing called Helen Drummond in Beijing she turned the telephone toward the window so that the sound of the approaching Red Army gunfire could be heard. Yenching University on the outskirts of the city had been entered.⁷

By the middle of January 1949, Tianjin had been taken. The UNICEF Field Representative, Jean Schilling, remained there during this period and did not leave China until June. Beijing itself was "liberated" before the end of the month. The continued efficiency of the long distance telephone service within China during these days was remarkable. For most of this period it was possible for Perry Hanson in Nanjing to talk with Helen Drummond, and later with Leo Eloesser even though Nanjing was still held by the Nationalists and Beijing by the Communists.

⁵ Draft, "Future of UNICEF Programme for China" p. 9

⁶ Draft, "Future of UNICEF Programme for China", p. 10

⁷ Philip West, Yenching University and Sino-Western Relations, 1916-1952.

In January also, the "Generalissimo" Chiang Kai Shek resigned the presidency of China, naming Li Tsung-jen Acting President and General Yen Hsi-shan, Premier. This set off a rush of Nationalist Government personnel out of Nanjing. The UNICEF-aided Child Care centres, however, remained opened as they were run by local non-government volunteers all of whom remained in Nanjing. Geraldine Kean, the volunteer UNICEF Field Representative from New Zealand also remained and continued her work of supervision and visiting of centres on a daily basis throughout the crisis.⁸ [There were a total of four UNICEF Field Representatives in succession in Nanjing during the year: first, Evelyn Andersen who was transferred to Shanghai for a while before leaving China; then Dr Earle McPhail, pediatrician who was transferred to the UNICEF "faculty" of the Health workers Training Course at Tungchow; Geraldine Keane the CORSO volunteer, who remained in Nanjing during the takeover period; and finally K. Y. Chen who had worked closely from the beginning with Sun Teliang of the Nanjing "Local Committee" to establish the child-care programme.]

The Nationalist capital was moved to Canton and for several hectic months, Simon Polak, UNICEF's Field Representative there had to deal not only with the operations of the child-care centres but also with the transplanted Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior. The Government wanted to open child feeding centres in additional cities to make up for those lost to the Communists. It was also eager to proceed with the Cotton Project. All this a few weeks before Canton too, the last Nationalist capital on the mainland, was abandoned.⁹ The

⁸ Letter, Hanson to Borders, 7 June 1949

⁹ Li Han-Wen, Minister of the Interior, Government of China to Simon Polak, China Representative UNICEF, Canton 25 June 1949. The Minister began his letter with the doggedly optimistic sentence: "In view of the loss of Nanking, Shanghai, Peiping, Tientsin, Tsingtao and Hankow, where the [UNICEF] relief work has been carried out, it is necessary that new areas of operation be established in order to expand the relief program."

response of UNICEF Headquarters was a diplomatic but firm "No".¹⁰

With the Nationalists in Canton and the Red Army poised on the northern banks of the Yangzi across from Nanjing, the UNICEF-WHO Joint Committee on Health Policy met in Geneva in mid-April to take up proposals for the China Programme. There were five of these - an elaboration of those discussed at UNICEF in January:

- 1) Training Centres for child health and welfare - one at the national level, seven regional centres and thirty-five local ones;
- 2) Tuberculosis control, three million tuberculin tests, BCG vaccination and X-ray surveys;
- 3) Kala-azar control - five centres to treat 250,000 of two million cases, and sand-fly control over two million square miles;
- 4) Fly control demonstration covering an area with a population of two and a half million;
- 5) Milk promotion, goats and soya.

One member of the Joint Committee, Dr Stamper, proposed that "the WHO Representative should be asked to get in touch with the Government of Northern China to find out how far it approved of the proposals made."¹¹

Ten days later, the forces of "the Government of Northern China" had crossed the broad, then bridgeless Yangzi, and had moved unopposed into the erstwhile Nationalist capital. The UNICEF Office in the Foo-chang Building on the broad Zhong Shan Avenue had remained intact except for the crashed, glass door broken through by a panicky fleeing soldier who thought the door was open. And during the night the large new building of the Legislative branch of the Government had gone up in flames. But the real damage done to the city was suffered during later

¹⁰ Newton Bowles to Simon Polak, NYCA-3, 14 July 1949

¹¹ Document JC.3/UNICEF-WHO/23, Geneva, 14 April 1949, para 15

Nationalist air attacks. UNICEF staff, taking cover in ditches and caves, remained unscathed. But, tragically, a UNICEF-aided child feeding centre received a direct hit and fifteen children were killed with many more wounded.¹²

On the 15th of May, John Merryman who had served as Acting Chief of Mission in Shanghai during the four months after Dr Junod's departure for New York in January, also left for the United States. The Red Army entered and took Shanghai ten days later. The UNICEF Field Representative there, William Berges, reported that the UNICEF-aided child feeding centres were still in operation.

The reason why most of the UNICEF-aided feeding centres were able to keep going throughout the uncertain period of military takeover in all these cities can be found chiefly in three factors. First, in none of the cities was there a protracted battle for its control, so that the pattern of civilian life was not greatly disrupted. Second, the centres were under the day-by-day management of local committees not directly connected to the leaving government; and the UNICEF Field Representatives also remained. Third, all centres were issued UNICEF supplies from the central warehouses to last for about a month.

But in the longer run, it became impossible to keep any of the centres open after the locally-stored supplies ran out. The need continued, of course, and UNICEF supplies remained available in central warehouses. There was also a willingness on the part of the members of the local committees to carry on. Nevertheless, although many approaches to the new authorities in each of the cities were made, and in various ways, the response was uniformly negative.

¹² Letter, Perry Hanson to Karl Borders, Nanking, 7 June 1948

When Eloesser had been confronted with an abruptly uncooperative CLARA clerk at Shijiazhuang in January, his reaction had been one of perplexity and "my perplexity increased in the next few months".¹³ This was the feeling of most of the UNICEF personnel remaining in China, particularly among those who had worked closely with CLARA in North China. They expected that since UNICEF was an international humanitarian organization for the benefit of children, and had demonstrated from its start in China that it could work wherever the needs were regardless of political considerations, and that it always worked with the authorities and not independently, the new government would look with favor, if not with enthusiasm, on a continuation and expansion of the projects already started. That expectation was not, of course, realized, and the perplexity continued.

Later, the Government's position became better understood. There was the twice-tied vote within the UNICEF Executive Board which thus rejected the seating of the new Government's nominee, Wu Yun-fu. There was the refusal of the United Nations itself to recognize the Beijing Government. And there was, still later, the entry of China into the Korean War on the North Korean side and against the United Nations.

But none of these events had happened during the first half of 1949, so there was little to prepare UNICEF's ingenuous staff in China to face the volte-face.

It was a time, then, for departures. Staff starting work only a relatively few months earlier, now had to leave. By the middle of 1949, the UNICEF Offices in Shanghai, Tianjin, Qingdao and Hankou had closed. International staff from these cities had left the country and most of the locally employed personnel had also been let go. Only the offices in Nanjing and Beijing

¹³ Eloesser, "Medical Service to the Chinese People" draft p 56

remained "open". The training of health workers at Tungchow [now Tong Xian] with Edith Galt, Isabel Hemingway and Earle McPhail as teachers continued to the end of January 1950. The number of trainees increased from 20 to 80, but all other projects were halted. Helen Drummond left Beijing in the fall and her place was taken by John Painter. And in September of 1949, just a year after the auspicious meetings to start a working relationship with CLARA for a health workers training and health programme, Leo Eloesser himself, with the very greatest of reluctance, decided that there was then no reason to remain in China.

A few months later in New York, he made a statement to the UNICEF Executive Board which summarized the "Public Health Lessons from the Chinese Experience,":

Experience gained in these courses convinced the instructors that young persons without medical preparation can be taught to recognize the ordinary forms of infectious disease by standard laboratory methods, can be taught to immunize and vaccinate against ordinary communicable disease, and to apply standard form of treatment. Similarly, such students can be taught ordinary midwifery and ordinary sanitation, including regulation of water supply, construction of latrines, some form of insect control and food inspection. The knowledge and experience gained in these two training courses may perhaps be one of the most valuable assets to UNICEF and WHO of this past year..

By using the most promising trainees as teachers, the number of trainees will increase rapidly--geometrically rather than arithmetically. New centers will be developed from existing ones. In two or three years the most urgent need should be filled.

The undertaking is not entirely new; somewhat similar courses have been tried in other countries of modest living standards. UNICEF's experience corroborates previous ones and adds importance to such programmes for underdeveloped countries.

