

Chron Ref: CF/NYH/05EB/HST/1995-046
File Sub: CF/HST/INT/WAL-001/M

0879Q ... 7 August 1984

Interview with Robert Walker

Conducted by Jack Charnow

Held at UNICEF HQ

On 4 May 1984


Charnow: This is an interview with Robert Walker by Jack Charnow at UNICEF Headquarters on May 4, 1984.

Bob would you like to say a little bit about your background before you came to UNICEF and how you got into UNICEF?

Walker: Jack, my background was, at the approximate time of coming to UNICEF, Service Director for the then British Standard Motor Company which later formed part of the British Leyland group in the United States and through a contact met Martin Mauwrer (?), the then Transport Director for UNICEF through common associations with the automotive industry in Detroit, Michigan. In an interview with Martin he explained the sort of work that he was involved in which had a certain amount of -- its humorous side to me was that I thought that he was talking about maintaining UN vehicles and I kept thinking of big cadillacs and Lincoln Continentals driving into the UN plaza. Another intriguing part about the interview was the possibility of an opening in India for a Regional Vehicle



UNICEF Alternate Inventory Label



Rcf0006CDH

Item # CF/RAD/USAA/DB01/1996-0154

ExR/Code: CF/HST/INT/WAL-001/M

Interview Robert Walker by John Charnow: Background; Educ

46pp + 8b

Management Adviser - which was then called Transport Officer - in the New Delhi office, and India was an old stomping ground of mine, having served virtually four years with the British Royal Air Force during World War II on a fighter squadron in Burma and in India, later transferring onto test flying in the same country, so my knowledge of India was quite good but of course somewhat out of date. Anyway as all things came to pass after somewhat of a long drawn-out hassle as is the wont with recruitment, I finally pressured Mary Taylor to get the documentation analyzed and I arrived in New York on August 30, 1965, to be assigned as Regional Transport Officer to the then New Delhi office under Charles Eggar. Want me to just carry on now?

Charnow: Yes, by all means.

Walker: To give some of my personal background, I was educated in Norfolk in England, in a technical school, I don't know that there is a sort of a perhaps a standard -- comes as a sort of a two year college education, and I was well embarked in this at the time when the war broke out - World War II. I went straight into the Air Force not many months after the war began and I didn't come out of the Air Force until 1946 if I remember correctly, and then I wanted to take up an education in medicine. In the meantime, while I was waiting to get a seat in the London University I started a business which was somewhat successful and as is the wont with young people, once you get the taste of having a bit of money in your hands to spend and living a good life, when the time came up to take a seat

in the University, I was making enough money that I decided to forego that, so I stayed in business. And I stayed in business, actually in the technical electrical type of business in the United Kingdom, going through a marriage which started to break up and this was the cause for coming to the United States, where I had taken my flight training during World War II. So I had some familiarity with the US, so I just separated from my wife and came to the United States and then restarted again. Now there is a little word of advice that I can give on this, because on doing this, I think that that period of my life I was at my very, very best, because I realized that to succeed in any new environment I had to give totally of myself and nobody was interested in me, whether I worked, whether I ate well, whether I got a job or whatever, everything had to be done on my own ?? ?? , so I think one really puts out the most. I always look back on it as a good period of time, because not only did it make me good business associations, it made good personal contacts which I still have to this day. It was a very good experience, and it was the way that I approached the job when I went to India, realizing that nobody knew me and I was going to be out there doing something that I had never tried before, I really had to put my back into it.

Charnow: From what you say, your interest seemed more in personal development rather than a sense of commitment for what UNICEF or the United Nations was all about.

Walker: Yes, because I don't think that came across during all of the period of interviews, first with Mauer, and then with an indoctrination period up here in New York. You meet people - they talk at you rather than with you and I think a common thread in human beings is that when you are talking to somebody on a subject that you are very well versed and knowledgeable you don't realize that it is strange or alien to them, so it doesn't sort of fit into your thinking and I think they lose you. I felt this and I still feel it today, that when people come to UNICEF they never really, in the first instance, get to know UNICEF, they find out about it through their own working environment when they get out into the field or wherever. I went out to India with very little idea of what UNICEF was doing, other than the part that I was going to be doing.

Charnow: You developed your technical abilities with transport in the army?

Walker: My training, my education was in the technical field. I was trained to be an engineer but this was broken up and my interest, as a lot of English people, was in the automobile industry, and my father had been in the automobile industry in transport, so this tended to come somewhat naturally. Then when I came to the United States I went into business for myself and opened an automobile agency and it still exists today, down in Southcoast.

Charnow: Well, earlier we left you in India.

Walker. Right. As I said I arrived in India not knowing very much about UNICEF - really what its aims or ideas were, other than it was a sort of a social organization trying to find ways to help children. I think my indoctrination in India helped me very very quickly because I knew nothing better than to jump in with both feet.

Let me backtrack to the indoctrination before I went to India. As I was saying I think we could really enhance our indoctrination programme or period with staff members to get a better understanding with them or for them of exactly what UNICEF is and what it is all about. Now the indoctrination that I got from Martin Maurer, being as I was going to be under his direct technical supervision, was naturally quite a little bit better and I spent time - my period in New York - travelling home with him and staying at his house, so there was a lot more personal involvement in this, so that when I did go to India I had really quite a good idea of what UNICEF was trying to do in the field of programme transport and its maintenance and its management. However, on arriving in India ...

Charnow. Well, may I just, aside from Maurer, did you have any discussions with say, Dick Heyward, Ed Bridgewater, or others more than just a formal introduction about what was expected of you, because obviously the transport thing was a big thing in terms of cost.

Walker: No, well, yes. I think it was a period of ten days I spent at Headquarters, when they were in the old place, and I did have interviews with each of the senior staff members - Dick Hayward, Martin Sandberg, I presume Bridgewater - I can't remember the itinerary, I know the interview with Dick Heyward was a little humorous, because they switched the times on me. I walked into Dick Heyward's office and said "Mr. Sandberg, I presume." Dick's somewhat stiff comment made me realize who he was, and of course I have never forgotten him from that day after. As a matter of fact he, I believe, remembered it himself. But one is really absorbing very little during these brief interviews and you don't know who the person is and where they fit in the firmament of UNICEF and I believe that it might be worthwhile for a new staff member to get part of what you are doing here, Jack, a sort of synopsis of UNICEF and maybe just three or four pages of sharp, crisp information on how the organization started, how it got going, where it went from there, who is on board, what they were doing and just how the structure fits in with maybe a sort of little staff pyramid - or a sort of organizational chart to see where senior management, programme, supply and how everybody all sort of fits and works together to form this team. I think it would be worthwhile for new staff members to see something like this before they come to these interviews. I think it would help put it in the picture, I think they could see well, yes, this is where this man Heyward fits into this ?? ?? .

Anyway, going on to my visit to India. I arrived in India, as I have done through most of my UNICEF life, on very auspicious occasions, always seemingly in September of the year or that last part of the year and India was in war with Pakistan. So I arrived under sort of rather strict restrictions - black-outs and such. Anyway, my indoctrination in India was really hectic because I felt the best thing I could do was to get out and find out about it myself. I realized this because there was really nobody to talk to, being as the then Regional Director, Charles Eggar, was not too struck on Regional Transport Officers having led through his experience with Jerry Medina. So I went in under somewhat of a cloud ...

Charnow: Was Jerry Medina your predecessor?

Walker: My predecessor. And this did also, funnily enough, impinge on the social side of one's assignment, because I believe Charles, in his own inevitable way, had sort of categorized all transport people as probably those that he knew only, namely Maurer, Jerry Medina and then this fellow Walker comes along. It was really through the efforts of my wife that broke through that, and now I could say that I could probably call Charles a friend after the years we've worked together.

Anyway, I had 26 states in India and some regional territories, of which there were transport organizations or a nucleus of them started, plus Afghanistan, Nupur, Outer Mongolia and Ceylon which

is now Sri Lanka. In the first twelve months of my assignment in India I spent 26 weeks in the field, receiving a certain amount of criticism from my programme colleagues, this fellow who was always travelling and never home. Anyway, it taught me a lot about India and what we were doing and maybe at this point I will break off and say that as we're going to discuss this subject with Jack I'll get into depth about how this all went during this period then.

Charnow: Yes, and on the conclusions reflections on the whole transport operation in UNICEF in addition to your experiences in India.

Well, Bob, in addition to transport the other major aspect of your career in UNICEF has been in emergencies. Do you want to talk about how you got into it and then we'll go on to some of your reflections on UNICEF as an emergency organization and the principles that should guide us.

Walker, OK. My introduction to emergencies was, I think a result of support through Gordon Carter, who was then Regional Director in India, a man whom I very much admired and whom I enjoyed working for and under. Through him I got the opportunity first was at the time of the cyclone of 1970 in what was then East Pakistan. Frances Smellek was the representative there and he called for some staff support. I didn't know him. Gordon Carter at that time recommended myself and David Henry, who is now no longer with UNICEF, to go and assist Frances Smellek in Dhaka because the, as history shows, the cyclone and tidal wave created such a tremendous

havoc and I think the office in those days was really very, very small that he needed outside help. However, as it came to pass, this was just before Christmas 1970, this did not come to pass. However, the following year in the early spring was then the upsurge of the civil unrest in East Pakistan and I was offered the appointment as the then Deputy Representative, I was the only place where we had a Deputy Representative, as it came under the West Pakistan office the Representative which was in those days Carl Schoenmeyer. So, I was under the appointment and transferred from India to Bangladesh. During the interim at the transfer I attended the first UNICEF programme course - the Paris course. Frances Smellek came to the Executive Board, which was held in Geneva, to report on the developing emergency situation and the sort of concluding emergency effect of the cyclone. It was a very interesting period of time. Quite a lot of things happened to me. One was related back to the India days - it was the major senior staff meeting with Dick Heyward, the then comptroller, the German Middlemen, Gordon Carter and myself - I think we were the only people involved. The decision for UNICEF to purchase all of its vehicles from the Indian manufacturer Mahendru Mahendron (?) - but that is the transport side. But Harry Hanson, who was then chief of the Asia section went to East Pakistan to hold the fort for me until I finished the Paris course and went there in the late summer. This was my introduction first into programming - to go as a Deputy Representative of this very small office. I think there were at that time two national offices and two or three local staff, but by the time I'd gotten there the civil emergency was

developing to rather a major point that the United Nations had established a focal point and there was a lot of emergency assistance beginning to move into the country. UNICEF, as always, was more deeply involved than anybody else and physically rather than on the sort of control side. Our major programme was the reaching of children with supplementary food to offset the ravages of the losses of crop the previous emergency and the now really damaging economic situation as a result of the civil strife, the lack of transportation movement. This eventually resulted with UNICEF feeding some three million children a day - on a daily basis. Quite an exercise.

So I arrived at the end of the monsoons in Dhaka with a plane looking as though it was going to land on the water. Arriving in Dhaka all one could see was just water. At the end of the monsoon period Bangladesh, as it now is, had one third of its country virtually under water during the monsoon periods ?? ?? . That was my introduction to both programming and emergencies.

Charnow: Before you go on to that ... You mentioned the Paris course. This is the one that the

Walker: The ?? ?? . The first.

Charnow: Do you want to comment a little bit about that course and whether it had any value for you and so on.

Walker, Yes. The course had naturally a value. There is always area where one can learn but there again it was an introduction into a field of which I was unfamiliar. I think I would have penetrated it if I'd have had, personally myself, more of an introduction into the programming side and I realize now just how naïve that I was. To be given ?? ?? Merdal's the eighth drama, which I lay ?? ?? because I again had felt that this was something of which the course was going to question you on, so I did read through it and as a result I sort of got something from it but a lot of the course was ... it was over my head. It was, I thought, more the cloud nine stuff, the conceptualization. I don't believe - Oh I never say I do believe to look at it more positively than negatively, that this sort of thing can be improved by looking at experience at what doesn't work and look at some of the reasons why things are not working because you start to get a feeling that there are two halves of the world and its those that have and those that have not which really isn't the truth of fact, but its those that have who are trying, it seems, to drag the others up but we try and do it with our answers to their problems and I think this is where we miss. I look at this business of transport and here we go in with a western idea of how to set up a system of maintenance for pieces of equipment of which a) they are unfamiliar because traditionally they use draft (?) animals and forms of transport of that nature, and we try and introduce management concepts to people who have the sort of background and I don't believe that we sort of really sat and worked with the people in the country to find out how we could achieve the end result we were looking for by building

on what their history was. Anyway, this is the sort of thing of the past. We even convinced our national colleagues to do it our way, and so they were perhaps a bigger exponent of the Western approach than the westerners were.

Anyway, to get through this business of going to this course was that I believe that we built on the concept that latterly came to fore of the exchange - what did they call this, this programme that we had ...

Charnow: TCDC

Walker: Perhaps the cross-fertilization of ideas was ... because I believed to some extent we were trying to promote concepts which were again western which didn't work. To my mind, and maybe not everybody would agree with it, I think this is proven with the WHO - the now change in the approach to basic services rather than the primary health care that worked in some way but ?? ?? some effect. We've obviously learned as we've gone along too.