Whatever future UNICEF may have in China, these or similar courses will go on. I think that their value has been proven for countries totally or almost totally lacking in trained medical personnel.¹⁴

The courses did indeed go on, and over the years have trained thousands of health workers for service throughout China.

¹⁴ "Statement of Dr. Leo Eloesser to Executive Board of UNICEF on the Fund's Progress in China". 2 November 1949

Chapter 7 - The Two-Year Talks

After the 1949 change of Government in China, UNICEF faced the question of how best to continue working. On the one hand, there was the child-care centre programme operating in several major cities under a Basic Agreement between UNICEF and the Nationalists. On the other, there was the health workers training and medical supplies programme begun under the Shijiazhuang Agreement with the Chinese Liberated Areas Relief Association (CLARA).

Although most of the decisions about these programmes were reached one way or another by the end of 1949, a talking relationship, steadily deteriorating, was continued until the withdrawal of UNICEF international staff from the Beijing and Nanjing Offices in February and April of 1951 - almost exactly two years after these cities had been taken by the Communist forces.

UNICEF had tried to maintain a distinction between the "China Mission" and the "North China Field Team". In December, 1948 when it appeared that Nanjing would soon be lost to the Nationalists, the "China Mission" was moved to Shanghai. A few months later, Shanghai fell, and the "China Mission" was transferred to Canton, the new, temporary capital. Simon Polak the UNICEF Field Representative there became responsible for maintaining relations with the Government. Canton fell on the 15th of October 1949 and the Government, after briefly seeking refuge in Chungking, moved to Taiwan, and on December 8, 1949 declared Taipei to be the capital of China. Since China (Taiwan) remained a member of the United Nations and was represented on UNICEF's Executive Board, a UNICEF Office was established in Taipei with Mr Sampson, formerly

UNRRA's Deputy Regional Director in Canton, serving as Country Officer, a post later filled by C Y Chen.

Meanwhile back on the mainland, Eloesser (leader of the North China Field Team accredited to the Liberated Areas of China) had moved to Beijing from Shijiazhuang while Hanson (the other member of the Team) remained in Nanjing. Instead of the positive working relationships both expected based on the personal experiences of previous years, they met a baffling resistance to continuing joint efforts. But the official break was not sudden. In both Beijing and Nanjing talks between Government officials and UNICEF continued throughout the rest of 1949.

In a December report, the UNICEF Office in Nanjing prepared a "case study" telling what happened on a month-by-month basis to the child feeding programme and to the UNICEF supplies.¹ This report can be summarized quickly:

April was a month of preparation for the coming "battle of Nanking" so that the care for some 20,000 children in 51 centres could continue without interruption; because the Ministry of Social Affairs had gone south and withdrawn all "matching" money and supplies for the centres, UNICEF Headquarters authorized direct funding to cover the take-over period. All 51 centres were also provided with enough food to continue caring for the 20,000 children for a full month. The remaining UNICEF supplies were brought inside the city walls and stored under UNICEF custody. The work was done through the Local UNICEF Committee headed by Sun Teliang assisted by UNICEF staff members K Y Chen and Geraldine Kean. The "battle" was over in three days. Child feeding continued in all centres and UNICEF supplies remained intact.

¹ Hanson to UNICEF NYHQ, "The Distribution of Residual UNICEF Supplies in Nanking, April - December, 1949" UNICEF, Nanking, 24 December 1949

In May child feeding continued without interruption except for the tragic loss of one centre to a bomb which killed 15 children. As supplies at the centres dwindled, UNICEF took steps to release additional food from its storehouse. Then a "take-over committee" from the new Government put a halt to further distribution until the Local UNICEF Committee could be "reconstituted". Kean and K Y Chen continued their rounds of all the centres which continued to care for children with supplies still remaining. The logistics of UNICEF's programme was investigated thoroughly and repeatedly by a succession of special committees and agencies. Finding nothing amiss in the supply operations, the government decided that the matter should be dealt with by its Foreign Affairs Section, since UNICEF supplies had come from a "foreign" source.

June brought direct talks between UNICEF and Huang Hua, Director of the Foreign Affairs Section of the Nanjing People's Government.² Huang Hua was a graduate of Yenjing University near Beijing and was fluent in English. But in keeping with the new official custom, he spoke only in Chinese. In keeping with the new custom also, he appeared for the talks stockingless and in faded trousers and jacket in sharp contrast to the rich Oriental carpets, teak tables, inlaid screens and other elaborate furnishings surrounding him, a legacy from the recently gone Nationalist Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Huang Hua was direct, repeating that there could be no further distribution of UNICEF supplies until the matter had been thoroughly investigated and referred to higher authorities. He made it clear that the Basic Agreement with the Nationalist Government was without force and that the Shijiazhuang Agreement referred only to the health workers training and medical programme and not to

² Huang Hua was later to become the first ambassador from the People's Republic of China to Canada.

child care and feeding centres. Therefore new proposals should be drawn up for the distribution of the balance of UNICEF supplies. Six separate proposals were offered by UNICEF to the Foreign Affairs Section with a covering reference to a cable from UNICEF Headquarters urging haste in distribution to children to avoid spoilage during the hot summer.

Late July brought an official decision to permit resumption of distribution of UNICEF supplies to the existing centres and through the Local Committee as before, except that the Local Committee would be "advised" by a semi-official organization known as the New Democratic Women's Association. All centres were asked to be ready to receive the now sorely needed replenishment of UNICEF supplies on the 4th of August.

August brought an unexpected development: all the 14,500 pounds of whole milk powder stored in a sealed UNICEF-rented warehouse had vanished! The New Democratic Women's Association was both shocked and determined to discover who had taken the children's milk. They were so worried that they also stopped all distribution from any of the other warehouses storing UNICEF supplies. After investigating for nearly a month, they discovered that the milk had been taken "for the comfort of wounded soldiers".

In September, a new organization was set up called the "People's Comfort League for Soldiers and Refugees". Although embarrassed in August by the diversion of one warehouse's supplies to soldiers, the New Democratic Women's League now decided that all remaining UNICEF supplies might as well be turned over to the new Comfort League. The niceties of proper procedure were followed: a UNICEF Representative was always asked to be present when the UNICEF warehouse seals were ripped off from warehouse doors. An

inspecting official from the People's Comfort League for Wounded Soldiers was surprised and somewhat disappointed to discover that all the UNICEF cloth had already been cut to size for children and babies.

Until the 5th of October, all entering of warehouses had been carried out in the presence of UNICEF staff members. But on that date when the supplies began to be taken away, UNICEF was not informed officially, the seals were broken, the supplies trucked out and no receipts given. The first truck loaded with 28-pound tins of margarine wound its way through the city to a guarded compound garrisoning an army unit and a prison reformatory for men.³

By the middle of November, all UNICEF supplies had been hauled away. Efforts continued throughout the month to get receipts for the amounts taken. Although detailed inventories were prepared with transfer destinations shown, these were never made official. The month ended with no supplies, no receipts and no food and clothing programme for needy children in Nanjing.

December was a time for reflection. What went wrong and why? On the Communist side, it may indeed have been "a victory that was too sudden". There was simply too much happening and too many responsibilities added during this period to allow much time for matters such as child welfare centres. There was also a serious shortage of experienced administrative cadres. On the UNICEF side, there seemed to be a tendency not to grasp the full extent of the fundamental change that was taking place throughout the country following the Communist victory.

³ Hanson, Nanking to Borders, UNICEF NYHQ, 6 October 1949

Earlier in the north, a similar type of experience had befallen the UNICEF staff in Beijing. Eloesser writes of this period, "Between teaching. . . and endless meetings with Chinese officials, the months went by. The meetings discussed supplies, supplies that UNICEF had or hadn't sent, where they should be stored, under whose supervision, to whom and how they should be distributed. In speeches and orations lasting three or four or five hours, sometimes with a break for lunch, to be continued in the afternoon, officials would expound their views and positions. . . . The discussions were not worth the effort. They hinged upon whether UNICEF should relinquish surveillance of its supplies after landing them in China. Again in retrospect, I think that perhaps some of the officials were willing, even trying, to find a modus operandi that would let UNICEF continue, while others, more intransigent, were quite ready to sever relations with an unimportant and troublesome intruder.