But anyway, giving in to the rest of the course, I learned I think more from my more experienced colleagues and remained of course excellent good friends - I can name most of the people on this course and most of them are still with UNICEF - Dave Haxton, Fitz Larrison, one or two have gone on - Robert Reynolds. Anyway, I think it was a good introduction, I think if I had been more astute and knowledgeable on programming matters I could have perhaps put

it in a better way because what I learned I believe I could have learned more if the approach had been somewhat different in ?? ?? theoretical.

Anyway, going to Bangladesh. Again, the introduction into this assignment - I was not well versed or briefed or naturally experienced so I think it points out the really critical need for having a manual, but it has to be readable and it has to of course be read, because you can't pick up when an emergency begins.

Bangladesh generally suffers these continuing emergencies the same as India, but these are the natural disasters rather than the manmade. So this was somewhat of a new cycle for Bangladesh. To me I didn't know enough about what I was doing, only trying to learn as one went along but the office mushroomed from I would say less than ten staff members to something like 150 staff members of volunteers, national and some international staff. Here was I, never had run a small UNICEF in any way, shape or form before and I think this is what prompted Labouisse to bring Glen Davis back into the fold and bring him in as the senior officer some six or eight months into 1982, it was some six or eight months after the emergency so it was well on its way.

Charnow: But here we are at UNICEF, an organization that at that point had had many years of experience with emergencies and then they put a guy like you in who doesn't know anything about this experience. Where did you get it then? You started from scratch but didn't you have support from the Supply Division and some others, in backing you up with our organizational experience?

you get it then? You started from scratch but you must have had support from the supply division and some others, and therefore had a lot of your understaking the organizational experience that came to you.

Walker: Well, yes. We did not have an emergency section. I believe the emergency section came out of Bangladesh because I think our first staff member that came on board was

Walker: The first emergency section was formed under Paul Larson and Judy - his assistant, I can't remember her last name - they were the contacts that I had then at headquarters. The difficulty with the situation was that communication was extremely difficult other than by cable and good lord, it is seven years ago, there was a very good team effort amongst the UN system. We had the personnel and the expertise. I don't know who was the architect of bringing on board the Care people, bringing their experience at food management and feeding programmes, I have a feeling it was Perry Hanson. Dan Roth, a senior Care officer, arrived in Dhaka just the same time as I did, so as he was going to be providing this support to UNICEF we formed a team, because I realized he knew more about the food business than I did, and its management and its movement and its control, so they set up this side of the emergency programme and I was working with, beginning through Gordon Carter because that was the first point of contact. Immediately after the emergency phase

came to a halt, this was after the Indians had attacked the west Pakistan forces, and Bangladesh had come into being. I made my contacts with the then new government, the Prime Minister being the most senior person, Che Ruge Raman (?), who was to become the president, was still in prison in east Pakistan, and I know Mr. Labouisse came within days of the emergency being over and he was somewhere I think in the Asia area and indicated that he wanted to come. Mr. Labouisse had also come in my very first part of the operation under the east Pakistan, and introduced me to the then governor and senior staff that were in control of the country. This was fortunate because Mr. Labouisse was able to stop what was probably going to be a massacre through a field trip that we took by road to Jhittigong (?) and meeting with various people on the way and the controlling forces in the country, when the sabotage had taken place they couldn't find the saboteurs they got all the village male population - I think boys from 12 on up - and I think that they lined the men and the women up and they purportedly were supposed to have physically abused the women and then shot and killed all the male population. This we heard was going to be happening on one of the passages of Mr. Labouisse on this field visit and we reported it back to the governor, he and I personally. And I think his mere presence in the country stopped this from happening, so I think some people realized that Mr. Labouisse being in what was then East Pakistan that my recollection of the immediate phase after the war was over there had been a mass evacuation of all UN personnel. Paul Montgonrie was the Secretary General's representative. He had not been assigned there, he was

actually his representative and he got stuck there. He came in on the last plane that came in and never got another one that went out. Actually his presence there was excellent because he was rather like Napoleon and led his forces like Napoleon in which we all were included. However, the moment that the sort of - I can't remember actually the timing but I know that he was trying to arrange an air evacuation which was eventually done but not under the auspices of the UN and so there was a mass exodus of personnel. It ultimately ended up I think immediately after the cessation of hostilities with just ten men, ten UN personnel remaining in Bangladesh. I was the senior UN officer and was placed in charge by Montgonrie and we had, I think, six UNICEF and four support UNDRO staff, which were primarily the communications people. We even received a personal from the then Secretary General, U Thant. Then we began the really, the rehabilitation rather than the emergency per se, it was to then try and help the country get back on its feet.

So, we had somewhat of a problem. A) The government that had not existed before made up of a new nation, same people but a new nation, who in my experience were not too well equipped to run a country. This was brought more forcibly to my notice at a very first reception given by the then US Consul General of all of the then new senior people in government. I was at the table of the Minister of Finance and one of the areas of discussion - he was a very pleasant person, and one of the areas of discussion was the assistance that was going to pour into the country. I asked him a

somewhat hypothetical question: had they ever thought of asking for management assistance and I tried to do this somewhat humorously, but he carried through with it, such as to have somebody like for their Minister of Foreign Affairs is to have Henry Kissinger go and be his adviser - somebody of this type of caliber, go to be his adviser so that at a time that there was going to be some really high-powered decision necessary the governor of Bangladesh's minister could say, "Excuse me, I've got to go into the bathroom," go in there and there was Mr. Kissinger sitting in there and he'd pose the question to him and get the advice and counsel of how to do it and then come back and put the story across.

Charnow: You were thinking of an outsider?

Walker: An ex-patriot. Well, I was thinking of a different form than was traditionally given - not UNICEF but sort of the international community - here was a new government, probably inexperienced, they were going to try and find their way through. As a matter of fact the response was that he thought that this was a good idea but would it be possible, and I said well your government should ask is, maybe to discuss could they get senior counsel. The man went on to bigger and better things and became the Ambassador I think to Indonesia.

That was one sort of humorous side, but it pointed out the emergency assistance that was I think necessary in the country. The West Bengal had never been in a position of having to manage.

Traditionally they are poets, lovers, song writers - they are that type of person and that part of the country has always been run by other parts of India and then east Pakistan. The west Pakistanis got sort of more drive.

However, we had the emergency problems of trying to get the schools back into operation, to try and keep the feeding programme going with the total lack of transportation in the country, to look at the problems of water which were traditionally were pretty bad and of course re-establish or try and establish a health services which were disappearing fast. The country was in a really big mess. So, rather than a pure disaster type emergency, it was really an emergency approach to massive restoration and rehabilitation.

Charnow: Well, now let me ask you a general question about our approach. We have said that UNICEF is not a general relief agency, that our function in emergency is to see that special attention is paid to children and we work with all the other agencies and there are a lot of inputs there. How did this work out in the Bangladesh situation? How do you distinguish what special interests are for children and what is not?

Walker: I think it is perhaps something that we say to give the reason for us - UNICEF - to do what we're good at, and that is to respond to emergency situations. I think children are always the most affected because they are the most vulnerable, however I think that we can never look at children in isolation from their families. To

assist the children we have to provide overall assistance to the family. If you look at what we do, we do not do or provide very much different than any other aid-giving agents. We are more conscious of the needs such as nutrition rather than just providing food, water as a health aspect rather than providing water to save life, and we do look at health from a consciousness of preventing the outbreaks of something rather than providing the assistance to the results of the emergency. It is a conscious net that we have, but traditionally we don't provide a great deal of different assistance from any others. This is perhaps a bit of the crueler side, but I was reading in the paper of the 900 children who died in Calcutta as a result of chagalla (?) and dysentery, here we are promoting oral rehydration salts - ok - where is the mix. Why did our oral rehydration salts work, were they available, how come we didn't know, what happened? This goes back maybe into sort of the consciousness of emergency situations. I think we use the name of children perhaps as the back-up for our staying in vogue in providing what was our traditional role - in fact when you said it had first started, we do look at that rather than just bringing stuff in. We do look and see what the needs are, we try and develop an assessment of some sort of how many children are involved, and we do make sure that the type of assistance we go with is going to be reachable for children, is going to be suitable for them, is going to be used by them, but is also going to be able to be used by the rest of the family.

Charnow: Would you like to give an example about how you go about making an assessment of needs?

Walker: Jack, this is something that I don't think anybody is really particularly good at. We have to rely upon the information that we can get from government sources. We do have our own information but I don't know that it is as current and up to date. I'll quote you an example: if we were to rely upon a census for Lebanon, the last one was in 1932. Now their mix of population has dramatically changed, it is only our physical presence in the country for so long that we know virtually more or less where everybody is, and who is where and what is the sort of population, what are the religions, what are the ?? ?? of the whole environment of that little particular area, so I think that we are better equipped to be able to take a decision if a disaster strikes a certain area in Lebanon - to say OK, this is what is needed and this is what population we are ?? ?? , these are the logistics problems, and whatever. But if we take India with the size that our UNICEF office in India must be now, and the numbers of the population which I believe are somewhat closely approaching a billion now, a lot of it has got to be guess work. Now a person who is familiar with the area can do site in the event of a natural disaster, like a flood, where it is something that has happened very, very quickly, a site view can be taken and some good estimates made of all sorts of things - of logistics, of the population and the affected area and the knowledge of what exists in the area can come from some government sources but I don't

believe we have enough in-country information. This bounces back in times of most emergency situations, for example, I think the classic one that always comes to my mind is in Managua, and how the British air-lifted in corrugated iron sheeting that was manufactured in the next country. OK they did the job, but at tremendous cost which was a waste of money because the monies could have been spent somewhere else, it could have gotten there quicker. To a large degree we have done more local purchasing in Lebanon because we can get it quicker, we're using this experience and we are being able to do it quicker, perhaps sometimes a bit more costly, but I think this is something we can also work on is the time shortage. Obviously the local entrepreneur is going to see a way of making some fast bucks, it is always the way. We've got to find some way that this could be overcome, I think by having a better knowledge of what is existing in country and have better systems set up with the national governments that in disaster or emergency-prone countries is that maybe it becomes a law that price escalations as a result of national shortage can be tantamount to - similar to looting or something of this nature. To do an assessment of the situation you have to go upon all the knowledge you can get your hands on. That that we should have you have got to draw on the national government and the national forces of the government more than anywhere else. And also other agencies - it is not a one-man job, it has got to be a team effort, which we don't do enough of, because in an emergency situation everybody wants to be there waving their flag first and nothing gives UNICEF more pleasure than not to say it out loud - that UNICEF got their

assistance in whilst the others were standing around talking. Now maybe you can have a look at some of these, but we've never really been able to do it, immediately when an emergency is over we should do an evaluation - and look and bring out all of the worms and all the things that went wrong, because these are the things that have got to get changed - not the things that we do right, we know what we do right, it is that we are good at doing things quickly. All we want to do is look at what we are doing things wrong.

Charnow: In an emergency, where does the government responsibility fit in? In regular programmes, obviously, there is a great deal of government responsibility. We are there to help them. How true is that in emergencies?

Walker: Usually, it is in a major emergency, the government will establish an emergency unit. This is part of what we have been promoting for years - that there should be an already pre-established emergency unit. It has got to be at the decision-making level that would have maybe a team of representations of health, public works, transportation, military adviser, so that all of the forces of government could report together, then they should bring in the outside forces. To a large degree, UNICEF tends to work, first of all, with the Ministries with which we are traditionally involved and unfortunately the more inter-related Ministry of Health is usually the stickiest, the slowest and they won't take too many decisions. We don't work much with the Food and Agricultural Ministries which also are involved in the transportation of major

food stocks. We don't have too much contact with the military, which are always a good resource in terms of logistics and management in an emergency situation, at least to draw on helicopter services for sight surveys, to work things out.

Look at the recent problem in Turkey. Now I thought that our effort there had nothing to do with me - I don't know what we do at Headquarters. We had a very inexperienced officer at Ankara office, and Victor Soler-Sala sent Brian Stock, who is a person who I don't admire for his capabilities, he is not at all experienced in emergencies, he is not a doer and he went in there and went up to the place and came back with just some standard traditional advice. I think we have to make a conscious decision that, OK if we can't do anything then we don't do it, but provide support to a government if they ask for it. Just don't go in just to wave our flag to be there and to sort of spend on ourselves.

Charnow: Well, you said that the agencies all like to be able to say they were there early or the first and so on. Aside from that, is there a competitive problem in emergencies among agencies?

Walker: To a degree, yes. This comes out more noticeably in our involvement with NGOs. This was the thing that Stanassis and I have tried to get across at NGO meetings that we attended - they weren't the right people but there was one or two that were - was that as a result of this competitiveness there is a certain secrecy. Things are held back. You don't want to let your cat out

of the bag. This is really entirely wrong. Here we are traditionally trying to learn by experience, so why should we do something of this nature when there is an emergency to prevent duplication - or shall I say if we can multiply the effort by the prevention of duplication, the emergency could be handled, probably quicker, more effectively and at less expense.

Charnow: Is part of this due to the fact that all the agencies are dependent upon contributions and financial contributions and they have to make a case in order to get financing?