"Gradually, reluctantly, perhaps indeed mistakenly, it seemed to me that further active participation was not in the cards and that UNICEF should withdraw. I regretted the conclusion at the time and, again in retrospect, regret still more strongly for, had we remained with our foot in the door-crack, UNICEF might finally have helped, some 25 years ago, to open the United Nations' door for China".⁴

In a letter to his sister written on September 10th just before leaving China, Eloesser refers again to the difficulty of making the decision to leave: "A very tough job these days--very tough, if you want to keep your head while doing it, and play fair, both to the new government and to UNICEF. To pack up and quit and say 'To hell with 'em'; if they don't like the way we do things, we'll just pull out. . . . That would have been easy--and maybe not unreasonable in a cold-blooded business-like sense. To give in and relinquish UNICEF's right to determine how its assets

⁴ Eloesser, Medical Service to the Chinese People, draft, pp 59-60

shall be used would have been equally easy. . . But to stand out and fight for one's right for six months has been a bit of a strain. . . It has not been an easy six months. . . It's been the first time I've ever had to think through so carefully, consider all the pros and cons, the possibility of error on both sides, and the effects of a move or of standing still. . ."⁵

The long and tedious meetings to which Eloesser referred had started just after he reached Beijing in February. UNICEF medical supplies had begun arriving in Tianjin, but in order for UNICEF to exercise "supervision and control" over them as provided for in the Shijiazhuang Agreement, UNICEF wanted the supplies moved to a warehouse in Beijing; UNICEF also wanted to take part in planning for the use of the supplies and to observe their final distribution. These ideas were not acceptable to CLARA and seeing no alternative, Eloesser asked UNICEF Headquarters to hold all further supplies in Hongkong until the matter could be sorted out. Thus no further UNICEF supplies were shipped for the rest of the year to mainland China except for one consignment for the BCG laboratory at the Temple of Heaven Institute which UNICEF turned over directly to the National Vaccine and Serum Institute.

Although the question of warehousing and right of observation was never settled, UNICEF took part in allocation meetings with CLARA and the Ministry of Health. By the end of 1949, all UNICEF supplies in North China had been distributed to a variety of nurseries, clinics, hospitals and the Health Workers Training Centre.⁶

⁵ Schumacker, Leo Eloesser, M.D., from a letter quoted on pages 375-377

⁶ Hanson, "An Account of the UNICEF Programme in China", UNICEF, New York, May 1951

Meanwhile, working relationships continued to deteriorate. On 22 September 1949, the Secretary-General of CLARA, Wu Yun-fu wrote to Dr Eloesser charging UNICEF with insincerity and stating that unless UNICEF supplies in Hongkong and the United States were shipped right away and the balance of the allocation of \$500,000 used to buy anti-kalaazar supplies, CLARA "would be forced to reconsider the question of the continued validity of the Shihchiachuang Agreement". Dr Eloesser replied that unless CLARA was prepared to observe the UNICEF principles agreed upon in that understanding, the demands could not be met. This exchange of letters marked the end of "normal" UNICEF-CLARA relations. On the operational level, however, UNICEF carried on: Hemingway, Galt and McPhail at the training centre; and after the departure of Eloesser and Helen Drummond, John Painter at the supply allocation meetings.

It was at this time that UNICEF Headquarters asked Hanson to act for Eloesser during his absence. But although the authorities had earlier given Hanson permission to travel to Qingdao and to Shanghai to close the office there, they withheld permission for the trip to Beijing because "there was nothing to discuss until the outstanding questions between UNICEF and CLARA had been settled."

At the end of the year, a Beijing daily paper carried the story of the end of the Agreement. The headlines read:

LEO ELOESSER, UNICEF NORTH CHINA REPRESENTATIVE,
VIOLATES THE UNDERSTANDING. CLARA WILL NO LONGER BE
BOUND BY THE UNDERSTANDING. CLARA ALSO ALLOWS UNICEF
PERSONNEL TO WIND UP THEIR WORK BEFORE THE END OF
JANUARY OF THE COMING YEAR⁷

⁷ Beijing Guang Ming Ri Bao, December 31, 1949

The text was written in a similar vein: "not only did UNICEF North China Representative Eloesser fail to abide by the Agreement. . . but he also demanded the power of complete control over the issuance and custody of shipped-in supplies. . . Eloesser also declared that the UNICEF North China Organization would be ready to withdraw should China find it impossible to accept this condition. Thus he intended to threaten. Consequently, Acting Secretary General Hsiung Chin-ting of CLARA now allows the twelve UNICEF workers in Peking to wind up their work completely before the end of January 1950"

The tone of Hsiung Chin-ting's statement was typical of increasing attacks in the press and on radio against UNICEF and its remaining staff in China over the next year and a half:

On behalf of UNICEF, Dr Eloesser insisted on his unreasonable condition, violated the Shihchiachuang Understanding, and caused the Shihchiachuang Understanding to lose all its practical significance. Consequently, I cannot help making the statement that the supplies left in Hongkong by Dr Eloesser have not been prepared for shipment to Chinese Liberated Areas, but rather are intended for use as the condition for bribing Chinese people into bowing our heads before American imperialism. But as we would not be bribed and bought and would not bow our heads before American imperialism, he therefore wanted to reallocate these supplies to other areas.⁸

John Painter in Beijing was handed the official copy of the Chinese text and an English translation. He also learned in a telephone conversation with Chi Feng, CLARA's secretary, that "allowing" UNICEF to withdraw was not an order to leave. When Dr Eloesser in New York read the personal attacks against him, his reaction was characteristically understanding.

⁸ Beijing Guang Ming Ri Bao, 21 December 1949

UNICEF Headquarters also decided there was nothing to be gained by withholding supplies any longer. In a renewed effort to enter into a working relationship with the Beijing authorities, UNICEF forwarded the supplies from Hongkong. CLARA accepted them from Painter on an "unconditional" basis. But he was given access to the warehouse for checking supplies and making inventories; no other participation by UNICEF was permitted.

UNICEF also went ahead with the purchase and shipment to China of anti-kalaazar supplies using up the original \$500,000 UNICEF allocation under the Shijiazhuang Agreement. With the arrival of these items in Tianjin, UNICEF's participation in the medical supply programme for mainland China came to an end.

Chapter 2 - The Last Link

In a paper on China and the United Nations, William Cunningham at the East Asian Institute of Columbia University, refers to UNICEF in 1949 and early 1950 as Beijing's "single organic link to the United Nations system."¹ It seemed strange to him that China would sever this link at the same time it was pressing for her place in the United Nations. He goes on to comment that "There is no evidence to suggest that the United Nations or any of its members contrasted Peking's severance of relations with UNICEF with its demand to be accepted into the Security Council. The more relevant point, however, is whether the coincidence of these events escaped attention or was disregarded in Peking." Cunningham also observes that the "UNICEF episode" was only one of many puzzling features in the early management of China's bid for entry into the United Nations.

There was indeed much to puzzle the remaining UNICEF staff in China. One of the few occasions for relaxation during the earlier hectic weeks in Shijiazhuang was the presenting of plays or operas by enthusiastic propaganda groups. These usually portrayed not only loyal and courageous comrades striving against the villainous Guomindang soldiers or landlords but also delivered heated polemics about American imperialism. CLARA and health officials would invariably hasten to reassure Eloesser and Hanson

¹ William J Cunningham, "The Chinese Communists and the United Nations 1943-1950", p 79

(both Americans) that within the Liberated Areas a very clear distinction was always made between a nation's policies and its people - between the American Government and American "friends". This seemed to be the accepted and widely practiced position made known to all Americans working in the Liberated Areas from 1946 through 1948.

But as the extent of the massive American aid - both military and economic - to the Nationalist Government became increasingly known, it became more difficult to maintain the distinction between individual and government. The publication of The China White Paper in August of 1949, confirming what had been generally believed, and providing documentation for additional details, had a tremendous impact in China and as a kind of by-product, on UNICEF in China as well.

The author of the introduction to the 1967 re-issue of the White Paper writes that "The Chinese Communists made the White Paper the center of their first mass anti-American campaign. There had been much Communist-inspired criticism of the United States in the past, but there remained in China considerable reservoirs of good feeling, particularly among the intellectuals and bourgeoisie in the cities. These reservoirs the Party now set out to drain, as a part of a larger movement to eliminate Western influence from China."²

After Mao himself had welcomed the release of the White Paper as corroboration of his position, an intense campaign was mounted against the United States in all cities under Communist control. In Nanking, for more than a month following Mao's denunciation, the Party newspaper almost unceasingly attacked the White Paper's revelations. Many Americans who thought of themselves as friends of the Chinese people seemed to be particularly vulnerable to attacks. "John Leighton Stuart, a

² Lyman P. Van Slyke, in the Introduction to The China White Paper, re-issued by Stanford University Press, 1967

former president of Yenching University, was particularly singled out, both as our last ambassador [in Nanking], and also because he represented so well all that was finest in the American philanthropic and educational tradition in China. In 'Farewell, Leighton Stuart!' Mao denounced him as one who 'used to pretend to love both the United States and China.'³

This makes more understandable, then, the the actions taken with regard to UNICEF in Beijing and Nanjing during this period. The strident accusations against Eloesser and later against Hanson were not intended to be criticisms of UNICEF, but of the United States. Writing about this period a few months later, Hanson notes:

"a sharp distinction has been made between the United Nations as such, and Americans employed by the United Nations. I do not recall any instance of a direct attack against the United Nations, although there were numerous articles and speeches endeavoring to show that the United States was in control of, or attempting to gain control of various UN agencies or committees... .