Walker: Well, yes, and this is one of the things that the voluntary agencies have as a problem. They have got to present their programme, they have got to generate their own funds, but fine, this is the way it is going on now, and it is not correct, it is not right, we are therefore putting the cart before the horse. Shouldn't we go back to try and find a solution to this problem in terms of raising money? Now we're very good at raising money and I believe we probably help agencies raise money. When we raised money for Lebanon, Jack, I was so impressed at how much of a snap it was to go out and raise \$40 million. It was Maggie, Jim Grant and myself - we just did it. I mean there was all this team work behind it, the preparation of the programme and supply division and the programme funding office and things, but when we actually physically went out and presented this thing we did it. Now I believe that this is an area where we could perhaps help voluntary agencies. Look at this - if we are - it is like taking a western

approach for an Afghan problem. The name of the game is to effectively assist in the emergency, not work out ways and means to fund-raise. This should perhaps be worked out before. This is why I believe we are lucky to have this emergency fund. I look at it as a starter. Maybe it will provide all that we need, but the amount of money that is available should be a starter, to get things going while we get other things in gear. We did it effectively for Lebanon. I can remember turning around to Jim Grant and saying, "Jim, can we have a million dollars to get on with it." And he said sure, and we wrote up the million dollars. We eventually gave \$800,000 back, I think it was just \$200,000 had been used.

OK, these are the sort of things maybe we can get across to voluntary agencies - that the name of the game is more than team effort. The voluntary agency has their role to play - they are usually more physically in certain locations, they've got knowledge and experience that we don't and this is when I think we should be able to pull things together, and it should be something natural ... that we come together and everybody spills everything out, maybe have a co-ordinator and say OK, let's ?? ?? what has got to be done, the government has got to do this, we'll do this, this and this, UNICEF can you do this? OK.

Charnow: You talked about the government responsibility and you talked about the fact that they set up emergency units, but to what extent in emergencies should we, and do we depart from our traditional practices, and actually put people in and do things which, for normal type programmes, is done locally?

Walker, Well, there could be some pros and cons about this. Let me just talk about Turkey. Here we have a new, fairly inexperienced UNICEF man in a UNICEF office with little or no programme, he hasn't gotten much to do anything yet, and here is a major disaster. You can see by his cables, he was wanting to wave his flag, wanting to do something, but he didn't know what to do. He didn't know what to do. He didn't even know what to say to anybody. Now this is where we need somebody, no, not somebody but every UNICEF staff member knows to look at such and such, and there is a synopsis of what UNICEF could do in an emergency operation. It will point him to directions to go, to point him to read page 49 of the manual, to call this, to cable headquarters for authority on that, decisions he can make himself. It is in that original emergency section of the old field manual, and that was synthesized and crystallized into a couple of pages of one-liners - if this happens, do this, if that doesn't happen, do this, go from here to here to here, point to other places to read, call headquarters, who to call in headquarters, what decisions he could make by himself. If somebody could pick that up, ?? ?? yellow pages, gives them the direction.

Then I believe, I've always said this - at one time Dick got interested in the idea, is that we should have a rotating set of emergency people. They'd be on a special assignment. For example, if we got, shall we say our best health man - has to be Hans ~~N~~arula - if Hans ~~N~~arula was called three weeks before the board he couldn't possibly go. So, we should have Hans Narula out of the line of fire for, shall we say, a one year or two year assignment, where he is

still working in programme, OK, but an emergency comes up where the co-ordinator has to call on his expertise he can go for three weeks, or two weeks or ten days or a month, together with other emergency people, to set something up, like we use the money for, we used the one million dollars for - to start up business. OK, then they can tell the representative, "Look, by the time we leave here you ought to get this person on board to carry you through for the next three months." Think how much better we would have been in Lebanon. But everybody grew up with it, learned, as you do by your mistakes.

Charnow: Well, we've touched on Lebanon, before we go on to your further discussion of Lebanon and your Kampuchea experiences, is there anything more you want to say about Bangladesh?

Walker: Let me say the same final word that I asked Mr. Labouisse at the Director's meeting right after the Executive Board of that year, which was then held in New York, I remember he asked me to talk to them about it and I turned to him afterward and I said we should do an evaluation about involvement in the emergency operations and I think this is something we should get set up. It could be done by a number of things, but getting back specifically to Bangladesh, I would say we did a job. I myself would say that we probably didn't do any worse or better than anybody else, but I would say that we did do the best that we could have done, mainly because I don't think we treated the government like responsible business partners. This is something we don't do.

Charnow: Well, have evaluations, to your knowledge, been done on any of our operations?

Walker: Very few. I mean we've tried to do one with Lebanon but it has never been accomplished. This would be a sort of a running report, like progress reports, you know, actually what goes on. I think we are caught up maybe in a humanistic syndrome - nobody ever likes to say anything bad about anybody. Look at the way we write periodic reports of people. Nobody will let you say anything about a person. I can remember, probably if I had been as knowledgeable now as when I got my first periodical report from Charles Egger, I was pissed off with the way he put down some affect of my work, but however that has always stuck in my mind as something I have got to be conscious about, is a shortcoming that I have, because I think then you start to look at yourself, to realize that well, maybe you don't think you are as bad as he thinks you are, but anyway it makes you think about it. It is the same thing with emergencies. If we'd just say it like it is, not to put blame on anybody or name names, or identify a problem with a person's decision, but look at what led up to the decision - if it was wrong, why? What caused it to be wrong? Was the information lacking - if so this is an area that has got to be improved. Was it that the person wasn't experienced enough to be able to take that decision - so then he shouldn't have been in the decision-making process then. We should be able to learn from what we do wrong, but we don't look at it, and we go on, year after year. We've now got a manual, but we had a manual before, but Jack, I always thought it was a very good one - by Frances Smithweek I think

was the architect of most of it, but nobody ever knew about it, never knew even where to find it. Now we had this thing photocopied, and any new staff member that came I gave them his personal copy. We sent them to the offices, but when you ever spoke to anybody, look at the field manual they'd say, "Oh, I've never seen that". What do you keep it, where do you find that, what are you talking about?
??

?? staff members. Mainly because they don't look. Fine, this manual is going to appear, but if you have an emergency and shit hits the fan, you are going to sit down and go through that book. You know the last thing you pick up from your desk is the thick thing, the quick snappy thing - this what I think that came from Catley-Carlson because people read it. She had a good knack of presenting it, it had impact. Gordon Carter was like that. When you got something from Gordon Carter it was almost as though he spat it out - you know it was there. Now we don't do enough evaluations.

Charnow: Well, you're suggesting that the evaluation could be done by someone who is not personally involved. This would be done by ...

Walker: I think it ought to be done ... I don't think we have to have teams that go out and do it, but I don't know if we are honest enough to do it ourselves of what we did over the period of six months - to spell it out, people don't like to see that about themselves. Like if I had run an emergency I would be very happy if say Ed Lannert did an evaluation of OK, my first six weeks of the Lebanon emergency and say it like it was and then we sat and talked about it. We'd talk about it, we - the organization talked about it and the things that we did right and did wrong.

Charnow: Well, to get on. After you left Bangladesh ...

Walker: Then I came back to Headquarters and went into Supply Division, but then shortly afterwards, a couple of years or so, I came back and took over the emergency desk from Smithweek when he retired, in '77, I think.

Charnow: Yeah. And on the Kampuchea situation you were involved here at headquarters, right?

Walker: Well, this again is something the UN should write up about. All in all, I would say that it was a classically good example of how the UN can handle a major emergency situation. Obviously not everything went right, but to a large degree I think it went well and I think UNICEF acquitted itself beautifully, so much so that the only other major emergency that I was involved in after that before I left the organization was the Lebanon one, and we used - we took the same pattern. It was kind of interesting because, as it turned out, we had a complete change in our senior management, not Grant but Catley-Carlson and Jolly and so therefore, I introduced the same concepts we started the Bangladesh via the Kampuchea emergency on and we followed the same thing and it worked just as well.

Charnow: Well, what was that pattern? I thought that in Kampuchea we were a lead agency and we decided never again.

Walker: Well, we're always the lead agency, Jack, whether we call it lead agency or not. We were named that because it was a name that may never ever get used again is that UNICEF was the only agency that I think legally could have been in country. The same is with ICRC. All the other agencies couldn't be there because there was a non-recognized government or whatever. That is where our mandate for children came in. So we became the umbrella, and it got called the lead agency and it became bigger than what it was and it was our leadership, the leadership of our people that we had in the field and at headquarters that took the lead and co-ordinated ?? ?? work that way. The concept was followed on when ?? ?? came on board, so we started something that maybe we didn't want to have, but we're always going to do it, we're always going to take the lead because we know what we're doing, and we have the experience and we have the right kind of people, despite the fact that some of them are not experienced at the right time but in anything this big we get it worked out. But we go through hell to make it happen. We went through absolute hell here at headquarters over the Kampuchea thing. There was blood, sweat and tears at headquarters and in the field when everything always rolled out, we were bearably on time, we got the money rolling in, reports being done properly and accepted properly, we'd call in other agencies with all their different ways of doing things, they were co-ordinated in the field in the different styles of centralization and de-centralization

and it's the UNICEF spirit because the leaders that we had in the field were not UNICEF men. There was Sir John Saunders of UNDP, there was Sir John Kelly of UNHCR, there was Kurt Jonnson, UNDP - I mean here we have people from other agencies coming on board, getting by somehow by this UNICEF ?? ?? as they do exactly the same way. John Saunders, I see him and went down to have a drink with him, he's more bloody UNICEF than UN. But you know they made it happen, they made it happen our way.

Charnow: Well, to get back to the idea, what were the patterns that we learned in Kampuchea that took over in Lebanon.

Walker: Co-ordination. And I am talking about in-house. When Kampuchea started as a result of the Vietnamese boat people, they were going on just at the same time or one ?? ?? followed the other, and it happened the 4th of July weekend. Beaumont was going in with ?? ?? from ICRC, to have it all set up, and this was getting organized, getting worked out, but the boat people from Viet Nam and the Kampuchea area were coming in, they were coming through the border and we got involved in this. I know I was on vacation and Charles was here and Michelle Scandalle was the chief of the programme desk, there was nobody else here. During the course of the next two weeks Smitthik - we got him back on board and we had Knut Christenson was sent out there to ramrod or co-ordinate this boat people business. Knut got really side-tracked out there by the Hamanna (?), I don't know, I don't know the story about that one. Anyway, he was put out in left field, but the boat people story got

overtaken by the impact of Kampuchea after Jack ?? ?? came out in the first two trips in August. But Henry Labouisse seemed to me very keenly aware of what we were likely to be heading for, because I used to have a meeting with him every morning before the start of the day, and there was just he and I that was going in, in the very beginning, then Dick Heyward sort of came in because, well we called in all sorts of people in the very beginning. I know we used to have meetings in the evening under the top end and Martin Sandberg was - I can't remember what he was doing, and Glen Davis was here, so there was a sort of lot of senior involvement in sort of the discussions about what we ought to be doing but it was primarily a sort of relationship with Labouisse myself. Then Dick Heyward was brought on because Labouisse had other things to do, and again for quite some time it was a morning affair with Dick Heyward and myself, but I realized that this was getting bigger and bigger and so what I did was set up, we formed a sort of task-force of a representative of each of the divisions so that we had programme and fund-raising and public information, the comptrollers division and this was how I got to know Tony Bloomberg, Tony Hewett, of course Dave Halliday, but we had this team and I know I took over the programme division conference room and there was nobody here and we had nowhere else to go, we just had this conference room. Then it started to get bigger and bigger and bigger and Dick Heyward would have to go on assignment and Charles came on board, but just at that time, Dick Heyward said why don't we set up an operations room and we got a lot of young people on board to help because it was getting - there were other things going on. We had a couple of young programme officers come

from the field, Ed Baninger (?) was one of them, the other one left, he left after Christmas, and Laura Lopez Lising came in. But we had this meeting every morning and it got bigger and bigger as the programme got bigger and bigger until eventually at the meetings we were having the directors of divisions, all except programme. Hyman Wittrin used to be at the meeting, Giovanni Cavaglia used to be at the meetings with their other support staff, and I can remember one meeting that I lost out at - it seemed that the whole bloody UNICEF was in the meeting, we had it in the Supply Division conference room and that was the team effort that really made things work. It relieved people of a lot of problems, - we still couldn't keep up, but programme funding were doing their own thing. Everybody participated in the management of this emergency and then it broke down. Charles is not an operational man, he is the talker and the doer and the traveller and the ?? ?? , so he and I automatically - I stayed on the operations side and he did all the conceptual programming and meetings with the big people. That's how we went.

When Lebanon started we had a couple of days where Richard Jolly was there and then Richard left and Maggie was brought in and this is what we set up, we did exactly the same thing. The first day with Maggie I can remember the end of the very first evening, we had a little meeting with some of the team and I said we've got to have our task force and we've got to start a daily sit-rep and the first sit-rep we prepared, Laura Lopez-Lising was there but didn't say anything but we were all walking around Maggie's office, Maggie was

sitting there typing it. She was sitting there typing away and I laughed and said here is the Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF acting as secretary and here I am dictating, and that is how we got started and we did the same thing and it worked. We had UNICEF working as a team, where before it was always left to the Emergency Co-ordinator and if I wanted anything done I had to go down and see Dave Halliday or I used to go and see Giovanni, used to have to physically go and do things rather than getting them on board. That was, I think, a good thing that came out of Kampuchea.

Charnow: Yes, but wasn't there also a kind of feeling that our handling of these, and our preoccupation with this was so great that it took up so much time and energy and attention from the regular operations.