That the idea of the United Nations and of UNICEF in particular was not under attack is further emphasized by the Peking nomination of Mr Wu Yun-fu as its proposed representative on the UNICEF Executive Board.

It seemed apparent that the government was avoiding any move to discredit the United Nations as a whole in the eyes of the people so that, should admittance be secured, it could dispatch its delegates without inconsistency.⁴

³ Van Slyke, Introduction to The White Paper

⁴ Hanson memorandum to Bowles, Closure of UNICEF Mission in China, 15 May 1951

Although CLARA's end-of-the-year's published statement (31 December 1949) that it would no longer be bound by the Shijiazhuang Agreement and that the "twelve workers" of the UNICEF North China Organization would be permitted to wind up their work completely before the end of 1950 would seem to be a definitive break with UNICEF, this did not turn out to be the intention of the statement. It was meant, Painter was informed in Beijing, simply to emphasize CLARA's refusal to accept Eloesser's letter of 24 September and that "the letter of mutual understanding is no longer binding".⁵ Indeed, CLARA hoped that the UNICEF teaching staff at the Health Workers Training Centre at Tungchow would continue their work until the end of the course.

The reference to the twelve UNICEF workers is puzzling. It is referred to again in Cunningham's dissertation: "On January 1, 1950, Hsiung Chin-ting, the Acting Secretary General of CLARA, announced termination of the UNICEF agreement and program, giving the twelve-man UNICEF staff in Peking until January 31 to wind up its affairs and leave China."⁶ There were never "twelve men" on UNICEF's North China Team. The UNICEF teaching staff at the training centre was made up of two women and one man. The office in Beijing had been headed by one woman (Helen Drummond) who had already left China in September as had Eloesser. So the only other UNICEF staff member, apart from local personnel, was John Painter. He was not given permission to leave the country, in spite of Hsiung's statement, for a full year after the "expulsion" notice. The locally-employed Chinese staff would not, in any event, be ordered to "leave China".

This ambivalence toward UNICEF was further illustrated in Nanjing where Hanson had been officially told, on the one hand,

⁵ Painter in Beijing to Eloesser, NYHQ, 9 January 1950

⁶ Cunningham, The Chinese Communists and the United Nations, 1943-1950, draft, p 79

that he was regarded simply as a "private foreign individual", but on the other hand, was officially held responsible for all UNICEF matters in China after the departure of Eloesser. One of these responsibilities was to prepare a report for the People's Government in Shanghai about The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. The information asked for was detailed in a straight-forward questionnaire:

Name of Organization - UNICEF
 Brief History
 Organization
 Personnel
 Responsible Officers
 Changes of Responsible Officers
 Work and Operations
 Principles of operation
 Liaison with local government
 The origin and distribution of supplies
 Finance
 How is UNICEF financed?
 How did the Kuomintang Government pay membership fees in the past?
 The general financial situation in the past
 Any local income
 Use of premises of UNICEF
 Has there been any agreement signed with local government or organization?
 Any changes in the operation and work after Liberation?
 The operation and work of Headquarters
 Chinese and English Agreements

The Nanjing Foreign Affairs Section considered a response to this questionnaire to be of sufficient importance to grant Hanson a

special pass to travel to Shanghai to deliver it to the People's Government there in person.⁷

It was during this period also that the pattern established for the Health Workers Training Courses in Shijiazhuang and then at Tungchow started showing sign of success. Although credit was given neither to UNICEF nor to Eloesser, Hemingway, Galt and McPhail, the People's Daily headlined in March that "More than 8,000 obstetrical workers have been trained in North China... Health work among women and babies has been improved. Death rate of infants has been decreasing."⁸ The report itself might have been written by a UNICEF Public Information officer after a trip to the field: "Midwives training classes have been operated one after another in North China. . . to train obstetrical workers and reform old-fashioned midwives in the new rural areas. . . lowering death rates of infants and improving health work among women and babies. . . upon their return after training to the villages, the new midwives, and the old-fashioned midwives have adopted new midwifery techniques and have greatly reduced the number of death and diseases among babies and lying-in women."

And then for authentic local color: "Old Mrs Li who had received training, attended the birth of 18 babies of whom 4 were cases of 'false death'. She restored all of them to life by means of artificial respiration. On the other hand, old Mrs Shao who had not received training, attended to the birth of three babies which were cases of 'false deaths' and all were discarded. Consequently, old Mrs Shao requested that she be given training. Cadres in the village wrote a letter saying, 'Your setting up of such a training class is real liberation of women!'"⁹

⁷ Hanson, UNICEF, Nanjing, Report for Foreign Affairs Section, People's Government, Shanghai, attached to NKNY-040 to Eloesser, March 1950

⁸ Jen Min Jih Bao, March 29, 1950

⁹ Jen Min Jih Bao, March 29, 1950

It was at this time also that Isabel Hemingway and Edith Galt, although now separated from their direct teaching responsibilities at Tungchow, were preparing the Midwifery Manual based on their experience throughout the second training course. As usual, Eloesser, then in New York, was most supportive. After receiving their report, he wrote, "I must congratulate you and wish that there were more like you. You are the best ever. . . and your report is one big knock-out. I wonder, seeing that the wooden model (mannekin) has proven successful, whether it would not be worthwhile to have similar ones made in a better quality earthenware, or still better porcelain. . . it might be more real than drawings and charts."¹⁰

The midwifery manual and the mannekin have, of course, long since become a part of the UNICEF supplies offered for midwifery training - the Manual translated into many languages, and the mannekin molded into forms appropriate for midwifery students around the world.

In May of 1950, CLARA, the old "Chinese Liberated Areas Relief Association" which had served as the partner of UNRRA and UNICEF in earlier years was dissolved and a newly constituted organization took its place - The Chinese People's Relief Administration which was referred to in documents of the time as "PRAC" or the People's Relief Administration of China. In contrast to CLARA, the new Administration emphasized "self-relief" and emphasized that its funding was to come from the government and from among the people. However, "genuinely friendly aid from international friends may also be accepted."¹¹

This last phrase naturally caught the eyes of the stubbornly optimistic within UNICEF and this optimism was reinforced by a letter from Madame Sun Yat-sen signing herself modestly by her

¹⁰ Eloesser at UNICEF NYHQ to Hemingway and Galt in Beijing, 24 March 1950, NYPE-9

¹¹ Jen Min Jih Pao, (People's Daily) - May 5, 1950

maiden name Soong Ching Ling, to Dr Borcic, UNICEF, Paris. Although there had been hope that she might be named chief of the new People's Relief Administration, she wrote rather as Chairman of the China Welfare Fund with headquarters in Shanghai. Nevertheless, her status within the Beijing Government was such that her letter was received with great interest. And after the brusque and abrupt dismissal of UNICEF in Beijing at the beginning of the year, it was heartening to read that:

There is no question but that the [UNICEF] money could be used, and used with such efficiency and planning as would delight you, after your many frustrating years here. For that reason, I am attempting to find out what the prospects are for reopening the question of the use of the UNICEF funds.¹²

The UNICEF money referred to was the \$7,000,000 earmarked by the Executive Board for programmes in China after a new Basic Agreement had been negotiated with Beijing and signed.