Walker: Jack, I can't answer that. Yes, I think it took attention away, but did it take attention away in ... did it affect UNICEF programmes in any way, shape or form? If UNICEF programmes anywhere in the world suffered as a result of our attention in Kampuchea or was it that it became so big, it became UNICEF and Kampuchea became synonymous for a time being and it was the sort of upsetness of ... Now you see one thing, and I told the programme director, Assadi, now Assadi was on that course, the very first course and I told him, afterwards, I said, "Of all of the directors, it was programme directors, it was programme division that never ever came to us, never talked to us." I always felt, in the very beginning, Ralph wasn't here a great deal, but when he was I used to go and report to him because I felt Heyward and Labouisse had taken the emergency office away from the programme

division and attached it to its office because he said for the time being we were going to be so involved it would save having to go in a round-about way, we could do things directly - this was the position that he took. Eckert and Assadi I think were upset. I don't know whether it was the feeling of exclusion or whatever, but the fact is they all came back and with the permission of Heyward, we'd taken over the conference room that they had hardly used and we turned it into an operation room, we had our own telex, we put everything in there that was for the Kampuchea emergency - we had our whole operation in there when they came back. This is why, I think, that there was some, perhaps a lot of talk, probably from other our colleagues in the field that UNICEF's intention was focussing on Kampuchea. And I think to a large degree it was. I think Labouisse gave more time to it than he should have done as Executive Director. I don't think it mattered that Charles was on board, because Richard Jolly was coming into the picture at that time, although he had no physical involvement. We had basically a representation from each of the divisions, but no more than any sort of big programme should have. It was the biggest thing that UNICEF has been involved in in terms of money as a programme, within the time

END OF TAPE I, SIDE II

Walker: (continued) involved in, and I think also, it was again another first for UNICEF in the involvement so deeply and closely with other agencies. While we were in association with FAO and WFP, in our sort of traditional programming, here we were absolutely in each other's pockets, I think our contacts were virtually on a daily basis by telephone with their senior management and I believe it sort of developed relationships that could be drawn upon and to enhance the regular type relationships.

Charnow: What about UNDRO?

Walker: Well, UNDRO has been outside the Kampuchea operation since the inception of the emergency situation. I think, to their annoyance, that they had no operational mandate for Kampuchea because it was a country run by a non-recognized authority, not recognized by the UN authority, so maybe this is the problem that the UN itself should look at. It does all the time point to me that UNICEF must be the unique, if that is a word, of all of the UN system. We have no bars to what we seem to be able to do and I think also the organization has within itself, despite our internal bickering, there is a team spirit that comes to the fore. It reminds me of the old British army - as long as they are complaining there is no worry, it is when they start praying that you have a problem.

Charnow: Well, you talked about the co-ordination pattern here in New York. How does our European Office fit into this?

Walker: Not very smoothly. I'll try to explain what I mean. Strategically I believe UNICEF headquarters is very badly located for emergency situations other than for the American continent - the Latin American, South American and North American continent. The rest of the world is more in tune in a time frame with Europe than it is with here. As an example, if you need to work with Lebanon you have to do it between 6-7 a.m. if you want to be in touch with them during the end of their working day, because of their working hours and the time differential. The knowledge of an emergency is always available in Europe before it is here. This was one of the assets that I developed for myself, was to have a short wave radio so that I could listen to the European news broadcasts, because sure as there be little chickens (??) the emergency started when we were either in bed or at the end of our working day or on a Friday when we were closing - and it was always available in Europe before it was here. So, quite frequently Headquarters could be out of the picture - things could have happened and we would not have even known.

I have an example - it was the tidal wave that hit Ceylon, I don't remember what year it was. But it happened on a Friday in Ceylon and the first news of it came on Friday evening, New York time 8:00, and the news that was available in Europe - the news broadcast. Ralph Eckert and I were in touch on Friday evening at 8:00, and Ralph tried constantly to get in touch with our representative, who was Ignatieff at the time, on the Friday and the Saturday morning. We came into the office on the Saturday morning. We got Arne Jensen organizing Copenhagen to be prepared, to have a stand-by team available for

Saturday, and by Saturday afternoon we had been in contact with Ignatieff, learned of what his first initial leads were and translated this by telephone to Copenhagen, documented it by a cable that was prepared on Saturday afternoon here in the office with Ralph Eckert and sent to Copenhagen. Copenhagen worked on the Sunday, Monday the aircraft was secured and it was delivered to Sri Lanka I believe on Tuesday, at the time when the Prime Minister had got all the agencies together, were talking, were coming up with what their needs were and I think it shows that UNICEF can do this sort of thing and the supplies that we sent in were the traditional supplies that are always going to be needed in situations like flood, there was some supplementary food, and oral rehydration salts, medical kits, things of this nature.

So this shows to me that Headquarters is strategically poorly located for emergency situations, so therefore we ought to have some monitoring device if we want to be on the ball, because quite often it has got to be Headquarters to contact the field office about an emergency, because of the problems they have with communication. A classic example is Lebanon. All of the contacts with Lebanon was initiated by Headquarters, all of the voice contact was initiated from here because we could get through and even in the bad days, the telex was done by here by the woman in the operations room - the cable room, the efforts that she tried and we used commercial telecommunication, so headquarters has got to play quite an important role.

Charnow: Well, what is your suggestion about meeting this problem that you began talking about when I mentioned our European office?

Walker: Oh, yes, well the European office should have more of a role, but there was probably, I don't know, an identity crisis, the seat of decision-making is here. Once there was the UN involved, however all of the communications with all of the agencies and the countries was so much more easily accomplished from Europe. A) ICRC's headquarters is there, WFP, UNHCR, FAO - they are all in Europe. Kampuchea is on that half of the hemisphere, so the time differential is so much easier to work with, we are here really out of the picture for communications. We overcame these things, but we could have used Geneva a lot more than we did. I think we should try and improve the communication link almost by having like a Watts line telephone if you like, because one doesn't think about money when you dial the telephone when you dial the telephone to here, there and everywhere. You do consciously, or sub-consciously think, 'is it absolutely essential, I'm dialing now, maybe I could get some more information'. Whereas it would be better to have an open line so that they are involved almost on the minute by minute business in the picture. Maybe if we could get our Wang improved where we've got video communication as well, this is what I'm thinking. Maybe they should be involved more during the working day that we have or where we have an overlap time.

Charnow: Well, do you think there needs to be a person there also responsible?

Walker: Well there is. Yes, you see Don Shields, who was there in the ?? ?? days, now Don and I could both work together in Kampuchea, in Bangladesh, also Acquel(?) was about and he was there. So we did keep them involved, but we could have had them more involved, but to a large degree they were side-tracked when Charles would call ICRC and do the work from here when it might have been maybe better if it had been worked, if it had been done by the office acting as the sort of representative of headquarters. But I wouldn't mind betting right at this very moment that the emergency unit that Geneva office is probably not in the picture at all.