But Madame Sun also "summarizes the hurdles which could not be surmounted through months of conferences." She believed that the main reasons for lack of liaison and a programme were that:

1. The New China enters into such activities on the condition that the program is our own and the supplies are in our control from the time they land on our shores. This basic condition apparently could not be met by ICEF.
2. The quality of supplies which did arrive was most disappointing and thereby made further negotiations seem pointless.¹³

¹² Mme Sun Yat-sen, Chairman, China Welfare Fund, Shanghai, July 4, 1950

¹³ Mme Sun Yat-sen to Dr B Borcic, July 4, 1950

Dr Borcic referred the letter to the Executive Director for comments. Mr Pate responded fully to the two points raised and suggested that Dr Borcic reply to the letter himself since it had been addressed to him in the first place. This was a roundabout but not unusual method of communication. Mme Sun's letter itself was not an official one.¹⁴

Mr Pate responded to Mme Sun's first point by noting that from the first of the year (1950), supplies were in fact turned over directly to the Government upon arrival in China. He expected "the same methods of operation as are followed in Europe" to apply equally in China. "Our method of operation in Europe", he repeats, could be cited as an example: the responsibility for the distribution of supplies and for the administration of projects lies entirely with the government. "You might point out how satisfactorily this simple method of operation has worked in the various UNICEF receiving countries."¹⁵

Then follows a curious assertion:

The original misunderstanding over the handling of supplies in China arose out of purely local administrative arrangements which had been made by our China Mission in relation to the original program in China in 1948. These arrangements were not imposed by UNICEF Headquarters, but were evolved in discussions in China and accepted by Headquarters on the assumption that the extreme instability which existed in the large cities at that time justified an unusual degree of international supervision. We have tried to make it clear that those purely temporary and local arrangements do not represent fundamental UNICEF policies, and that we do not consider them applicable to the present China

¹⁴ Maurice Pate to B Borcic, 3 August 1950

¹⁵ Pate to Borcic, 3 Aug 1950

situation. 16

If the "supervision and control" clause of the Shijiazhuang Agreement was only a "local arrangement" and did not represent fundamental UNICEF policy at the time, why was Dr Eloesser left to continue his "endless meetings" over this very point which finally led to the impasse with CLARA and the suspension of shipments of UNICEF supplies from Hongkong? Why, indeed, was the UNICEF staff in Nanjing also left for month after month to try to ensure that the warehoused supplies remained the concern of UNICEF until they had reached the "end user"? It would have been much simpler all around had UNICEF Headquarters sent out the message directly to the field a year and a half earlier that "we do not consider them [your earlier arrangements] applicable to the present China situation." And especially to have instructed the UNICEF staff in Beijing and Nanjing to "Let the government become the responsible trustee for the [UNICEF] supplies and equipment until they are consumed." What a relief that would have been!

As a matter of fact, "our method of operation in Europe" was not adopted for a long time in other parts of the world. In many Asian countries receiving UNICEF assistance during the 1950s and 1960s, the handling of supplies was usually a joint responsibility of the UNICEF Representative and the Government's designated Project Director, often requiring the signature of both before supplies would be released from warehouses.

As for Mme Sun's complaint about the quality of UNICEF supplies, the Executive Director rightly emphasized that UNICEF had shipped exactly what was ordered and that the supply lists had been drawn up jointly by UNICEF and the medical advisers of CLARA. Indeed, each supply list was signed by a CLARA representative before it was forwarded to New York for

procurement.

Whether or not Dr Borcic's reply to Mme Sun's letter influenced Premier (and Minister for Foreign Affairs) Chou En-lai's decision to seek for China a seat on UNICEF's Executive Board is not clear, but on the 25th of August he nominated Wu Yun-fu, who had formerly been the chief of the Chinese Liberated Areas Relief Association [CLARA] and was then the Secretary-General of the People's Relief Administration of China to serve as China's Representative on the Board. Mme Sun wrote again to Dr Borcic stating "that the problems in connection with the resumption of a UNICEF program in China could be resolved only if the Peking Government secured representation on the Executive Board."¹⁷

Soon afterwards, in November 1950, the UNICEF Executive Board put the matter to a vote: should Beijing's nominee be seated as a Board member? The result was a tie. A second vote was taken. Tied again. A tie vote meant that the nomination was not carried. Taipeh continued to represent all of China on UNICEF's Executive Board.

The reaction in Beijing was understandable and is reflected in Chou En-lai's cable to the General Assembly on another matter at this time:

What particularly arouses the world's indignation is that, in spite of the fact that during the past several months the United Nations held innumerable discussions on China or on important questions concerning China, the Delegates of the Peoples Republic of China, who are the only Representatives of the 475,000,000 people of China, are still being kept out of the doors of the United Nations, whereas the Representatives of a handful of the

¹⁷ Hanson memorandum to Bowles Closure of UNICEF Mission in China, UNICEF, NYHQ, 15 May 1951

Chiang Kai Shek reactionary remnants are still being allowed to usurp the seats of the Chinese Delegation in the United Nations. To such an extent the Chinese people have been slighted and insulted!¹⁸

There was then nothing to be gained by trying to keep open the UNICEF offices in China. On the first of December, 1950 Headquarters cabled that the UNICEF offices would be "temporarily" suspended and the international representatives withdrawn.¹⁹ The decision was taken by Headquarters after a discussion with Dr Ludwik Rajchman, then Chairman of the UNICEF Executive Board, who in turn was in touch with General Wu Hsiao-chuan, an emissary from Beijing sent to New York to take up negotiations regarding Korea. Although Headquarters had earlier hesitated about the withdrawal from China, fearing that the move would be interpreted negatively, Rajchman felt that leaving now would not really make any difference.²⁰

By the end of the month - on 28 December - the People's Republic of China entered the war on the side of North Korea. If there had been any doubt at first about the appropriateness of UNICEF's decision to withdraw, this event heightened the tensions to such a pitch that any hope of further negotiations in China between UNICEF and the Government was clearly ended.

18 From cablegram dated 23 December 1950 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China addressed to the President of the UN General Assembly, Mr Naorollah Entezam

19 UNICEF New York cable 179 to UNICEF Nanjing, 1 December 1950

20 Bowles to Hanson, NYCH-123, 4 December 1950

TABLE I

A Brief Chronology of Some Events in China
During the First Half of the Twentieth Century

| | |
|-------------|--|
| 1899 - 1901 | The Boxer Uprising |
| 1911 - 1912 | The overthrow of the Manchu dynasty and the establishment of the Republic of China Dr Sun Yat-sen is the first president; resigns in favour of Yuan Shih-k'ai |
| August 1912 | Nationalist Party (Guomindang) organized |
| June 1916 | Death of Yuan Shih-k'ai |
| 1917 - 1918 | China enters World War I |
| 1919 | China becomes an original member of the League of Nations |
| July 1921 | Chinese Communist Party organized |
| 1920s | Warlord satrapies throughout much of China |
| 1923 - 1927 | "Coalition" of Nationalists and Communists |
| March 1925 | Death of Dr Sun Yat-sen |
| 1926 | Chiang Kai-shek leads Nationalist armies northward |

- April 1927 Chiang ousts Communists from Guomindang in bloody purges. Irreconcilable cleft dates from this period
- October 1928 After continuing advance northward and taking over Beijing, Chiang moves capital to Nanjing
- 1930 - 1933 Meanwhile Red army becomes sizable force in large areas of Jiangxi, Fujian, Hunan and Hubei provinces. Nanjing government launches five campaigns to destroy Red Army
- October 1934 The Red Army begins "Long March", retreating northwestward and reaching north Shaanxi a year later
- 1931 - 1934 Japanese forces occupy many cities in Manchuria.
Create a new "state" Manchukuo. In 1934 P'u Yi, last Manchu emperor of China, crowned "monarch" of Manchukuo
- 7 July 1937 Marco Polo Bridge incident. Beginning of Sino-Japanese War. Beijing and Tianjin occupied by Japanese
- Nov-Dec 1937 Shanghai and Nanjing occupied by Japanese
Chinese Nationalist Capital moved to Hankou
- October 1938 Japanese take Hankou; also Guangzhou (Canton)
Chinese Nationalist Capital moved to Chongqing (Chungking) in Sichuan province
- China divided into three parts:
"Free China" under control of Nationalists;

"Liberated Areas" making up Communist China; and the areas occupied by Japan.

- | | |
|------------------|---|
| December 1941 | United States enters World War II Other nations enter war in Asia |
| August 1945 | World War II ends, but civil war continues in China Despite periods of truce, efforts at reconciliation fail. |
| 1948 - 1949 | Red Army destroys Nationalist forces in Manchuria, wins victories in North China and moves southward to control all of mainland China |
| 1 October 1949 | People's Republic of China established with capital in Beijing |
| 8 December 1949 | Nationalists declare Taipei, Taiwan province, to be new capital of China |
| 17 February 1950 | Sino-Soviet Treaty signed |
| 28 December 1950 | Peoples Republic of China enters Korean War on side of North Korea |

UNICEF Staff and Others

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| Anette, Henri A | UNICEF China Mission, Shanghai Office Finance Officer, May 1948 - July 1949 |
| Andersen, Evelyn | UNICEF Field Representative, Nanjing, 1948 [Later joined the UNICEF office in Manila] |
| Berges, Wm C | UNICEF Field Representative, Shanghai, 1948 until 14 July 1949 [lived in Xi'an 1983-84] |
| Birckhead, John T | UNICEF NYHQ, Chief of Administration, 1948- |
| Borders, Karl | UNICEF NYHQ, Executive Officer, 1947-1949 |
| Borcic, B Dr | UNRRA, Chief, Health Division, China Office also, UNICEF "Correspondent" in China 1947-48; and WHO Medical Advisor to UNICEF |
| Bowles, Newton R | UNICEF NYHQ, Programme Division; Chief, Asia Desk [with UNRRA 1946-1948] UNICEF officer at headquarters chiefly con- cerned with the development and operation of the UNICEF programme in China |
| Burinski, Mikhail | UNRRA, Deputy Director-General, Bureau of Services |
| Cadbury, Charles | Friends Service Unit leader of transport team near Kaifeng cooperating with UNRRA and UNICEF, |

1946-1948

| | |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Chait, Frederick | UNRRA, General Counsel |
| Chang, H C Dr | Republic of China, Director, Department of Social Affairs in Ministry of Social Affairs Nanjing, 1948 to early 1949 |
| Chang, F C | United Nations, Member for the Republic of China, Economic and Social Council |
| Chen, K Y | UNICEF Field Representative in Nanjing for child feeding centres, 1949-1950 |
| Chi Feng | Member CLARA (Chinese Liberated Areas Relief Administration) Beijing 1949-1950 . Also at Shijiazhuang for CLARA-UNICEF discussions, August 1948 |
| Chiang Ching-Kuo | Economic "czar" of Shanghai during crisis of inflation and introduction of the "gold yuan" August-November 1948. Confessed utter failure and resigned. Later became President of China (Taiwan) after the death of his father, Chiang Kai-shek |
| Ch'ien Chung Hsin, Dr | Health Commissioner for North China 1948 Shijiazhuang discussions, CLARA-UNICEF August 1948 |
| Chou En-lai (Zhou Enlai) | Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. In 1950 nominates Wu Yun-fu as China's Representative on UNICEF Executive Board |

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| Cleveland, Harlan | UNRRA, Director, China Office, 1947-1948 [1984 - Director, Hubert H Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs] |
| Drummond, Helen | UNICEF Field Representative and Administrative Officer in Peiping (Beijing) September 1948-September 1949. Formerly Dietician with the Peking Union Medical College |
| Edgerton, Glen E (Maj Gen) | UNRRA, Director, China Office, 1946-47 |
| Eloesser, Leo Dr | UNICEF, North China Field Team leader 1948 UNICEF Senior Representative, Beijing, 1949 (Seconded from WHO in June 1948) Subject of biography by Dr Harris Shumacker: <u>Leo Eloesser MD, Eulogy for a Free Spirit</u> , New York, 1982 |
| Faris, Donald K | UNICEF Field Representative, Hankou, from September 1948 to early 1949 [formerly with UNRRA Yellow River Project 1946-1947] |
| Galt, Edith (RN) | UNICEF Nurse-Midwife Tutor for Midwifery and Health Personnel Training Course, Tungchow (February 1949 to end January 1950) (Seconded from American Board Mission) Co-author UNICEF Midwifery Training Manual |

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|---------------------------|---|
| Gaumnitz, Richard | UNRRA, Deputy Director, China Office |
| Geraghty, Dorothy | UNICEF "foreign" secretary seconded by UNRRA for opening of Shanghai UNICEF Office (29 December 1947-15 February 1948) |
| Goodwin, Ralph | UNICEF Deputy Chief of Mission for a few months of 1948; in charge of supply operations. |
| Hannam, H L | UNICEF NYHQ, Assistant Comptroller, 1951- |
| Hanson, Perry | UNICEF North China Field Team from June 1948 Senior UNICEF Representative in China from Sept 1949 to May 1951 [with UNRRA 1945-1948] |
| Harris, F D (Lt Col) | UNRRA, Chief, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Washington D C 1947 |
| Hatem, George Dr | See Ma Hai-teh |
| Hauske, A.C. | Representative of American Board Mission leasing North China American School property to UNICEF for Health Workers Training in Tungchow (Tongxian) |
| Hemingway, Isabel (RN) | UNICEF Nurse-Midwife Tutor for Health Workers' Training Course at Tungchow from 21 April 1949 until end January 1950 Co-author of the UNICEF <u>Midwifery Training Manual</u> with Edith Galt. (Seconded from |

the American Board Mission)

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|-------------------|---|
| Heyward, E J R | UNICEF NYHQ, Deputy Executive Director |
| Hinder, Eleanor | British Consulate, Shanghai 1947 (advised about proposed \$2 million cotton project) |
| Ho, Te-liang | UNICEF Representative, Shanghai Office from October 1949 until its closure |
| Horn, Norman | UNICEF Textile Consultant, Shanghai, August 1948 until early 1949 |
| Hoskins, Lewis | Chairman, Friends Service Unit in China; Made offer to transport UNICEF medical supplies in North China, 1948 |
| Hsiung, Chin Ting | CLARA, Acting Secretary General 1949-50 |
| Jacobson, Jerome | Legal Counsel to UNICEF in China, August 1948 |
| Junod, Marcel Dr | UNICEF, Chief of China Mission, January 1948 to January 1949 [formerly with the International Red Cross for 11 years; IRC Delegate in Japan during World War II; subject of biography by Japanese Journalist Ohsako, <u>Dr Junod - Valiant Without Arms</u> , Tokyo 1979 |
| Katzin, A G | UNRRA HQ, Washington DC, Deputy Director |

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|--------------------|---|
| | General 1947; Chief Executive Officer |
| Ke Fei | People's Republic of China Midwifery Training Tutor at Tungchow, 1950 |
| Kean, Geraldine | UNICEF Field Representative (CORSO volunteer) Nanjing, 1949 |
| King, P C | Nationalist China, Vice-Minister of Health 1947 |
| King, P Z Dr | UNICEF NYHQ Medical Advisor, 1947-1949 |
| Ku Cheng Kang | Nationalist China, Minister of Social Affairs Signed Basic Agreement with UNICEF on behalf of Government, 21 May 1948 Granted clearance of North China Field Team to areas not under control of Government, but would "withdraw permission in case of war" |
| Kuo, T L Dr | Director Anti-Tuberculosis Association in Tianjin |
| Lakshmanan, C K Dr | Director, All India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health, Calcutta - Co-author of the Parran-Lakshmanan Report on health conditions of children in Asia - July, 1948 |
| Lewis, Helen Baun | UNRRA Child Welfare specialist - wrote Welfare Monograph after the UNRRA Welfare Conference, Shanghai 1947 |

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| Li Chih-chung Dr | Chinese Liberated Areas, Chief, Anti-Epidemic Bureau; taught Sanitation at first Health Personnel Training Centre; with Dr Eloesser at Shijiazhuang 1948; husband of Shen Yuan-hui |
| Li Han-wen | Nationalist China, Minister of the Interior, in Canton when it served as temporary capital; Wrote to Simon Polak in June 1949 about new UNICEF projects |
| Lieberman | China Correspondent for the New York Times, Nanjing, 1948-49 |
| Lin Chung | CLARA Representative stationed in Hongkong 1948; Dr Junod discussed with him proposals and plans for projects in North China in June 1948 |
| Liu Shih-chieh Dr | Taught Communicable Diseases at Health Personnel Training Course with Dr Eloesser; later, taught at the North China Medical College |
| Long, Fred G | UNICEF NYHQ, Deputy Administrative Officer 1948 |
| Lund, Harold H | UNRRA, Shanghai wrote "Suggestions for the Utilization of an ICEF Grant for China" 6 December 1947 |
| Ma Hai-Teh Dr (George Hatem) | CLARA Medical Adviser (at Shijiazhuang with Dr Eloesser during planning stages of |

first Health Personnel Training Course 1948
Later, Head of Venereal Disease Division of
Communicable Disease Bureau. ["Stamped out
venereal disease in China", Eloesser, 1976]

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| Merryman, John E | UNICEF Shanghai, Administrative Officer September 1948; Acting Chief of Mission from 22 January until leaving China on 15 May 1949 |
| Milledge Dr | In charge of the London Mission Hospital at Qiang-xian during visit of North China UNICEF team, August 1948 |
| Morrill, Arthur (Col) | ["most cheerfully optimistic man on the scene" NK-NY-044, 10 March 1950] |
| Moyle, Elsie | UNICEF Field Representative, Tsingtao (Qingdao) September 1948 to early 1959 returned to New Zealand |
| McDonald, Wm C | UNICEF Deputy Chief of Mission in Shanghai from 29 January 1948 for a short time, leaving China in July 1948 |
| McIver, Alexander | UNRRA HQ, Washington, Acting Chief, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, 1947 [Later, UNICEF Country Representative for Pakistan] |
| McPhail, J Earle B (Dr) | Pediatrician, UNICEF advisor in Nanking and Beijing; tutor at Health Personnel Training Centre in Tungchow; 1948-1951 - left China January 1951. (Seconded from WHO; formerly with UNRRA in Kaifeng) [March 1951, took up post with WHO in Burma] |