Charnow: Now, would you like to say something about the Lebanon situation?

Walker: OK. Going on to, while I'm still talking about this business of the leading agency ... one of the key issues in any emergency is communications. And invariably this is quite the most problematic, because communication gets affected by whatever the emergency situation is, like in a military operation obviously there is - I mean I think we are physically cut off, they just don't want communications out. I know from down in South Lebanon there the Israelis just wouldn't have it. There is also the problem that the break-down of communications as a result of the emergency situation and the disaster itself. We don't have any back-up. Now this is so feasible by single side band radio for ham radios communication all over the world. For example, the King of Jordan has his own ham radio station and people talk to him, ?? ?? voice content.

In emergency situations we cannot get cut off. ?? ??
Frances Smellek told me that the contact with the outside world was
with ham radios when Managua happened. We don't build on this. Now
this is feasible and practical. There is a co-ordinating station in
Chicago, but we never did anything about this. We don't have any
alternative radio communication ?? ?? from Lebanon.

Charnow: The UN system doesn't.

Walker: When we're broken down the UN system is broken down. All we needed
was communication with Cyprus, which is ?? ?? and then you
are back on the system again because they've got a UNDP office and
all the telephones in the world. Obviously we couldn't do anything
through Damascus, communications with Israel wouldn't be able to be
used there, all we needed was to bridge that short gap, but we
couldn't. So, you know you can become incommunicado by just such a
problem as this. I think the UN should think about it. Maybe each
representative's office has a single side band radio and this is part
of the agreement that we have with every government, just like the
basic agreement that the United Nations can have this emergency radio
link with the outside world if it is cut off militarily, humanly or
whatever, just so that communications can go on. It is for the
benefit of the country as much as anything because our only reason
for communication is to try and co-ordinate relief for emergency
support.

Charnow: To what extent have we made use of the communications facilities of various embassies in countries when they ... couldn't we use them in emergencies?

Walker: We can, but again this has not been developed to the point that it could. Now in the days of Bangladesh we used the American communication when ours was not working for some reason. As a matter of fact it gave the US a bit of a problem because they got criticized for this ?? . Anyway, no we don't look in enough to this, this is something we should build upon but there again you need more than one string for your fiddle, because like in Lebanon, nobody would go near the French embassy because you never knew when they were going to blow the bloody place up. Also the American embassy. People really stayed away from them. But yes, this is something that we should get set up is that we can programme our traffic through - this has got to be done very properly because our traffic, god it gets awful when we get an emergency going on. The stuff comes in, pads of it. But we need to look at that, that's one aspect that we should look at.

Anyway, going on the Lebanon, again I think we should do an evaluation because I think that we are not doing anything wrong but what we are doing is such that we are making it very easy for the country to follow its own political unrest because they know that outside agencies are looking after these aspects. I mean the fact that displaced people appear on the scene, oh well, UNICEF and the UN are going to look after them. All the monies and efforts we put into

repairing and rebuilding schools, we get them finished and then they get taken over again because usually schools are uninhabited at the time the emergency breaks out because it's usually in that hot, summer period of time when all things get irritated and people start shooting each other, all the displaced people appear, they go and take over the schools, they chuck out all the furniture, it gets smashed up, all the toilet and sanitary fixtures get smashed and broken, and the place is a wreck by the time they leave it. There is shortage of money in Lebanon, I mean everybody drives a Mercedes whether they are a displaced person or not and they come down with all their bedding and all of their stuff, but the things they forget, which I think is probably human, they don't think about what are they going to drink, how they are going to cook their food, all these sorts of things, how they are going to keep themselves warm. So this is where the emergency assistance comes in. Every time we have to provide containers, basic foods, cooking utensils, blankets, - we didn't do it this year but they were talking about providing kerosene heaters - I think we bought some 200 of them. But, they all go back and then all this work has got to be done again. We're doing so much repetitive work, and we are also doing work that - well I know Victor has gone on record to tell CDR, Dr. Atolla (?) the government that UNICEF is going to finish this reconstruction programme at the end of this year. However I understand that Dr. Atolla has been to see Grant and Washington and everybody is of the idea that this continuity - we have the experience, we are good at what we are doing but I don't think we are doing it as efficiently as we could do it, but here is a classic example of doing something that we shouldn't be

doing. I mean rebuilding schools and building multi-million dollar hospitals, we're really out of our field I think. I mean the amount of money that is going into Lebanon with the population of the few that it has, per capita the cost is ...

Charnow: You are also questioning the long-range effectiveness of what we are doing?

Walker: Yes, because you see again, of money that is going into Lebanon with the population of the few that it has, per capita the cost is ...

Walker: Yes because you see again ... I don't know why it's ... Jack I can't answer. It is like the black, unmarried woman that gets screwed and has 15 million kids and can get anything, she can have a cadillac, she has social security coming out of her ears, the more she screws around the more money she is going to get, so it makes one wonder why the hell do you want to go out and get yourself a job and do everything right. I think it is the same ?? ?? such as Lebanon. All of this assistance is being plumbed in, it is done and then half destroyed, broken up. The mountains of times we have repaired water, we have supplied alternate sources of electrical power because they keep breaking up the electrical power, we keep providing the generators at a very high cost, to keep the water pumping in the water stations. It is all curative stuff that we are doing, we're doing the curative stuff and as a result they won't get down and organize their country again.

I know you could say well, you know we are saving lives and we are giving people safe water to drink, and at one time or another they will settle down. But all of this at what cost. Maybe it makes it easy for them to not have to worry about these things. If all of a sudden, they are all Lebanese but they're either Druids, or Sheites or Christians or whatever, Lebanon is still Lebanon, it is theirs. If they see that they are tearing the thing to pieces themselves and nobody is going to come in and bloody well help them maybe they will decide to get together and stop all of this and find another way of finding a solution.

The Minister of Health, a very nice fellow, very impressive, we all were very impressed with him when he comes here, but he comes in and sits down and wants to get this, that and the other and sort of programming ?? . This last batch of pricing, when we got it back, \$4 million dollars or something went into this emergency, I mean really emergency. Pouring more and more money into this big sink hole and here we've got this \$32 million dollar programme of rehabilitation of which we're finally spending the money, this is two years old. This is why I say, maybe we should have a look at our policies and our roles in emergencies. The Board doesn't want us to become an emergency agency - we do it, but we do it very well, but sometimes I think we do too much. It becomes too easy.

Charnow: Well, I think with that interesting comment perhaps we might leave it for today to revert, when we meet again, to a discussion of some specific experiences and lessons to be drawn from it for our work in the future in this field. So, thank you very much.