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|-------------------|---|
| Nason, John B | UNICEF Liaison Officer with UNRRA, UNICEF Liaison Office, Washington D C 1947 |
| Painter, John F | UNICEF Transport and Supply Officer in Beijing, April 1949; Officer-in-charge (after departure of Helen Drummond) from October 1949 through February 1951 |
| Palevsky, Mary | UNRRA Shanghai, Chief, Regional Administration Division Interim UNICEF Representative in China from 29 December 1947 until Dr Junod's arrival in Shanghai 5 February 1948 |
| Parran, Thomas Dr | former USA Surgeon-General with Dr C.K. Lakshmanan visited 13 Asian countries and presented report on health condition of children to the UNICEF Executive Board in July 1948 |
| Paschen, Hans | UNICEF NYHQ, Chief, Personnel Section 1948 |
| Pate, Maurice | First UNICEF Executive Director, 1947-1964 |
| Petersen Dr | WHO - Developed unofficial WHO/UNICEF joint proposals in the amount of \$2 million for fellowships and supplies |
| Polak, Simon | UNICEF Field Representative, Canton, 1948-49 Left China in September 1949 [Later served as UNICEF Area Representative, Thai Area, Bangkok for many years] |
| Price, Harry B | UNRRA Assistant Director, China Office |

1945-1947. Author of UNRRA in China 1945-1947, July 1948

Wrote letter of suggestions at request of Mr Pate about establishing a programme of help for children in China, December 1947 [formerly Instructor of Agricultural Economics at Yenching University in Peking during the 1930,s]

Price, Shirley UNICEF Secretary, China Mission, Nanking 1948

Quan, L King UNRRA HQ Washington D C Chief, Analysis Branch, Office of Far Easter Affairs
Wrote "Notes on the needs of Chinese Children"

Rajchman, Ludwig Chairman, UNICEF Executive Board 1948-1951
[formerly League of Nations Advisor]

Ray, J Franklin Jr UNRRA, Acting Director, China Mission, Shanghai
UNRRA HQ, Chief, Office of Far Eastern Affairs

Rolbant, Naomi UNICEF Secretary, Shanghai and Nanking May 1948-July 1949
[Later UNICEF secretary in Regional Office Paris]

Satterthwaite, Penny Dr On loan from voluntary agency to teach at Health Personnel Training Centre Beijing, 1948-1949 [Later WHO Family Planning Advisor in Bangladesh and several other places]

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|--------------------|---|
| Sayre, Geneva | Honorary UNICEF Field Representative, Kaifeng, 1948-1949 |
| Schilling, Jean | UNICEF Field Representative, Tientsin 1948 Beijing 1949 until 25 June 1949 [later rejoined UNICEF as supply officer in North Africa] |
| Schmerler | UNICEF Textile Expeditor, Shanghai 1948 |
| Schmittlinger, M | UNICEF NYHQ Programme Coordinator, 1948 |
| Shen Yuan-hui | CLARA, Director of first Health Personnel Training Course; worked with Dr Eloesser; wife of Dr Li Chih-chung; taught midwifery 1948-1950 |
| Shor, Franc | UNRRA China Office, Executive Officer, 1947 |
| Sinclair, Adelaide | Chairman, Programme Committee, 1950 [Later, UNICEF Deputy Executive Director, Programmes] |
| Soong Ching Ling | (see Madame Sun Yat Sen) |
| Ssu Chin-kwan Dr | Chief Health and Medical Commissioner for Chinese Liberated Areas 1947; Head Army Medical Service 1948; helped develop health personnel training plans |
| Stein, C R | UNICEF NYHQ Signed letter of appointment for Dr Junod 12 January 1948 [Personnel officer? Administration?] |
| Street | Honorary UNICEF Representative (?) Dr Junod wrote to MDSA that Mr Street |

(of the China Inland Mission) "will be"
UNICEF Representative in Lanchow for the
cotton project

| | |
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| Stuart, J Leighton | U S Ambassador to China from 11 July 1946 until establishment of People's Republic of China in 1949 [formerly President of Yenching University] |
| Sun Teliang | Executive Secretary, Local Committee for UNICEF-aided projects; Nanjing 1948-49 |
| Sun Yat-sen, Mme (Soong Ching Ling) | Chairman, China Welfare Fund 1950 [Widow of Dr Sun Yat-sen, first President of the Republic of China (1912)] |
| Sweet, Lenning Dr | United Services to China 1947 Proposed by Harry Price to serve as Chief of UNICEF Mission in China |
| Sypher, F Dr | UNRRA China Mission, physician |
| Terry, Charles | Honorary UNICEF Representative in Hongkong from 1948 to 1952; very helpful to UNICEF |
| Thorp, John S | UNRRA Reviewed situation in China with regard to milk and milk products |
| Tsiang, T S | Chinese (Nationalist) Delegate to the United Nations 1948 |

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| Tung Pi-wu | Chairman of CLARA (Chinese Liberated Areas Relief Association) Letter of Understanding between UNICEF and CLARA "chopped" by Tung Pi-wu and General Wu Yun-fu in Shijiazhuang in August 1948 |
| Wang Yin-pu | Director of CLARA's Shijiazhuang Office, 1948 |
| Wu Hsiao-chuan (General) | Dr Rajchman, Chairman of UNICEF Executive Board to take up the question of the future of the UNICEF work in China with General Wu after decision to suspend offices in China, December 1950 |
| Wu Yun-fu (General) | Signed Letter of Understanding with UNICEF Nominated to Represent the People's Republic of China on the UNICEF Executive Board, 1950 |
| Yen, "Jimmy" Y C | Director, College of Rural Reconstruction Espoused mass education and literacy programmes |
| Youngson, Stuart | Assistant Supply Officer, UNICEF Shanghai 1948 |
| Yang H Dr | Head of Child Welfare Department, Chinese National Institute of Health 1947 Nominated to head the proposed UNICEF-aided Children's Institute |
| Yu Yung | UNICEF Nanjing Representative from October 1949 until June 1951; remained in Nanjing - last UNICEF staff member in China until new officer opened thirty years later |

1- Zia, Samuel H Dr Peking Union Medical College (PUMC) 1949
at request of Dr Eloesser, carried out study
on possible causes of neo-natal tetanus

TABLE IIChronology of Some Events Related to the
Period of UNICEF Mission in China: 1947-1951

| | |
|-----------------|--|
| 9 November 1943 | United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) created with 44 nations signing agreement |
| 1944 - 1945 | UNRRA opens office in Chongqing during war; then moves its Headquarters to Shanghai and begins operations in China |
| 24 October 1945 | Charter of United Nations enters into force |
| 1946 | Mediation efforts continue throughout year by Gen George C Marshall for cease-fire between Nationalists and Communists UNRRA work continues on both sides |
| December 1946 | UNICEF created by United Nations General Assembly. UN Secretary General names Mr Maurice Pate as first UNICEF Executive Director |

- February 1947 UNRRA Welfare Division helps Ministry of Social Affairs plan programme for use of UNICEF assistance in China
- March 1947 Ministry of Social Affairs requests \$150,000,000. in cash and supplies for projects covering 3-year period
Mr Pate notes funds not yet available and UNRRA still operating, so UNICEF would start at later date in China
- September 1947 UNICEF proposes \$2,000,000. programme for China
- October 1947 UNICEF Executive Board approves first allocation to China of \$3,500,000. (E/590)
- 5 December 1947 Appointment of head of UNICEF Mission in China still under consideration
- 19 December 1947 Dr Marcel Junod, Swiss surgeon and International Red Cross chief delegate in Far East selected to head UNICEF Mission in China
Pending his arrival in Shanghai, Mary Palevsky to serve as Interim Representative
Mr and Mrs William McDonald will accompany Dr Junod
- 31 December 1947 UNRRA operations in China officially terminated
Closure staff to finish work by 30 April 1948
- 5 February 1948 Dr Junod arrives in Shanghai as Chief of UNICEF Mission
- March 1948 Dr Junod opens UNICEF China Mission in Nanjing

- April 1948 UNICEF Programme Committee meeting at New York Headquarters devotes session to China programme
- 24 April 1948 First UNICEF-aided child feeding centres opened in Nanjing
- 28 April 1948 UNICEF Executive Board sets aside \$500,000. for establishment of programmes "in areas not under direct control of Government"
- 16 May 1948 UNICEF Child Feeding Centres opened in Hankou
- 21 May 1948 Basic Agreement between UNICEF and the Republic of China signed by Dr Junod for UNICEF and by Mr C K Ku, Minister of Social Affairs, for the Government.
- 25 May 1948 UNICEF Child Feeding Centres opened in Shanghai
- 1 June 1948 Dr Junod makes initial liaison with Communist authorities through Mr Lin Chung (in Hongkong) representing CLARA.
- Dr Leo Eloesser designated to draw up a health programme with Communist officials in North China and to secure letter of understanding; Perry Hanson appointed to assist him, together forming UNICEF North China Field Team

- 2 June 1948 UNICEF-aided child feeding centres opened in Tsingtao (Qingdao)
- July 1948 Newton Bowles from New York Headquarters Programme Division visits Shanghai and Nanjing Offices and North China Field Team to take up programming, personnel & administrative matters
- August and September 1948 Eloesser and Hanson travel to Shijiazhuang for discussions with CLARA officials
Letter of Understanding and health workers training project agreed upon
- 15 August 1948 Republic of Korea inaugurated
- 23 August 1948 Cotton Project - appointment of Norman Horn to work with UNICEF China Mission and Textile Advisory Committee in China
\$600,000 worth of raw cotton procured for program
- 23 August 1948 UNICEF appoints Jerome Jacobson as "Legal Counsel to the Fund in China"
- September 1948 Donald K. Faris takes up post as UNICEF Field Representative in Hankou
Elsie Moyle appointed UNICEF Field Representative in Qingdao
- 6 November 1948 Supplemental Agreement for processing of raw cotton into cloth and for its distribution to needy children signed in Nanjing by UNICEF and Government

- 24 November 1948 Dr Eloesser reports first UNICEF-aided health training courses opened
- December 1948 Red Army counterattacks; enters Yanjing University in Beijing suburbs; takes Xuzhou north of Nanjing in major battle
- 15 January 1949 Red Army takes Tianjin (Tientsin); UNICEF office remains open; Jean Schilling, Field Representative
- end January 1949 Communists occupy Beijing ("Peiping"); UNICEF office remains open; Helen Drummond, UNICEF Field Representative
- January 1949 Chiang Kai-shek resigns presidency and leaves Nanjing. Li Tsung-jen becomes Acting President; Yen Hsi-shan named premier. Capital moved to Guangzhou (Canton)
- 22 January 1949 Dr Marcel Junod leaves for New York for UNICEF Executive Board Meeting; does not return to China
- 15 February 1949 Dr Eloesser leaves Shijiazhuang for Beijing; starts preparing for second health workers training centre; joined by Edith Galt and Isabel Hemingway, nurse-midwife instructors, and Earle McPhail, pediatrician, to teach preventive health care

- February 1949 Nationalist Government personnel start moving southward out of Nanjing
- 24 March 1949 Red Army occupies Taiyuan, capital of the province of Shanxi
- April 1949 John Painter joins UNICEF Beijing Office as Transport and Supply Officer
- 14 April 1949 UNICEF/WHO Joint Committee on Health Policy discusses proposals for China Programme: Child health and welfare training; tuberculosis control; kala-azar control; fly control; and promotion use goat's milk and soya milk¹
- 24 April 1949 Red Army takes Nanjing after crossing Yangzi river unopposed
UNICEF Office remains open; child feeding centres continue in operation
- 15 May 1949 John E. Merryman III, Administrative Officer in Shanghai and Acting Chief of Mission following Dr Junod's departure for NYHQ, leaves China
- 16-17 May 1949 Red Army enters Hankou
Donald K Faris, UNICEF Field Representative
- 17 May 1949 In negotiations between CLARA and UNICEF in Beijing, issue of "supervision and control" of supplies unresolved. Dr Eloesser asks HQ withhold further shipments from Hongkong until

¹Document JC.3/UNICEF-WHO/23, Geneva

issue settled

- 21 May 1949 Jean Schilling, UNICEF Field Representative in Tianjin reports child feeding centres closed
- 25 May 1949 Red Army enters Shanghai; Wm Berges, UNICEF Field Representative reports child feeding centres continue in operation
- 2 June 1949 Red Army enters Qing-dao; Elsie Moyle, UNICEF Field Representative
- 16 July 1949 Second UNICEF-aided Health Training Centre begun at Tongxian (Tungchow)
- August 1949 White Paper issued by United States Department of State. Includes statements of amounts of aid provided through UNRRA and other relief and welfare agencies to China (mostly Nationalist)
- U.S. Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart leaves China
- September 1949 Dr Eloesser regrettably decides to leave China Attends UNICEF Executive Board meeting in New York; returns to China 27 years later
- Simon Polak, UNICEF Field Representative in Canton leaves China; joins UNICEF in Bangkok
- 15 October 1949 Canton entered and most of mainland China under control of Communist forces

- 1 October 1949 People's Republic of China established
Name of capital officially designated Beijing
- 30 November 1949 Chongqing, capital of Nationalist China during
Sino-Japanese War and World War II, taken over
by Chinese Communist forces
- 31 December 1949 Communist authorities in Beijing abrogate
"Shih-chia-chuang Agreement" between UNICEF
and CLARA.
- 30 January 1950 Second health personnel training course
completed in Tungchow;
UNICEF instructors Edith Galt and Isabel
Hemingway leave UNICEF; prepare Manual;
Earle McPhail returns to UNICEF Beijing;
Third "People's Health Workers' Training
Course" opens with UNICEF equipment and supplies
but without UNICEF-provided personnel
- 17 February 1950 Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty signed
- March 1950 Chiang Kai-shek resumes presidency in Taiwan
- 5 May 1950 Formation of People's Relief Association of
China (PRAC), replacing CLARA
- 25 June 1950 Korean War begins
- 4 July 1950 Soong Ching Ling (Mme Sun Yat-sen), Chairman
China Welfare Fund writes to Dr Borcic about
possibilities of resumption of relations with
UNICEF

- 19 July 1950 UNICEF signs a Basic Agreement with the Republic of China in Taipeh (Replacing the ones signed in Nanking in May and November of 1948)
Joint WHO-UNICEF Liaison Office established in Taipeh
- 25 August 1950 Chou En-lai nominates Wu Yun-fu, Secretary-General of People's Relief Association to serve as China's Representative on the UNICEF Executive Board
- 21 October 1950 Tibet incorporated into the People's Republic of China
- November 1950 UNICEF Executive Board vote to seat Beijing's nominee as Board member results in tie; vote repeated - still tie; China's nominee, Wu Yun-fu, not seated
- December 1950 UN General Assembly extends UNICEF 3 years
UNICEF Resources to be used for "supplies, training and advice"
- December 1950 UNICEF NYHQ cables Hanson in Nanking that UNICEF China Mission to be "temporarily suspended", local staff to be terminated, and the remaining international staff members (John Painter and Earle McPhail in Beijing and Perry Hanson in Nanjing) withdrawn; McPhail leaves for Hongkong and WHO Burma
- 28 December 1950 Peoples Republic of China enters Korean War on side of North Korea

- January 1951 John Painter receives exit permit
Closure of UNICEF China Mission in Nanjing
proceeds very slowly
- February 1951 Painter, last UNICEF international staff
member in Beijing, leaves China .
- 16 March 1951 Newton Bowles at NYHQ writes to Hanson in
Nanjing that first consignment stibinol
for use in kala-azar control in China
had been shipped; balance of some 14,000 vials
to follow
- March 1951 Huang Hua, chief of Government's Bureau of
Foreign Affairs in Nanjing requests Hanson
as "Senior [and only] UNICEF Representative
in China" to remain in Nanjing until all
matters relating to UNICEF in China are
cleared up.
- April 1951 All UNICEF offices in China officially closed
Hanson and family given permission to leave
- 1 May 1951 Hansons arrives Canton amidst May Day
celebrations, leaving China next day and
returning 33 years later
- 1953 Separate Liason Office for relations with UNICEF
established by Government in Taipei under the
direction of K C Chen

25 October 1971 General Assembly resolution 2758 (XXVI) admits
People's Republic of China to the United Nations
and People's Republic replaces the Republic of
China on the UNICEF Executive Board for
unexpired term - until 31 July 1973

1981 [?] UNICEF Office in China reopened in Beijing

May 1984 UNICEF Executive Board approves a commitment of
\$50,000,000 from general resources for the China
Country Programme for the period 1985-1989 -
(E/ICEF/1984/P/L.22)

Some Books, Letters and Articles

Blunden, C & Elvin, M - Cultural Atlas of China, Equinox, Oxford,
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
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- ~~~~~ Rivers
- ===== Grand Canal
- +++++ Railways
- Rail lines (not operating)
- Land routes
- x-x- Nationalist-Communist borders

Scale of Miles

0 50 100